Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo ? coram regibus stabit, nec erit inter ignobiles." Here is observed, that of all virtues for rising to honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors many times love not to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and diligent.

"Vidi cunctos viventes, qui ambulant sub sole, cum adolescente secundo, qui consurgit pro eo." Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius: " Plures adorant solem orientem, quam occidentem vel meridianum." Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne dimiseris, quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima." Here caution is given, that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the unfittest; for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of means to make them better.

"Erat civitas parva, et pauci in ea viri; venit contra eam rex magnus, et vadavit eam, instruxitque munitiones per gyrum, et perfecta est obsidio; inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens, et liberavit eam per sapientiam suam, et nullus deinceps recordatus est hominis illius pauperis." Here the corruption of states is set forth, that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of it. "Mollis responsio frangit iram." Here is noted, that silence or rough answer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth.

"Iter pigrorum, quasi sepes spinarum." Here is livelily represented how laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred to the last instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth a brier or an impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.

"Melior est finis orationis, quam principium." Here is taxed the vanity of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, than upon the conclusions and issues of speech.

"Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem, non bene facit; iste et pro buccella panis deseret veritatem." Here is noted, that a judge were better be a briber, than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly as a facile.

"Vir pauper calumnians pauperes, similis est imbri vehementi, in quo paratur fames." Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry horse-leech.

Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, est justus cadens coram impio." Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the face of the world, doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many particular injuries passed over by connivance.

“Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et dicit hoc non esse peccatum, particeps est homicidii." Here is noted, that whereas men in wronging their best friends, use to extenuate their fault, as if they might presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety.

"Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato cum homine furioso." Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do principally avoid

those which are impatient, as those that will espouse us to many factions and quarrels.

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'Qui conturbat domum suam, possidebit ventum." Here is noted, that in domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves quieting of their mind and contentment, but still they are deceived of their expectation, and it turneth to wind.

"Filius sapiens lætificat patrem filius vero stultus mœstitia est matri suæ." Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort of the good proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of their ill proof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but of fortune.

"Qui celat delictum, quærit amicitiam; sed qui altero sermone repetit, separat foederatos." Here caution is given, that reconcilement is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that which is past, than by apologies and excusations.

"In omni opere bono erit abundantia; ubi autem verba sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egestas." Here is noted, that words and discourse abound most, where there is idleness and want.

"Primus in sua causa justus; sed venit altera pars, et inquirit in eum." Here is observed that in all causes the first tale possesseth much, in such sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed, except some abuse or falsity in the information be detected.

"Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora ventris." Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation, which seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far; but that entereth deep which hath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity.

"Qui erudit derisorem, ipse sibi injuriam facit; et qui arguit impium, sibi maculam generat." Here caution is given how we tender reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to esteem it for contumely, and accordingly to return it.

"Da sapienti occasionem, et addetur ei sapientia.” Here is distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verbal, and swimming only to conceit; for the one upon the occasion presented is quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and confused.

"Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus." Here the mind of a wise man is compared to a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures and customs are represented, from which representation proceedeth that application,

"Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit." Thus have I staid somewhat longer upon these sentences politic of Solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example, led with a desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also attended them with brief observations, such as to my understanding offer no violence to the sense, though I know they may be applied to a more divine use but it is allowed even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea and some writings, have more of the eagle than others; but taking them as instructions for life, they might have received large

discourse, if I would have broken them and illustrated them by deducements and examples.

Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; that as men found out any observation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it and express it in parable, or aphorism, or fable. But for fables, they were vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: now that the times abound with history, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And therefore the form of writing, which of all others is the fittest for this variable argument of negotiation and occasions, is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories or examples: for knowledge drawn freshly, and in our view, out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again; and it hath much greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance: for when the example is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set down with all circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it as a very pattern for action; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse's sake, are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a servile aspect toward the discourse which they are brought in to make good.

But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as history of times is the best ground for discourse of government, such as Machiavel handleth, so history of lives is the most proper for discourse of business, because it is more conversant in private actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, which is discourse upon letters; such as are wise and weighty, as many are of Cicero " ad Atticum," and others. For letters have a great and more particular representation of business than either chronicles or lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this part of civil knowledge, touching negotiation, which we note to be deficient.

