attack; but the Sieur de Palisse, at the head of a strong detachment, having availed himself of the services of the neighbouring peasants, surprised him whilst he was seated at table, and having dispersed his troops, made him and several of his chief officers prisoners. * This unexpected and disgraceful event, by which a great and experienced commander, in whose abilities and integrity the allied powers had the fullest confidence, was lost to their cause, added to the successes of Aymer de Prie, spread a sudden panic throughout the country, and was more particularly felt by the pope, who, relying on the courage and vigilance of the Swiss, had flattered himself that the French would not be able to force their way into Italy.

As the measures in which Leo had concurred for the public defence had been adopted rather through compulsion, than from any hostile disposition to the French monarch, for whom he still continued to profess the highest regard; so the earnest of success which Francis had already obtained, induced him to relax still further in his opposition, lest he should eventually exasperate the young monarch beyond all hope of reconciliation. Hitherto the troops of the church had taken no other part in the contest than such as appeared necessary for the protection of the papal territories. Unable to support the fatigues of a camp, Giuliano de' Medici had been attacked by a slow fever, in consequence of which he relinquished the command of the Roman troops to his nephew Lorenzo, and retired to Florence, in hopes of deriving advantage to his health from the air of his native place. Three days after the capture of Colonna, Lorenzo arrived at Modena, between which place and Reggio he stationed his troops; the only active service which he had performed having been the expulsion of Guido Rangone from the fortress of Rubiera. In this situation it became a subject of serious deliberation with the pope, whether he should order, the Roman and Florentine troops to hasten and join the Swiss, who were obliged to retire before the French in all directions, or should avail himself of the opportunity which might yet remain, of a reconciliation with the French monarch. In consulting his principal advisers,

* Murat. Ann. d'Ital. vol. x. p. 114.

he found at this important crisis a great diversity of opinion among them. The cardinal da Bibbiena, and other courtiers, actuated rather by their fears of the French, than by a deliberate consideration of the circumstances in which the Roman pontiff was placed, earnestly advised him to humiliate himself to the king. They represented to him that the duke of Ferara would undoubtedly seize this opportunity to recover the cities of Modena and Reggio, and that the Bentivoli would in like manner repossess themselves of Bologna; on which account it would be more prudent for the pope, rather to relinquish those places voluntarily, than by an obstinate and hopeless defence, to endanger the safety of the states of the church. This pusillanimous advice was, however, opposed by the firmness of the cardinal de' Medici, who having lately been appointed legate of Bologna, and conceiving that the disgrace of its surrender would be imputed to his counsels, exhorted the pope not to relinquish to its former tyrants one of the finest cities in the ecclesiastical state, nor to desert at such a crisis those noble and respectable inhabitants, who had adhered with such unshaken fidelity to his interests. These representations, which the cardinal enforced by frequent messengers from Bologna, are said to have had a great effect on the mind of the pope, who resolved not to surrender any part of his territories, until he was compelled to it by irresistible necessity. If, however, on the one hand he did not abandon himself to despair; on the other, he did not think it advisable to take the most conspicuous part among the allies in opposing the progress of the king, but directed his general, Lorenzo, to keep his station on the south of the Po. At the same time he despatched to Francis I. his confidential envoy, Cinthio da Tivoli, for the purpose of endeavouring, by the assistance of the duke of Savoy, to effect a new treaty; or at least for the purpose, as it has been with no small probability conjectured, that in case the monarch should prove successful, the pope might be found in open negotiation with him.*

Nor did the allies of the pope, the Swiss alone excepted, discover any greater inclination than himself to oppose the

* Ligue de Camb. liv. iv. vol. ii. p. 423. Guicciard. lib. xii. vol. ii. p. 92.

progress of the French. The emperor elect did not appear on this occasion either in his own person, or by his representatives. The viceroy Cardona, at the head of the Spanish army, after having long waited in vain at Verona for the reinforcements in men and money which Maximilian had promised to furnish, quitted that place, and proceeded to Piacenza, to join the troops under the command of Lorenzo de' Medici. In the mean time Francis had arrived with the remainder of his army at Turin, where he had met with a splendid reception from his near relation, Charles III. duke of Savoy. As the Swiss found themselves closely pressed by the French, and wholly unsupported by their allies, who ought to have felt a much greater interest in the cause than themselves, they listened to the representations of the duke of Savoy, who had endeavoured to effect a reconciliation between them and the king. Nor is it unlikely that his efforts would have been successful, had they not been frustrated by the remonstrances and exhortations of the cardinal of Sion, who being irreconcileably adverse to the cause of the French, and possessing great influence among his countrymen, stimulated them by every means in his power to persevere in the cause. He also repaired to Piacenza, where he prevailed on Cardona to furnish him with a supply of seventy thousand ducats, and a body of five hundred cavalry, under the command of Lodovico Orsino, count of Pitigliano, with which he returned to his countrymen; who, upon this reinforcement, rejected the overtures of the king, and determined to seize the first favourable opportunity of bringing him to a decisive engagement. The arrival, at this juncture, of fresh levies of their countrymen, confirmed them in this resolution; and although some of their leaders were still desirous of an accommodation, yet the increasing activity and energetic harangues of the cardinal, had inflamed their resentment to such a degree, that the greater part of the army breathed only war and revenge.1

