speak of the hand's seile, that gave the first money. 66 The fader Eneas astonyst wox sum dele, His hands baith vphevis towart the hevyn, O Jupiter Gif ony thyng behind zit dois remane, Wyth this zour happy takin auguriane, Zeild us zour plesand rest syne and ferme pece, G. Douglas's Virgil, fol. 476. 1. 36. VI. "TRUTH is the third person singular of "the indicative Trow. It was formerly written Troweth, Trowth, Trouth, and Troth. And it "means (aliquid, any thing, something) that which one troweth, i. e. thinketh or firmly believeth. "TRUE as we now write it; or TREW as it was formerly written; means simply and merely"that which is trowed. 66 66 "That every man in his communication with "others, should speak that which he troweth is of "so great importance to mankind, that it ought "not to surprize us, if we find the most extravaIgant praises bestowed upon truth. But truth 66 66 66 supposes mankind: for whom and by whom alone "the word is framed, and to whom only it is apapplicable. If no man, no truth. There is "therefore no such thing as eternal, immutable, Ieverlasting truth, unless mankind, such as they "are at present, be also eternal, immutable, and everlasting. Two persons may contradict each other, and yet both speak truth: for the truth 66 66 66 66 66 "of the one may be opposite to the truth of another. To speak truth may be a vice as well as a virtue for there are many occasions where “it it ought not to be spoken."-Vol. ii. p. 402-3-8. As we do not know that words are used by any other beings but man, we may say of every other word as well as truth, that it supposes mankind, " for whom and by whom alone the word is formed." He adds, "and to whom only it is applicable." Is this a deduction from the premises, that is, because the word was formed for and by man alone? Then the same will hold of every other word, and we may say - If no man, no Earth; if no man, no God for Earth and God suppose mankind, for whom and by whom alone "the words" are formed, and to whom only they are therefore applicable. Or is it because man alone can trow, that Truth is applicable to mankind only? Why may not other beings trow as well as man? Or who has a right to say that they can or cannot? If they can, there may be Truth (troweth) or belief, (supposing the word to have no other meaning,) "though men were none.' I do not mean to dispute Mr. Tooke's etymology of Truth, or to say that the word is never used in that which, according to him, is its only sense : but how often does it happen that the whole, or the precise meaning of a word, cannot be ascertained from its etymology? Suppose a foreigner were made acquainted with all the Anglosaxon and English verbs, and their participles, illustrated in the second volume of The Diversions of Purley, and were told that their past participles are used as nouns in English: in how many cases would it be impossible for him to guess, to what "sub"audition" use had limited or appropriated them? For instance, how could he divine, that HEARSE, the past participle of "hyrstan, ornare, phalerare, "decorare," was applicable to an ornamented carriage but not to an ornamented lady, and to an ornamented carriage for the dead, not for the living? That he must say a person's drift, not his drove, in an argument; since both these words are past participles of the same verb to drive? That Field (felled) must be applied not to the trees that have been felled, but to the land where they grew? &c. It cannot then be said, on the strength of Etymology, that any word means, " simply and merely," what its origin or analogy may suggest. Mr. Tooke had told us a little before, that "the winds "as well as colours must have their name from some circumstances attending them;" but did not assert that they meant simply and merely those circumstances, that SOUTH was merely seething, &c. It is not with regard to sensible objects, that there is much danger of our being misled by Etymology: we have there better guides, and trust little to its glimmering light. It is in "the dim "discover'd tracts of mind," that there is any danger of our trusting too much to it; although it is there that etymology least deserves to be trusted to, because the language employed on intellectual subjects is mostly, if not altogether, figurative. Truth and Belief are connected somewhat as danger and fear: truth when we know it producing belief; as danger produces fear, where we may be affected by the contingent evil. There may be danger where there is no fear, because the danger is not known; and there may be fear where danger is not, but is thought to be. It is the same with truth and belief. It is not uncommon in conversation to hear it said, "There is no fear," when the meaning is, there is no danger- a mode of expression exactly similar to calling truth belief or troweth, putting the effect for the cause. Other instances of the same trope will readily occur, as complaint or disease for bodily disorder or malady, Laus for virtus, "sunt sua præmia laudi"; Dearth * for scarcity, &c. I therefore think Mr. Tooke's etymology of Truth and True sufficiently probable: but his conclusion, that True is simply and merely what is trowed, is no wise superior to this, that danger is simply and merely what is feared; or that a sick man's complaint is merely his cries and groans; South merely seething, what seeths or is seethed. * I have been led to some results, which may possibly be considered as worthy of record in the present dearth of our knowledge in this branch of science. Journal of the Sciences and Arts, No. xi. Oct. 1818. The ideas of Benefits and Obligations are so closely connected, that to do a man a kindness, and to oblige him, are used promiscuously as expressions of the same signification.-Balguy's Tracts, p. 113. The application of the same name, to the qualities in bodies which we call Heat and Cold, and to the sensations excited by them, is perhaps an instance of the same trope or figure of speech: as, indeed, a conclusion has been drawn from it, very similar to that which Mr. Tooke draws from his etymology of the word Truth-That the words Heat and Cold denote simply and merely sensations; and, consequently, if there were no man or sentient being, there could be neither Heat nor Cold. But though the supposed etymological is not the only sense of the word, it is not disputed that instances may still be found, where Truth is used to denote simply and merely belief. Perhaps the following is one : Naie old chorle, by God thou shalt not so, n til me et oth Al H M Chaucer. The Pardoner's Tale, fol. 65. p. 2. col. 1. Но just M Ho Cr Speaking according to one's belief is by Locke called Moral Truth. "Besides Truth taken in the strict sense before mentioned, there are other sorts of truths; as, "1. Moral Truth, which is speaking of things "according to the persuasion of our own minds, 66 though the proposition we speak agree not to "the reality of things," &c. Ac on his yet b Fre or ce iln'y Lad Omer |