Page images
PDF
EPUB

(to which only my suspected compliment was intended) to be a most necessary step towards wisdom and true knowledge. From the innumerable and inveterate mistakes which have been made concerning it by the wisest philosophers and most diligent inquirers of all ages, and from the thick darkness in which they have hitherto left it, I imagine it to be one of the most difficult speculations. Yet, I suppose, a man of plain common sense may obtain it, if he will dig for it; but I cannot think that what is commonly called Learning, is the mine in which it will be found. Truth, in my opinion, has been improperly imagined at the bottom of a well: it lies much nearer to the surface though buried indeed at present under mountains of learned rubbish; in which there is nothing to admire but the amazing strength of those vast giants of literature who have been able thus to heap Pelion upon Ossa. This at present is only my opinion, which perhaps I have entertained too lightly. Since therefore the question has been started, I am pleased at this occasion of being confirmed or corrected by you; whose application, opportunities, extensive reading, acknowledged abilities, and universal learning, enable you to inform us of all that the ancients have left or the moderns have written on the subject.

:

B.-Oh! Sir, your humble servant! compliments, I perceive, are banished from Purley. But I shall not be at all enticed by them to take upon my shoulders a burthen which you seem desirous to shift off upon me. Besides, Sir, with all your caution, you have said too much now to expect it from me. It is too late to recall what has passed your lips: and if Mr. T. is of my sentiments, you shall not be permitted to explain yourself away. The satisfaction which he sceks after, you say is to be had; and you tell us the mine where you think it is not to be found. Now I shall not easily be persuaded that you are so rash, and take up your opinions so lightly, as to advance or even to imagine this; unless you had first searched that mine yourself, and formed a conjecture at least concerning the place where you suppose this knowledge is to be found. Instead therefore of making me display to Mr. T. my reading, which you have already declared insufficient for the purpose, is it not much more reasonable that you should communicate to us the result of your reflection?

H.-With all my heart, if you chuse it should be so, and think you shall have patience to hear me through. I own I prefer instruction to correction, and had rather have been informed without the hazard of exposing myself; but if you make the one a condition of the other, I think it still worth my acceptance; and will not lose this opportunity of your judgment for a little shame. I acknowledge then that the subject is not intirely new to my thoughts: for, though languages themselves may be and usually are acquired without any regard to their principles, I very early found it, or thought I found it, impos. sible to make many steps in the search after truth and the nature of human understanding, of good and evil, of right and wrong, without well considering the nature of language, which appeared to me to be inseparably connected with them. I own therefore I long since formed to myself a kind of system, which seemed to me of singular use in the very small extent of my younger studies to keep my mind from confusion and the imposition of words. After too long an interval of idleness and pleasure, it was my chance to have occasion to apply to some of the modern languages; and, not being acquainted with any other more satisfactory, I tried my system with these, and tried it with success. I afterwards found it equally useful to me with some of the dead languages. Whilst I was thus amusing myself, the political struggle commenced; for my share in which you so far justly banter me, as I do acknowledge that, both in the outset and the progress of it, I was guilty of two most egregious blunders; by attributing a much greater portion of virtue to individuals, and of understanding to the generality, than any experience of mankind can justify. After another interval therefore (not of idleness and pleasure), I was again called by the questions of our friend Mr. T. (for yesterday is not the first time by many that he has mentioned it) to the consideration of this subject. I have hitherto declined attempting to give him the satisfaction he required: for, though the notion I had of language had satisfied my own mind and answered my own purposes, I could not venture to detail to him my crude conceptions without having ever made the least inquiry into the opinions of others. Besides, I did not at all suspect that my notions, if just, could be peculiar to myself: and I hoped to find some author who might give him a clearer,

fuller, and more methodical account than I could, free from those errors and omissions to which I must be liable. Having therefore some small intervals of leisure, and a great desire to give him the best information; I confess I have employed some part of that leisure in reading every thing I could easily and readily procure that has been suggested by others.

