sensible Ideas; nor conceive any Alteration to be made, but by conceiving a Change of fome of its Ideas. Power active and paffive. : §. 2. Power thus confidered is twofold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive any Change; the one may be called aftive, and the other paf five Power. Whether Matter be not wholly destitute of active Power, as its Author GOD is truly above all passive Power; and whether the intermediate State of created Spirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and paffive Power, may be worth Confideration. I shall not now enter into that Enquiry, my present Business being not to search into the Original of Power, but how we come by the Idea of it. But since attive Powers make so great a Part of our complex Ideas of natural Substances, (as we shall see hereafter) and I mention them as fuch, according to common Apprehenfion; yet they being not perhaps so truly active Powers as our hafty Thoughts are apt to represent them, I judge it not amiss by this Intimation, to direct our Minds to the Confideration of GOD and Spirits, for the clearest Idea of active Powers. §. 3. I confefs Power includes in it fome Kind Power includes of Relation, (a Relation to Action or Change) as indeed which of our Ideas, of what Kind foever, Relation. when attentively confidered, does not? For our Ideas of Extension, Duration, and Number, do they not all contain in them a fecret Relation of the Parts? Figure and Motion have fomething relative in them much more visibly; and fenfible Qualities, as Colours and Smells, &c. what are they but the Powers of different Bodies in relation to our Perception, &c.? And if confidered in the Things themselves, do they not depend on the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of the Parts? All which include some Kind of Relation in them. Our Idea therefore of Power, I think, may well have a Place amongst other fimple Ideas, and be confidered as one of them, being one of those that make a principal Ingredient in our complex Ideas of Substances; as we shall hereafter have occafion to observe. The clearest Power bad §. 4. We are abundantly furnished with the Idea of active Idea of pafssove Power by almost all Sorts of fenfible Things; in most of them we cannot avoid observing their sensible Qualities, nay, their very Substances, to be in a continual Flux; and therefore with Reason we look on them as liable still to the fame Change. Nor have we of active Power (which is the from Spirit. more I more proper Signification of the Word Power) fewer Instances; fince whatever Change is observed, the Mind must collect a Power somewhere able to make that Change, as well as a Poffibility in the Thing itself to receive it. But yet if we will confider it attentively, Bodies by our Senses do not afford us so clear an, distinct an Idea of active Power, as we have from Reflection on the Operations of our Minds; for all Power relating to Action, and there being but two Sorts of Action whereof we have any Idea, viz. Thinking and Motion, let us confider whence we have the clearest Ideas of the Powers which produce these Actions. 1. Of Thinking, Body affords us no Idea at all; it is only from Reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from Body any Idea of the Beginning of Motion. A Body at rest affords us no Idea of any active Power to move; and when it is set in Motion itself, that Motion is rather a Paffion than an Action in it; for when the Ball obeys the Stroke of a Billiard-stick, it is not any Action of the Ball, but bare Paffion: Also when by Impulse e it fets another Ball in Motion that lay in its Way, it only communicates the Motion it had received from another, and lofes in itself so much as the other received; which gives us but a very obscure Idea of an active Power of moving in Body, whilst we observe it only to transfer, but not produce any Motion: For it is but a very obscure Idea of Power, which reaches not the Production of the Action, but the Continuation of the Passion; for so is Motion in a Body impelled by another, the Continuation of the Alteration made in it from Rest to Motion being little more an Action, than the Continuation of the Alteration of its Figure by the fame Blow is an Action. The Idea of the beginning of Motion we have only from Reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by Experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a Thought of the Mind, we can move the Parts of our Bodies, which were before at reft: So that it seems to me, we have from the Observation of the Operation of Bodies, by our Senfes, but a very imperfect obscure Idea of active Power, fince they afford us not any Idea in themselves of the Power to begin any Action, either Motion or Thought. But if, from the Impulse Bodies are observed to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear Iea of Power, it serves as well to my Purpose, Sensation being one of those Ways whereby the Mind comes by its Ideas; only I thought it worth while to confider here by the way, whether the Mind doth not receive its Idea of active Power clearer from Reflection on its own Operations, than it doth from any external Senfation. §. 5. This Will and Understanding, two Powers. §. 5. This at least I think evident, that we find in ourselves a Power to begin or forbear, continue or end several Actions of our Minds, or and Motions of our Bodies, barely by a Thought or Preference of the Mind, ordering, or as it were commanding the doing or not doing such or fuch a particular Action. This Power, which the Mind has thus to order the Confideration of any Idea, the forbearing to confider it, or to prefer the Motion of any Part of the Body to its Rest, and vice verfa, in any particular Instance, is that which we call the Will. The actual Exercise of that Power, by directing any particular Action, or its Forbearance, is that which we call Volition, or Willing. The Forbearance of that Action, consequent to such Order or Command of the Mind, is called voluntary; and whatsoever Action is performed without such a Thought of the Mind, is called involuntary. The Power of Perception is that which we call the Understanding. Perception, which we make the Act of the Understanding, is of three Sorts. I. The Perception of Ideas in our Minds. 2. The Perception of the Signification of Signs. 