During these negotiations, the Swiss had quitted Novara on the approach of the king, who, after a cannonade of some days, compelled the inhabitants to surrender, on terms which secured to them their safety and effects. He thence hastened to Pavia, which instantly surrendered to his arms, and passing the river Tesino, he despatched Trivulzio with the advanced

guard towards Milan, in expectation that the inhabitants would openly espouse his cause. In this, however, he was disappointed. The sufferings which they had experienced on the last incursion of the French had taught them the danger of a premature avowal of their sentiments, and they therefore determined to remain neutral, if possible, until the event of the contest was known. In order, however, to mitigate the resentment of the king, who had already advanced as far as Buffalora, they despatched an embassy to him, to entreat that he would not attribute their reluctance to obey his summons to any disrespect either to his person or government, but that after having suffered so much on a former occasion by their attachment to his predecessor, they trusted they should not now be called upon to adopt such a conduct as might expose them to the resentment of his enemies. The difficulty of their situation justified in the mind of the monarch the temporising neutrality which they professed; and with equal prudence and generosity he declared himself satisfied with their excuse.

From Buffalora the king proceeded to Abbiategrasso, whilst the Swiss assembled in great numbers at Gallerata. In this situation the duke of Savoy renewed his pacific negotiations, and having given audience to twenty deputies sent to him with proposals on the part of the Swiss, he so far coincided in their representations as to lay the foundation for a further treaty, for the completion of which he afterwards went to Gallerata, where the terms of the proposed reconciliation were explained and assented to. It was there agreed, that an uninterrupted peace should be established between the king and the Helvetic states, which should continue during his life, and ten years after his death; that the territories which the Swiss had usurped in the valleys of the Milanese should be restored, and the pension of forty thousand ducats paid to them from the state of Milan abolished; that the duke of Milan should have an establishment in France under the title of duke of Nemours, should ally himself by marriage to the reigning family, enjoy a pension of twelve thousand francs, and have an escort of fifty lances. For these concessions on the part of the Swiss, they were to receive six hundred thousand crowns, claimed by them under the treaty of Dijon, and three hundred thousand for the restoration of the valleys, retaining four thousand men in arms

*

for the service of the king. In this treaty the pope, in case he relinquished Parma and Piacenza, the emperor, the duke of Savoy, and the marquis of Monferrato, were included as parties and allies, but no mention was made either of his Catholic majesty or the Venetians, or of any other of the Italian states. The treaty was, however, no sooner concluded than it was broken, in consequence of the arrival of fresh bodies of Swiss, who, holding the French in contempt, refused to adhere to the conditions agreed upon; whereby such a diversity of opinion arose among them, that although the chief part of the army agreed to remain for the defence of Milan, great numbers quitted the field, and retired towards Como, on their return to their native country.

This defection of a part of the Swiss army was not, however, so important as to damp the ardour of the rest. A body of thirty-five thousand men, accustomed to victory, and inflamed with the expectations of an immense booty, presented a formidable barrier to the progress of the king. In retiring from Verona to Piacenza, Cardona had eluded the vigilance of the Venetian general D'Alviano, who having the command of an army of upwards of ten thousand men, had assured the king that he would find sufficient employment for the Spanish troops. No sooner, therefore, was he informed of the movements of Cardona, than he quitted his station in the Polesine, and passing the Adige, proceeded along the banks of the Po towards Cremona, with a celerity wholly unexampled in the commanders of those times, and which he was himself accustomed to compare to the rapid march of Claudius Nero, when he hastened to oppose the progress of Asdrubal. On the approach of D'Alviano, Francis proceeded to Marignano, for the purpose not only of affording the Venetian general an opportunity of joining the French army, but also of preventing the union of the Swiss with the Spanish and papal troops.

It may be admitted as a general maxim in the history of military transactions, that the efforts made by separate powers in alliance with each other are inferior to those made with equal forces by a single power. On such occasions the post of

* Guicciard. lib. xii. vol. ii. p. 92. Ligue de Camb. liv. v. vol. ii. p. 435.