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on of body, which is derived exclu-om the phenomenon; they may or be separable from the thing as it is

this explanation, it is manifest that Erine, that matter as a subject or um of attributes is unknown and ble, is totally different from that of etic idealism, with which Mr Mill

acy, not the substantial justice, of Mr. Mill's critive preferred to meet him on the ground he has himThe same error, of supposing that "presentationism" ith "noumenalism," and "phenomenalism" with "resm," runs through the whole of Mr. Stirling's recent Hamilton's theory of perception. It is curious, howhe very passage (Lectures, i., p. 146) which Mr. Mill ving that Hamilton, in spite of his professed phewas an unconscious noumenalist, is employed by Mr. rove that, in spite of his professed presentationism, he onscious representationist. The two critics tilt at om opposite quarters: he has only to stand aside and against each other.

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The Philosophy of the Conditioned. onfounds it; and that a philosopher may without inconsistency accept the former and eject the latter. The former, while it holds he material substance to be unknown, does ot deny that some of the attributes of natter are perceived immediately as material, hough, it may be, modified by contact with aind. The latter maintains that the attriutes, as well as the substance, are not perceived immediately as material, but meditely through the intervention of immaterial epresentatives.

It is also manifest that,

n answer to Mr. Mill's question, which of Hamilton's two "cardinal doctrines," Relaivity or Natural Realism, "is to be taken in non-natural sense," we must say, neither. "he two doctrines are quite compatible with ach other, and neither requires a non-natural

*

Examination, p. 23.

+ Examination, p. 20.

The Phil

interpretation

panion.

The doctrine

practical value

next great doct the incognisab Infinite. For into contact wi relation to thed practical impor

other two "i Kant calls the world, the que

as realities or a dealing with ce

but need not For we have attributes of phenomenal ol

'he doctrine of relativity derives its chief ctical value from its connection with the t great doctrine of Hamilton's philosophy, incognisability of the Absolute and the nite. For this doctrine brings Ontology contact with Theology; and it is only in tion to theology that ontology acquires a etical importance. With respect to the er two "ideas of the pure reason," as t calls them, the human soul and the ld, the question, whether we know them ealities or as phenomena, may assist us in ing with certain metaphysical difficulties, need not affect our practical conduct. we have an immediate intuition of the butes of mind and matter, at least as nomenal objects, and by these intuitions

The Ph

38

The Philosophy of the Conditioned.

may be tested the accuracy of the conceptions derived from them, sufficiently for all practical purposes. A man will equally avoid walking over a precipice, and is logically as consistent in avoiding it, whether he regard the precipice as a real thing, or as a mere phenomenon. But in the province of theology this is not the case. We have no immediate intuition of the Divine attributes, even as phenomena; we only infer their existence and nature from certain similar attributes of which we are immediately conscious in ourselves. And hence arises the question, How far does the similarity extend, and to what extent is the accuracy of our conceptions guaranteed by the intuition, not of the object to be conceived, but of something more or less nearly resembling it? But this is not all. Our knowledge of God, ori

ginally derive receives acces

from the exte

from revelati conclusions d compared tog arise between

in rejecting o

of the other third? or are

knowledge in

an imperfect are warranted ciliation may prevents us

Here at least

very highest of our previ voured to sh

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derived from personal consciousness, accession from two other sources

e external world, as His work; and evelation, as His word; and the ons derived from each have to be ed together. Should any discrepancy tween them, are we at once warranted ting one class of conclusions in favour other two, or two in favour of the or are we at liberty to say that our lge in respect of all alike is of such erfect and indirect character that we ranted in believing that some recon

may exist, though our ignorance s us from discovering what it is? t least is a practical question of the ghest importance. In the early part previous remarks, we have endeato show how this question has been

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