still, according to his old bias, when the nature of the war was altered, and required hot pursuit. In some other it is want of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not discern when things have a period, but come in too late after the occasion as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country fellows, when they play in fence school, that if they have a blow, then they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some other it is a lothness to lose labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring about occasions to their ply; and yet in the end, when they see no other remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of Sibylla's books the treble price, when he might at first have had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial, and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune.

Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with that we last spake of, but with difference, is that which is well expressed, "fatis accede deisque," that men do not only turn with the occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit or strength to over-hard or extreme points; but choose in their action that which is most passable for this will preserve men from foil, and not occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please the most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake; which cannot but mightily increase reputation.

Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I understand it, and it is that which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms: "Et quemadmodum receptum est, ut exercitum ducat imperator, sic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ ducendæ ; ut quæ ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, et non ipsi eventus tantum persequi cogantur." For, if we observe, we shall find two differing kinds of sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little some can urge and pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; either of which is very imperfect without the other.

:

Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in the declaring, or not declaring a man's self: for although depth of secrecy, and making way, "qualis est via navis in mari," which the French calleth "sourdes menées," when men set things in work without opening themselves at all, be sometimes both prosperous and admirable, yet many times "Dissimulatio errores parit, qui dissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant." And therefore, we see, the greatest politicians have in a natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been reserved and disguised in them: for we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of profession," that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they stood his friends or enemies." So Cæsar, when he went first into Gaul, made no scruple to profess, "that he had rather be first in a village, than second at Rome."

So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see what Cicero saith of him, "Alter," meaning of Caesar, "non recusat, sed quodammodo postulat, ut, ut est, sic appelletur tyrannus." So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Cæsar, in his very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet in his harangues to the people would swear, "Ita parentis honores consequi liceat," (which was no less than the tyranny,) save that, to help it, he would stretch forth his hand towards a statue of Cæsar's, that was erected in the same place and men laughed, and wondered, and said, Is it possible, or, Did you ever hear the like? and yet thought he meant no hurt, he did it so handsomely and ingeniously. And all these were prosperous: whereas Pompey, who tended to the same ends, but in a more dark and dissembling manner, as Tacitus saith of him, "Occultior, non melior," wherein Sallust concurreth, "ore probo, animo inverecundo," made it his design, by infinite secret engines, to cast the state into an absolute anarchy and confusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms for necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon him, and he never seen in it: and when he had brought it, as he thought, to that point when he was chosen consul alone, as never any was, yet he could make no great matter of it, because men understood him not; but was fain in the end to go the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by colour of the doubt of Cæsar's designs: so tedious, casual, and unfortunate are these deep dissimulations; whereof, it seemeth, Tacitus made this judgment, that they were a cunning of an inferior form in regard of true policy, attributing the one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius, where, speaking of Livia, he saith, "Et cum artibus mariti simulatione filii bene composita;" for surely the continual habit of dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly politic.

Another precept of this architecture of fortune is, to accustom our minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they conduce and are material to our particular ends; and that to do substantially and not superficially. For we shall find the logical part, as I may term it, of some men's minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they can well judge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparisons, preferring things of show and sense before things of substance and effect. So some fall in love with access to princes, others with popular fame and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase: when, in many cases, they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment.

So some measure things according to the labour and difficulty, or assiduity, which are spent about them; and think if they be ever moving, that they must needs advance and proceed: as Cæsar saith in a despising manner of Cato the second, when he describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose; "Hæc omnia magno studio agebat." So in most things men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best when it should be the fittest.

As for the true marshalling of men's pursuits | towards their fortune, as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand thus: first the amendment of their own minds; for the remove of the impediments of the mind will sooner clear the passages of fortune, than the obtaining fortune will remove the impediments of the mind. In second place I set down wealth and means, which, I know, most men would have placed first, because of the general use which it beareth towards all variety of occasions. But that opinion I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that moneys were the sinews of the wars, whereas, saith he, the true sinews of the wars are the sinews of men's arms, that is, a valiant, populous, and military nation; and he voucheth aptly the authority of Solon, who, when Crœsus showed him his treasury of | gold, said to him, that if another came that had better iron, he would be master of his gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed, that it is not moneys that are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men's minds, wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. In third place I set down reputation, because of the peremptory tides and currents it hath, which, if they be not taken in their due time, are seldom recovered, it being extreme hard to play an aftergame of reputation. And lastly I place honour, which is more easily won by any of the other three, much more by all, than any of them can be purchased by honour. To conclude this precept, as there is order and priority in matter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of the commonest errors, while men fly to their ends when they should intend their beginnings; and do not take things in order of time as they come on, but marshal them according to greatness, and not according to instance, not observing the good precept, "Quod nunc instat agamus."

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to embrace any matters which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that sounding in a man's ears, "Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus:" and that is the cause why those which take their course of rising by professions of burden, as lawyers, erators, painful divines, and the like, are not commonly so politic for their own fortunes, otherwise than in their ordinary way, because they want time to learn particulars, to wait occasions, and to devise plots.

Another precept of this knowledge is, to imitate nature, which doth nothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do well interlace his business, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally intendeth. For a man ought in every particular action so to carry the motions of his mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if he cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a second, or so in a third; and if he can have no part of that which he purposed, yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else; and if he cannot make any thing of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come; and if he can contrive no effect or sub

:

stance from it, yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like. So that he should exact an account of himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant for nothing is more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one; for he that doth so, loseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are many times more proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need afterwards, than for that which he urgeth for the present; and therefore men must be perfect in that rule, " Hæc oportet facere, et illa non omittere."