-I am afraid I have already spoken with too much presumption: But when I tell you that I differ from all those who with such infinite labour and erudition have gone before me on this subject; what apology

B.-Oh! make none. When men think modestly, they may be allowed to speak freely. Come-Where will you begin?— Alpha-Go on.

H.-Not with the organical part of language, I assure you. For, though in many respects it has been and is to this moment grossly mistaken, (and the mistakes might, with the help of some of the first principles of natural philosophy and anatomy, be easily corrected,) yet it is an inquiry more of curiosity than immediate usefulness.

B.-You will begin then either with things or ideas for it is impossible we should ever thoroughly understand the nature of the signs, unless we first properly consider and arrange the things signified. Whose system of philosophy will you build upon?

H.-What you say is true. And yet I shall not begin there. Hermes, you know, put out the eyes of Argus: and I suspect that he has likewise blinded philosophy: and if I had not imagined so, I should never have cast away a thought upon this subject. If therefore Philosophy herself has been misled by Language, how shall she teach us to detect his tricks?

B.-Begin then as you please. Only begin.

EIIEA IITEPOENTA, &c.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE DIVISION OR DISTRIBUTION OF LANGUAGE.

H.-THE purpose of Language is to communicate our thoughts

B. You do not mention this, I hope, as something new, or wherein you differ from others?

H.-You are too hasty with me. No. But I mention it as that principle, which, being kept singly in contemplation, has misled all those who have reasoned on this subject.

B.-Is it not true, then?

H.-I think it is.

rests.

And that on which the whole matter

B. And yet the confining themselves to this true principle upon which the whole matter rests, has misled them!

H.-Indeed I think so.

B.—This is curious!

For thus they rea

H.-Yet I hope to convince you of it. soned-Words are the signs of things. There must therefore be as many sorts of words, or parts of speech, as there are sorts of things. The earliest inquirers into language proceeded then to settle how many sorts there were of things; and from thence how many sorts of words, or parts of speech. Whilst this method of search strictly prevailed, the parts of

1 "Dictio rerum nota: pro rerum speciebus partes quotque suas sortietur."-J. C. Scaliger de Causis L. L.

speech were very few in number: but two. At most three, or four.

All things, said they, must have names.' But there are two sorts of things:

1. Res que permanent.

2. Res quæ fluunt.

There must therefore be two sorts of words or parts of speech: viz.—

1. Notæ rerum quæ permanent.

2. Notæ rerum quæ fluunt.

Well; but surely there are words which are neither notæ rerum permanentium, nor yet notæ rerum fluentium. What will you do with them?-We cannot tell: we can find but these two sorts in rerum natura: call therefore those other words, if you will, for the present, particles, or inferior parts of speech, till we can find out what they are. Or, as we see they are constantly interspersed between nouns and verbs, and seem therefore in a manner to hold our speech together, suppose you call them conjunctions or connectives."

This seems to have been the utmost progress that philosophical Grammar had made till about the time of Aristotle, when a fourth part of speech was added,-the definitive, or article.

1 From this moment Grammar quits the daylight; and plunges into an abyss of utter darkness.

2 A good convenient name for all the words which we do not understand; for, as the denomination means nothing in particular, and contains no description, it will equally suit any short word we may please to refer thither. There has latterly been much dispute amongst Grammarians concerning the use of this word, particle, in the division and distribution of speech: particularly by Girard, Dangeau, the authors of the Encyclopédie, &c. In which it is singular that they should all be right in their arguments against the use made of it by others; and all wrong in the use which each of them would make of it himself. Dr. S. Johnson adopts N. Bailey's definition of a particle-" a word unvaried by inflection." And Locke defines particles to be "the words whereby the mind signifies what connection it gives to the several affirmations and negations that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration."

3

The Latin Grammarians amuse themselves with debating whether Evvdeoμos should be translated Convinctio or Conjunctio. The Danes and the Dutch seem to have taken different sides of the question for the Danish language terms it Bindeord, and the Dutch Koppelwoord.

« PreviousContinue »