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him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express himself, that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine: his words are these: "Immanitati autem consentaneum "est opponere eam, quæ supra humanitatem est, "heroicam sive divinam virtutem:" and a little after, "Nam ut feræ neque vitium neque virtus "est, sic neque Dei: sed hic quidem status altius “quiddam virtute est, ille aliud quiddam a vitio." And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan in his funeral oration; where he said, "that men needed to make "no other prayers to the gods, but that they would "continue as good lords to them as Trajan had "been;" as if he had not been only an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting upon their souls charity, which is excellently called the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together. And it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a false imitation of divine love, "Amor melior sophista lævo ad humanam vitam," that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist or preceptor; which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules and precepts, he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can
certainly, if a man's mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay further, as Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, though they raise the mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses; but only love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle and compose it so in all other excellencies, though they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess; only charity admitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring to be like God in power, the angels transgressed and fell; Ascendam, et ero similis Al"tissimo:" by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; "Eritis sicut Dii, scientes "bonum et malum:" but by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that imitation we are called: "Diligite inimicos "vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, et orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos, ut "sitis filii Patris vestri qui in cœlis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super justos et injustos." So in the first platform of the divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, "Optimus Maximus:" and the sacred Scriptures thus, "Misericordia ejus super omnia opera ejus."
Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning the culture and regimen of
the mind; wherein if any man, considering the parts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to collect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted by others, as matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well. But as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, "You may not marvel, Athenians, "that Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh "water, and I drink wine;" and like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of sleep,
"Sunt gemine somni portæ : quarum altera fertur
Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:
"Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,
"Sed falsa ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes:"
so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor of wine is the more vaporous, and the braver gate of ivory sendeth forth the falser dreams.
But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth of body and spirit. Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth to be a relation or conformity between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For as we divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and pleasure; so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without perturbation; beautiful, and graced with
decency; and strong and agile for all duties of life. These three, as in the body, so in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy to observe, that many have strength of wit and courage, but have neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings: some again have an elegancy and fineness of carriage, which have neither soundness of honesty, nor substance of sufficiency and some again have honest and reformed minds, that can neither become themselves, nor manage business: and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure, we have likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to stupidity, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it, than in the strength and vigour of it.
CIVIL Knowledge is conversant about a subject which of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the censor said, "that the Romans were like sheep, "for that a man might better drive a flock of them, "than one of them; for in a flock, if you could get "but some few to go right, the rest would follow :" so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an external goodness; for that as to society sufficeth. And therefore it cometh oft to pass that there be evil times in good governments for so we find in the holy story, when the
kings were good, yet it is added, " Sed adhuc popu"lus non dexerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum "patrum suorum." Again, states, as great engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of frame: for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so governments, for a time well grounded, do bear out errours following: but the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted. These respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge.
This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary actions of society; which are Conversation, Negotiation, and Government. For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection: and they be three wisdoms of divers natures, which do often sever; wisdom of the behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state.
The wisdom of Conversation ought not to be over much affected, but much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an influence also into business and government. The poet saith, "Nec vultu destrue verba tuo:"
a man may destroy the force of his words with his countenance: so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his brother affability and easy access; "Nil interest habere ostium apertum, vul"tum clausum;" it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and to receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. So, we see, Atticus, before the first interview between Cesar and Cicero, the war depending, did seriously advise Cicero touching