3. The Perception of the Connexion or Repugnancy, Agreement or Disagreement, that there is between any of our Ideas. All these are attributed to the Underftanding, or perceptive Power, tho' it be the two latter only that Ufe allows us to say we understand. Faculties. §. 6. These Powers of the Mind, viz. of perceiving, and of preferring, are usually called by another Name; and the ordinary Way of speaking is, that the Understanding and Will are two Faculties of the Mind; a Word proper enough, if it be used, as all Words should be, fo as not to breed any Confufion in Men's Thoughts, by being supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for fome real Beings in the Soul that performed those Actions of Understanding and Volition. For when we say, the Will is the commanding and fuperior Faculty of the Soul'; that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior Faculties; that it follows the Dictates of the Understanding, &c. tho' these, and the like Expreffions, by those that carefully attend to their own Ideas, and conduct their Thoughts more by the Evidence of Things than the Sound of Words, may be understood in a clear and diftinct Sense; yet I fuspect, I say, that this way of speaking of Faculties, has mifled many into a confused Notion of so many distinct Agents in us, which had their several Provinces and Authorities, and did command, obey, and perform feveral Actions, as fo many diftinct Beings; which has been been no small Occasion of Wrangling, Obscurity, and Uncertainty in Questions relating them. Whence the §. 7. Every one, I think, finds in himself a Power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several Actions in himself. From the Confideration of the Extent of this Power of the Mind over the Actions of the Man, which every one finds in himself, arise the Ideas of Liberty and Neceffity. : berty and Neceffity. §. 8. All the Actions that we have any Idea of, reducing themselves, as has been faid, to Liberty, what. these two, viz. Thinking and Motion; so far as a Man has a Power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the Preference or Direction of his own Mind, fo far is a Man free. Wherever any Performance or Forbearance are not equally in a Man's Power; wherever doing or not doing, will not equally follow upon the Preference of his Mind directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the Action may be voluntary. So that the Idea of Liberty is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular Action, according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be produced by him according to his Volition, there he is not at Liberty; that Agent is under Neceffity. So that Liberty cannot be, where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Will; but there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no Liberty. A little Confideration of an obvious Instance or two may make this clear. Supposes the Understanding, and Will. §. 9. A Tennis-Ball, whether in Motion by the Stroke of a Racket, or lying still at Reft, is not by any one taken to be a free Agent. If we enquire into the Reason, we shall find it is, because we conceive not a Tennis-Ball to think, and consequently not to have any Volition, or Preference of Motion to Reft, or vice versa; and therefore has not Liberty, is not a free Agent; but all its both Motion and Reft come under our Idea of Neceffary, and are so called. Likewise a Man falling into the Water, (a Bridge breaking under him) has not herein Liberty, is not a free Agent. For though he has Volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the Forbearance of that Motion not being in his Power, the Stop or Cessation of that Motion follows not upon his Volition; and therefore therein he is not free. So a Man striking himself, or his Friend, by a convulfive Motion of his Arm, which it is not in his Power VOL. I. N by by Volition or the Direction of his Mind to stop, or forbear; no-body thinks he has in this Liberty; every one pities him, as acting by Neceffity and Constraint. Belongs not to §. 10. Again, suppose a Man be carried, whilft fast asleep, into a Room, where is a Person he longs to fee and speak with; and be there locked fast in, beyond his Power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himself in so defirable Company, which he stays willingly in, i. e. prefers his Stay to going away. I ask, Is not this Stay voluntary? I think no-body will doubt it; and yet being locked fast in, 'tis evident he is not at liberty not to stay, he has not Freedom to be gone. So that Liberty is not an Idea belonging to Volition, or Preferring, but to the Person having the Power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the Mind shall chuse or direct. Our Idea of Liberty reaches as far as that Power, and no farther. For wherever Restraint comes to check that Power, or Compulfion takes away that Indifferency of Ability on either side to act, or to forbear acting, there Liberty, and our Notion of it, presently ceases. Voluntary opposed to Involuntary, not to Neceffary. §. 11. We have Instances enough, and often more than enough, in our own Bodies. A Man's Heart beats, and the Blood circulates, which 'tis not in his Power by any Thought or Volition to stop; and therefore in respect of these Motions, where Rest depends not on his Choice, nor would follow the Determination of his Mind, if it should prefer it, he is not a free Agent. Convulfive Motions agitate his Legs, so that though he wills it ever so much, he cannot by any Power of his Mind stop their Motion, (as in that odd Disease called Chorea Sancti Viti) but he is perpetually dancing: He is not at liberty in this Action, but under as much Neceffity of moving, as a Stone that falls, or a Tennis-Ball struck with a Racket. On the other fide, a Palfy, or the Stocks, hinder his Legs from obeying the Determination of his Mind, if it would thereby transfer his Body to another Place. In all these there is Want of Freedom; though the fitting still even of a Paralytick, whilst he prefers it to a Removal, is truly voluntary. Voluntary then is not opposed to Necessary, but to Involuntary. For a Man may prefer what he can do, to what he cannot do; the State he is in, to its Abfence or Change, though Neceffity has made it in itself unalterable. §. 12. As it is in the Motions of the Body, fo Liberty, what. it is in the Thoughts of our Minds: where any one is such, that we have Power to take it up, of lay |