politicians in this tract. The omission of the first article from the table of a statesman's business would very much simplify it, but that which was a stumbling stone to James, and a stumbling block to his son, is still the perpetually uppermost hinderance to all good and quiet government. So completely was this article a part of Bacon's political creed, that, when he had retired from public life, he sent "to the Right Reverend Father in God, Lancelot Andrews, Lord Bishop of Winchester, and Councillor of Estate to his Majesty," An Advertisement touching an Holy War; which he describes as "an argument, mixt of religious and civil considerations; and likewise mixt between contemplation and action." The modern reader will be surprised to learn that it is a dialogue on the lawfulness of a war for the propagating of religion! The king certainly had his hands full in trying to extirpate heresies, reconcile schisms, and reform manners, but our author was inclined to imagine that a crusade might be undertaken at the same time.

Milton was of a very different opinion. "Who is there that measures wisdom by simplicity, strength by suffering, dignity by lowliness? Who is there that counts it first to be last, something to be nothing, and reckons himself of great command in that he is a servant? Yet God, when he meant to subdue the world and hell at once, part of that to salvation, and this wholly to perdition, made choice of no other weapons or auxiliaries than these whether to save or to destroy. It had been a small mastery for him to have drawn his legions into array, and flanked them with his thunder; therefore he sent foolishness to confute wisdom, weakness to bind strength, despisedness to vanquish pride."

At the same time that our author was engaged with this Utopian project, he inscribed to Prince Charles Some Considerations touching a War with Spain, which is a most interesting document. He justifies the quarrel, balances the forces, and propounds a variety of designs for choice, in this commended expedition against an old and cruel enemy.

From the reports of his parliamentary speeches, we can form no adequate conception of his oratorical powers. He was, however, the most accomplished statesman and the most brilliant speaker of his age. A quotation from Jonson, who appears to have heard him frequently, will tempt the reader to examine them for himself; and a finer description than "Rare Ben's" of the perfection of this art will not be found in any author.

"There happened in my time," says the learned poet, "one noble speaker, the Lord Verulam, who was full of gravity in his speaking. His language, where he could pass by a jest, was nobly censorious. No man ever spake more neatly, more prestly, more weightily, or suffered less emptiness, less idleness in what he uttered. No member of his speech, but consisted of its own graces. His hearers could not cough or look aside without loss. He commanded where he spoke, and had his judges angry and pleased at his devotion. No man had their affections more in his power; the fear of every man that heard him was, lest he should make an end."

We are now to contemplate Bacon in the civil character which he sustained, as a lawyer. He was compelled to engage in the profession in consequence of the necessitous circumstances in which his father's sudden death left him; and notwithstanding other and more congenial pursuits, he became a thoroughly learned practitioner, rose slowly through all its gradations of dignity, and ultimately attained its highest honour. There can be no better proof of his acquirements than the jealousy of Sir Edward Coke, which, even at the commencement of his career, was perfectly uncontrollable. This irrefragable doctor was very hard to be convinced of the solidity and depth of Bacon's acquaintance with law. His own erudition was confined to, and only limited by, the vast circle of common-law jurisprudence,— he was accomplished beyond all his contemporaries within this wide range, which he guarded like a dragon, and as he knew what it had cost him to become what he was, he had lost all taste for every thing else, depreciated what he had been compelled to sacrifice, and despised attainments in those departments of learning from which nature, education, and fortune had

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excluded him. Without compeer as a pleader," reporter," or "compiler," he had as little to fear from our author in his own province, as he had to hope for out of it; and there is no doubt that professional collisions must soon have taught him that philosophy and law were by no means incompatible,-that the aspirant he pretended to despise was not to be put down by him, or "cousin" Cecil either,-and that his competitor would soon be pronounced by the bar, the senate, the court, and the world, to be the greater man of the two. Bacon was not a mere lawyer, but he was a first-rate one. The genius of the man was not more remarkable than his industry; and what is there in our laws, so subtle, extensive, or perplexed, that his vigorous and plastic intellect could not easily unravel, grasp, and master? all that was required was the will, and that was not wanting. His other writings show that he possessed common sense," sound roundabout common sense," in the highest degree, and those now to be examined form no exception to the remark.

We shall briefly notice his few professional works, and then advert to his much more valuable suggestions for the improvement of the law. As an expositor of feudal usages and fleeting decisions, he did little for his own age, and less for posterity; but as a philosophical jurist his views were remarkably sound, and his recommendations deserve the most serious attention.