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a man's self peremptorily in any thing, though it seem not liable to accident, but ever to have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire; following the wisdom in the ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash was dry whither they should go, and the one moved to go down into a pit, because it was not likely the water would dry there, but the other answered, "True, but if it do, how shall we get out again?"

Another precept of this knowledge is, that ancient precept of Bias, construed not to any point of perfidiousness, but only to caution and moderation, "Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus, et odi tanquam amaturus:" for it utterly betrayeth all utility, for men to embark themselves too far into unfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and humorous envies or emulations.

But I continue this beyond the measure of an example, led, because I would not have such knowledges, which I note as deficient, to be thought things imaginative, or in the air; or an observation or two much made of, but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is hardlier made than a beginning. It must be likewise conceived that in those points which I mention and set down, they are far from complete tractates of them, but only as small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no man, I suppose, will

think that I mean fortunes are not obtained without all this ado; for I know they come tumbling into some men's laps, and a number obtain good fortunes by diligence in a plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping themselves from gross errors.

But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect orator, doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a prince or a courtier hath been described by such as have handled those subjects, the mould hath used to be made according to the perfection of the art, and not according to common practice: so I understand it, that it ought to be done in the description of a politic man, I mean politic for his own fortune.

But it must be remembered all this while, that the precepts which we have set down are of that kind which may be counted and called bonæ artes. As for evil arts, if a man would set down for himself that principle of Machiavel, "that a man seek not to attain virtue itself, but the appearance only thereof, because the credit of virtue is a help, but the use of it is cumber:" or that other of his principles; "that he presuppose that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by fear, and therefore

that he seek to have every man obnoxious, low, and in strait," which the Italians call "seminar spine," to sow thorns: or that other principle contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, “Cadant amici, dummodo inimici intercidant," as the triumvirs, which sold, every one to other, the lives of their friends, for the deaths of their enemies: or that other protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire, and trouble states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap their fortunes, "Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium, id non aqua, sed ruina restinguam :" or that other principle of Lysander, "that children are to be deceived with comfits, and men with oaths:" and the like evil and corrupt positions, whereof, as in all things, there are more in number than of the good: certainly, with these dispensations from the laws of charity and integrity, the pressing of a man's fortune may be more hasty and compendious. But it is in life, as it is in ways, the shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the fairer way is not much about.

But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and sustain themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of ambition, ought, in the pursuit of their own fortune, to set before their eyes not only that general map of the world, that "all things are vanity and vexation of spirit," but many other more particular cards and directions: chiefly that, that being, without well-being, is a curse, and the greater being the greater curse; and that all virtue is most rewarded, and all wickedness most punished in itself: according as the poet saith excellently:

66

Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri, pro laudibus istis
Præmia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum
Dii moresque dabunt vestri."

And so of the contrary. And, secondly, they ought to look up to the eternal Providence and divine judgment, which often subverteth the wisdom of evil plots and imaginations, according to the scripture, "He hath conceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing." And although men should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this incessant and sabbathless pursuit of a man's fortune leaveth not that tribute which we owe to God of our time who, we see, demandeth a tenth of our substance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of our time and it is to small purpose to have an erected face towards heaven, and a perpetual grovelling spirit upon earth, eating dust, as doth the serpent, "Atque affigit humo divinæ particulam auræ." And if any man flatter himself that he will employ his fortune well, though he should obtain it ill, as was said concerning Augustus Cæsar, and after of Septimius Severus, "that they should never have been born, or else they should never have died," they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of their greatness, and so much good when they were established: yet these compensations and satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be purposed. And, lastly, it is not amiss for men in their race towards their fortune, to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is elegantly expressed

by the emperor Charles the fifth, in his instructions to the king his son, "that fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that if she be too much wooed, she is the farther off." But this last is but a remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted: let men rather build upon that foundation which is as a corner-stone of divinity and philosophy, wherein they join close, namely, that same Primum quærite. For divinity saith, "Primum quærite regnum Dei, et ista omnia adjicientur vobis:" and philosophy saith, “Primum quærite bona animi, cætera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt." And although the human foundation hath somewhat of the sands, as we see in M. Brutus, when he brake forth into that speech,

"Te colui, virtus, ut rem: ast tu nomen inane es:" yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may serve for a taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.

Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge, secret and retired in both these respects, in which things are deemed secret; for some things are secret because they are hard to know, and some because they are not fit to utter; we see all governments are obscure and invisible.

Such is the description of governments: we see the government of God over the world is hidden, insomuch as it seemeth to participate of much irregularity and confusion: the government of the soul in moving the body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity, the shadows whereof are in the poets, in the description of torments and pains, next unto the crime of rebellion, which was the giants' offence, doth detest the crime of futility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this was meant of particulars; nevertheless, even unto the general rules and discourses of policy and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling.

But, contrariwise, in the governors towards the governed, all things ought, as far as the frailty of man permitteth, to be manifest and revealed. For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the government of God, that this globe which seemeth to us a dark and shady body, is in the view of God as crystal, "Et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare vitreum simile crystallo." So unto princes and states, specially towards wise senates and councils, the natures and dispositions of the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions and combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, in regard of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations, and the height of the station where they keep centinel, in great part clear and transparent. Wherefore, considering that I write to a king that is a master of this science, and is so well assisted, I think it decent to pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain the certificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto;