not a little to facilitate the advancement of the pupil, to propose, at the analysis of each duty, a few questions in casuistry, and then let the whole scholars try their skill in disentangling themselves from the puzzle. Not alone because this manner of sharpening the judgment is the very best adapted to the capacity of beginners, but especially because it is man's nature to acquire a liking and relish for studies he is at length well versant in, and has urged to the grade of science; and thus the pupil is unawares drawn over, by unsuspected steps, to the interests of morality.

But it is of the very last moment, in all education, not to mix up and amalgamate the religious with the moral catechism; and yet of higher, not to suffer "that" to precede "this," but always to endeavour, with the greatest diligence and detail, to bring the understanding to the clearest insight in ethical topics; for, when the case is otherwise, RELIGION slides imperceptibly, and in the sequel into HYPOCRISY; and mankind is driven by fear, to lie in the face of his own conscience, an acknowledgment of duties in which his heart takes no share.

APOTOME II.

THE ASCETIC EXERCISE OF ETHICS.

§ 54.

The rules for the exercise of virtue, are intended to bring about and establish these two moods or frames of mind, viz. to make it (1) HARDY and (2) CHEERFUL in the discharge of duty. Virtue has to combat obstacles, for the vanquishing of which she has to rally all her forces; and is also sometimes summoned to quit and yield up the joys of life, the loss of which may well sadden the soul, and might even make it dark and sulky. But he who does not do, what he has to do with alacrity, but renders the servile services of bondage, finds no inward worth in the obeying of the law, but dislikes it; and will shun as much as possible all occasions of observing it.

The culture of virtue, i. e. the ethical ascetics, has, in regard of its first element, i. e. for the valiant, dauntless indefatigable practice of virtue, no other than the old watchword of the Stoa (aviyoυ xαι αTεyou, bear and forbear). BEAR, endure the evils of life without complaint; FORBEAR, abstain from its superfluous enjoyments. This is a kind of diatetics, enabling man to keep himself ethically in health. Health however is, after all, only a negative satisfaction, and is not itself capable of being made sensible. Something must be superadded (viz. the second element) to make us taste the sweet amenity of life, and which must still be only moral. This is the having a serene, gay, and ever joyous heart, according to the sen

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timent of the virtuous Epicurus. And who, indeed, can have more reason to be contented with himself, and gay ; nay, who so able, even to regard it as a duty owed by him to himself, to transplant himself into a serene and joyous frame of mind, and to make it habitual, as he who is aware of no wilful transgression, and knows himself secured against a lapse (hic murus aheneus esto)? The anti-part of all this, however, is the ascetic exercise of the monasteries, which, inspired by superstitious fear, and

• A reply made by Kant to Schiller may belong to this place. The common objection in Germany to Kant's Ethics is, that it is too rigoristical; and the poet, in his paper on grace and decorum, affirms that Kant's ideas of duty and obligation are best fitted to produce monastic manners, being subversive of all physical grace, and proper only for slaves. Here is the answer of the philosopher. He distinguishes betwixt the idea duty and the beneficial effects of virtue. The first admits of no grace, on account of the awe and sense of the sublime, which follow on its representation; the sublime disdaining charms and embellishment as only proper to the beautiful: but permanent effects of active virtue on him who has fulfilled his duty, may be, and often are, advantageous, and appear as graceful and decorous.

"So that were the question put, which then is the right determination of the sensory wherewith duty is to be obeyed? i. e. what is the TEMPERAMENT of virtue, valiant, and by consequence joyous? or anxious and dejected? Scarce any answer would be needed; so slavish a state and tone of soul never can be, where the law itself is not hated; and the glad and joyous heart, on the execution of duty (not complacency in recognising it) betokens that the virtuous sentiments are genuine, -nay, is the test that piety is real,-piety consisting not in the self-reproachings of a whiring sinner (a state of mind I look upon as exceedingly equivocal, and which is, for the most part, the man's inward upbraidings at having erred against a dictate of prudential expediency), but in the stedfast, unfaultering determination to make the matter better in all time to come. And this purpose gaining in life and force by the constancy wherewith the ascetic knows he has adhered to it, must needs effectuate a joyful disposition. Apart from which, no one can be certain that he loves good, i. e. has adopted it into his maxims." (Kant's Religion, p. 11.) TR.

the hypocritical discsteem of a man's own self, sets to work with self-reproaches, whimpering compunction, and a torturing of the body, and is intended not to result in virtue, but to make expurgation for sins, where, by selfimposed punishment, the sinners expect to do penance, instead of ethically repenting of them (i. e. merely forsaking them by the undecaying energy of the representation of the law); but this custom of imposing and executing punishment upon a man's own self (which encloses a contradiction,-punishment demanding the sentence of another), cannot beget that hilarity which goes hand in hand with virtue, and would rather tend to engender a covert hatred of the behests of duty. All ethical gymnastic consists, therefore, singly in the subjugating the instincts and appetites of our physical system, in order that we remain their master in any and all circumstances hazardous to morality; a gymnastic exercise rendering the will HARDY and ROBUST, and which, by the consciousness of regained freedom, MAKES THE HEART GLAD. To feel compunction, is inevitable on the remembrance of former sins,—it is even a duty not to suffer it to fade on such reminiscence; but this compunction, and the infliction of a penance, such as fasting, are totally distinct and disparate ethical operations, the latter whereof, understood not in a diatetical, but pious sense, is cheerless, sad, and gloomy, makes virtue hateful, and scares away her supporters. The discipline exercised by man upon himself, can only by its attendant hilarity and alacrity become welcome and exemplary.

CONCLUSION OF THE ETHICS.

RELIGION, AS A DOCTRINE OF THE DUTIES OWED TO GOD, FALLS BEYOND THE BOUNDARY OF PURE MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

Although the last result obtained in our inquiry into the reach and extent of the a priori operations of human understanding was, that speculative reason declared the existence of God problematical; yet the belief in God being here admitted, and it being farther admitted, that the doctrine of religion is an integral part of the general system of the offices, the question now raised respects the determining the boundary of the SCIENCE, whereof it is part. Are we to regard it as belonging to morals (to law in no event, for the rights of man cannot comprehend it)? or is it to be considered as falling out of and beyond the domains of pure moral philosophy?

The formal of religion, explained to be "the aggregate of our duties, AS IF THEY WERE divine commandments," belongs to the philosophy of morals; since it expresses singly the relation obtaining betwixt reason and that idea of God itself evolves, and the duty to have religion is not thereby made any duty owed by us toward God, as a being existing out of and beyond our own ideas; for we expressly abstract from such existence. That all human duties must be cogitated agreeably to this form (by referring them to a Divine a priori Will), rests on a ground subjectively logical only. We cannot easily depicture to ourselves in thought, obligation (ethical necessitation), except by figuring to ourselves another and His will—God, -whose vicegerent is our universally legislative reason; but this duty in relation to the Divinity (strictly in rela