The practical law writings have been those that have least contributed to his fame, though discovering the same grasp of thought, aptitude of expression, and profusion of illustration, which are displayed in his more renowned productions. Had he lived at a later period, his labours in this branch of study would have insured him a high standing among those who have not merely illustrated but improved the legal science. But any attempt to reduce it to elementary propositions, when every thing was in a transitionary state, could only be imperfectly successful, and if successful, of but temporary utility. He was therefore more happy in showing what was required for the elucidation and arrangement of the subject, than in applying rules to the insulated and frequently discordant cases from which maxims were to be deduced. There was not the same practical sense in weighing the value of authorities, and in selecting the leading cases, which was evinced by the author of the Institutes, though there might be more sagacity, in perceiving the principles upon which laws should be framed, and according to which they should be amended. As a lawyer therefore he was less accurate than Coke. In seeking to simplify the science of the law, he necessarily omitted many points which could not well be made to fall within any of his general rules, and though he clearly saw and reasoned well on the necessity of attending to all particulars, he does not always guide himself by the rules he promulgated. His labours therefore, both here and elsewhere, were more valuable, in suggesting hints for the formation of a systematic and harmonious code, rather than furnishing an exposition of the law, as it really existed. His two principal tracts are of a character to benefit the legislator more than the lawyer; and are more useful to him who has to frame a new system or remove the anomalies of the old, than to him who seeks to acquire a correct knowledge of existing law, with all its imperfections and inconsistencies.

To a mind like Bacon's the legal science was perhaps the very last in which we could pect that he would attain any high degree of excellence. Eminently skilled in generalization, in tracing out the rules of study and philosophy, and in developing the principles by which the general result involved in a multitude of particular facts might be discovered, he was almost sure to err in applying himself to a pursuit, where the ultimate facts from which he had to reason were a number of cases possessing apparently equal weight, but often seemingly and often really discordant; and in which it is necessary that the reason should submit itself blindly to the authority of dicta resting upon some arbitrary principle, or applicable to circumstances which no longer existed, but which were still

retained. This circumstance creates a difficulty which almost all original thinkers have experienced, and which is seldom overcome but by the sacrifice of all originality and freedom of thought, and by an almost total devotion of every faculty of the mind to this one pursuit. This sacrifice Bacon would not make; and though from this cause his authority as a practical lawyer is less, the general claims that he has upon mankind as a teacher and guide are greatly enhanced.

But whatever might be his disqualifications in reference to this pursuit, he did not fail either from an inadequate conception of the compass of the work he had undertaken, or from any lack of earnestness in his devotion to the task. The motives by which he was influenced in commencing his treatise on The Elements of the Common Law of England, are set forth with equal dignity and force, in the preface to the treatise. "I hold every man a debtor to his profession; from the which as men of course do seek to receive countenance and profit, so ought they of duty to endeavour themselves, by way of amends, to be a help and ornament thereunto. This is performed in some degree by the honest and liberal practice of a profession, when men shall carry a respect not to descend into any course that is corrupt and unworthy thereof, and preserve themselves from the abuses wherewith the same profession is noted to be infected; but much more is this performed, if a man be able to visit and strengthen the roots and foundation of the science itself; thereby not only gracing it in reputation and dignity, but also amplifying it in profession and substance. Having therefore from the beginning come to the study of the laws of this realm, with a mind and desire no less, if I could attain unto it, that the same laws should be the better by my industry, than that myself should be the better by the knowledge of them; I do not find that by mine own travel, without the help of authority, I can in any kind confer so profitable an addition unto that science, as by collecting the rules and grounds dispersed throughout the body of the same laws; for hereby no small light will be given in new cases, and such wherein there is no direct authority to sound into the true conceit of law, by the depth of reason, in cases wherein the authorities do square and vary, to confirm the law, and to make it received one way; and in cases wherein the law is cleared by authority, yet nevertheless to see more profoundly into the reason of such judgments and ruled cases, and thereby to make more use of them for the decision of other cases more doubtful: so that the uncertainty of law, which is the most principal and just challenge that is made to the laws of our nation at this time, will, by this new strength laid to the foundation, somewhat the more settle and be corrected." And the account that he furnishes of the manner in which he endeavoured to execute this task, and the principle upon which he regulated himself in his division of the subject, furnish much valuable materials for the future jurist. The whole of the preface is full of valuable matter, illustrating the character of his mind, and the comprehensive and accurate view that he took of this, as of every other field of learning which he endeavoured to explore, and the just conception he had formed of the method wherein it should be treated in order to its most useful development. He explains his plan in the treatment of the subject in reference to the nature of the rules that he should select for illustration, the language in which they should be delivered, the authorities by which they should be supported, and the mode of their illustration ; and in each of these respects he furnishes an admirable lesson for those who second him in his work. He states under the first head, that "whereas these rules are some of them ordinary and vulgar, that now serve but for grounds and plain songs to the more shallow and impertinent sort of arguments; others of them are gathered and extracted out of the harmony and congruity of cases, and are such as the wisest and deepest sort of lawyers have in judgment and in use, though they be not able many times to express and set them down. For the former sort, which a man that should rather write to raise a high opinion of himself than to instruct others would have omitted, as trite and within every man's compass; yet, nevertheless, I have not affected to neglect them, but having