But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much from that whereof we have spoken, as sapere and sibi sapere; the one moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre for there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a man's own fortune, and they do sometimes meet, and often sever; for many are wise in their own ways that are weak for government or counsel; like ants, which is a wise creature for itself, but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge of: "Nam pol sapiens," saith the comical poet, fingit fortunam sibi ;" and it grew to an adage, | "Faber quisque fortunæ propriæ:" and Livy attributeth it to Cato the first, "in hoc viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat, ut quocunque loco natus esset, sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur."

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This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and professed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed in Timotheus the

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Athenian; who having done many great services to the estate in his government, and giving an account thereof to the people, as the manner was, did conclude every particular with this clause, " and in this Fortune had no part." And it came so to pass that he never prospered in any thing he took in hand afterwards; for this is too high and too arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, "Dicis, Fluvius est meus, et ego feci memetipsum;" or of that which another prophet speaketh, that "6 men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares;" and that which the poet expresseth,

"Dextra mihi Deus, et telum, quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint."

But yet nevertheless these positions, "Faber quisque fortunæ suæ; Sapiens dominabitur astris ; Invia virtuti nulla est via ;" and the like, being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to insolency, rather for resolution than for presumption or outward declaration, have been ever thought sound and good, and are, no question, imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this opinion, as they can scarce contain it within: as we see in Augustus Cæsar, who was rather diverse from his uncle, than inferior in virtue, how when he died, he desired his friends about him to give him a Plaudite, as if he were conscient to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage. This part of knowledge we do report also as deficient; not but that it is practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to writing. And therefore lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible by axiom, it is requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some heads or passages of it.

ambitu vitæ.

Wherein it may appear at the first Faber fortua new and unwonted argument to næ, sive de teach men how to raise and make their fortune: a doctrine, wherein every man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple till he seeth difficulty; for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is as hard and severe a thing to be a true politician, as to be truly moral. But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and in substance: in honour, because pragmatical men may not go away with an opinion that learning is like a lark, that can mount, and sing, and please herself, and nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey in substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, "that nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the globe of crystal, or form;" that is, that there be not any thing in being and action, which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and doctrine.

First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most summary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus did require; who seeing in the frame of man's heart such angles and recesses, found fault there was not a window to look into them; that is, to procure good informations of particulars touching persons, their natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand; so again their weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they lie most open and obnoxious; their friends, factions, and dependences; and again their opposites, enviers, competitors, their moods and times, "Sola viri molles aditus et tempora noras ;" their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and this not only of persons but of actions, what are on foot from time to time, and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and the like. For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous; for men change with the actions, and whilst they are in pursuit they are one, and when they return to their nature, they are another. These informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the minor propositions in every active syllogism, for no excellency of observations, which are as the major propositions, can suffice to ground a conclusion if there be error and mistaking in the minors.

Neither are deeds such assured pledges, as that they may be trusted without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: "Fraus sibi in parvis fidem præstruit, ut majore emolumento fallat:" and the Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is better used than he was wont to be, without manifest cause. For small favours, they do but lull men asleep both as to caution and as to industry, and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, "Alimenta socordiæ." So again we see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcilement which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus advanced many of the friends of Antonius: " simul amicis ejus præfecturas et tribunatus largitur:" wherein, under pretence to strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from his dependences.

As for words, though they be, like waters to physicians, full of flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised, especially with the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius, upon a stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his dissimulation, when he said, "You are hurt because you do not reign;" of which Tacitus saith, "Audita hæc raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere, correptamque Græco versu admonuit: ideo lædi, quia non regnaret." And there

We will begin therefore with this precept, according to the ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to words; and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised words than to set and purposed words. Neither let that be feared which is said, Fronti, nulla fides; which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and not of the private and subtle motions and labours of the countenance and gesture; which, as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is animi janua, "the gate of the mind." None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, "Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat." So again, noting the differing character and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in the senate, he saith, touching his fashion, wherein he carried his speech of Germanicus, thus; "Magis in speciem adornatis verbis, quam ut penitus sentire videretur;" but of Drusus thus, Paucioribus, sed intentior, et fida oratione:" and in another place speaking of his character of speech when he did any thing that was

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that urge men to confess their secrets :

"Vino tortus et ira."

And experience showeth, there are few men so true to themselves, and so settled, but that sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open themselves; especially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation, according to the proverb of Spain, “Di mentira, y sacaras verdad," "Tell a lie, and find a truth."

As for the knowing of men, which is at second hand from reports; men's weakness and faults are best known from their enemies, their virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends, with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and the opinions conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to such, men are more masked, "Verior fama e domesticis emanat."

But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is, by their natures and ends; wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by their natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was both