chosen out of them such as I thought good, I have reduced them to a true application, limiting and defining their bounds." He then explains that in those cases in which the civil law and the common law of England agreed, he should employ the language of the civilians, as being ordinarily the aptest, and that which was generally used; and that in those cases wherein there was a discrepancy, when either of the two courses being open to the legislator a different course had been pursued, or when the varying circumstances of the countries to which the laws were applicable, required a corresponding diversity in the nature of the law, he would point out and illustrate the nature and the cause of the incongruity. And again, with regard to the method, he had rather preferred placing the rules in an apparently unconnected, than to framing them into a systematic, form; and, though the latter might have the apparent advantage of giving an aspect of completeness and uniformity, following in this respect the example of the teachers of former times, who had thus delivered their instructions, of whom he instances Solomon in his Proverbs, and Phocylides in his Aphorisms. With regard to the language, he assigns the reasons which led him to prefer employing the Latin law phraseology for the rules, and the English language for the illustrations. He then adduces the reasons which had led him to refrain from quoting all the authorities, for the general rules which he laid down; and lastly, observe, "There is one point above all the rest I account the most material for making these reasons indeed profitable and instructing; which is, that they be not set down alone, like dark oracles, which every man will allow still to be true, but in the mean time they give little light and direction; but I have attended them (a matter not practised, no not in the civil law to any purpose, and for want whereof, the rules indeed are but as proverbs, and many times plain fallacies) with a clear and perspicuous exposition, breaking them into cases, and opening their sense and use, and limiting them with distinctions, and sometimes showing the reasons whereupon they depend, and the affinity they have with other rules." The work is executed in conformity with the rules thus laid down, but it was only a small portion of the subject that was completed. The part that was first published, and which was intended as the introduction to the design, was committed to the judgment of his contemporaries, according to whose opinion he proposed to continue or abandon his undertaking. The manner also in which he executed the remainder was also to be determined by their reception of this portion of his labours. He did not profess to hold himself so far above other men, as to disdain to consult even their prejudices in respect of the manner in which a work intended for their instruction should be framed. His object being usefulness, he was content that the lessons he desired to inculcate should be moulded into the form that was most acceptable to others, not that which appeared abstractedly best to himself. As he expressed it, "It is great reason that that which is intended for the profit of others, should be guided by the conceits of others."

The work consists of two parts, The Maxims of the Law, and The Use of the Law: the former is devoted to the arrangement, exposition, and illustration of legal rules upon the principles he had laid down; the latter points out and enforces the ends which the law was designed to accomplish. These ends he defines to be, 1. To secure men's persons from death and violence. 2. To dispose the property of their goods and lands. 3. For preservation of their good names from shame and infamy. He shows generally the manner in which these objects are secured, and gives a brief view of the machinery provided for the administration of justice, and of the nature and effect of the various conveyances by which property may be transferred and acquired. The tract was written as early as 1596, and inscribed, as appears from the Harleian MSS. to Queen Elizabeth, on the 8th of January of that year, but it was not published till after his death.

The account of the office of alienations, which was established for the purpose of taking the fines and compositions payable upon lands held under the Crown, was composed in

The

1598, but not published until some years after his death, under the title of An Account of the lately erected Service, called the Office of Compositions for Alienations, from a Manuscript in the Inner Temple Library. It is a model of legal, historical, and economical writing. biographer of Bacon, in the Biographia Britannica, becomes quite enthusiastic in his comment upon it; and as his eulogium may encourage" young readers in the perusal of books of this kind," whilst ours would fail, we are tempted to quote it for their benefit. "This curious and highly finished tract is one of the most laboured pieces penned by its most learned author, containing his resolutions on a very perplexed question, whether it was most for the queen's benefit that the profits arising from the office for alienations should be let out to farm or not? In handling this he has shown such diversity of learning, and so clear a conception of all the different points of law, history, antiquities, and policy, as is really amazing; for I think it may be truly said, that there is not any treatise of the same compass extant in our language, which manifests so comprehensive a genius, and so accurate a knowledge, both with respect to theory and practice, as this." Our author was involved in great pecuniary difficulties, when he drew this tract. He was then in his thirty-eighth year, and it may be conjectured that the envy of his relative, Mr. Secretary Cecil, to whom he actually appeals from a spunging-house for assistance, at the time when this dissertation was before the council, occasioned its posthumous publication.

The Reading on the Statute of Uses, which was not printed till after his death, is familiar to lawyers. Hargrave pronounces it to be "an excellent work,"-and thinks that it was delivered about three or four years before the death of Elizabeth. The commencement of his address to the students is grave and figurative, and the last sentence is an exposition of his own fate. "I have chosen to read upon the statute of uses, a law whereupon the inheritances of men are tossed at this day, like a ship upon the sea, in such sort, that it is hard to say which bark will sink, and which will get to haven; that is to say, what assurances will stand good, and what will not. Neither is there any lack or default in the pilots, the grave and learned judges; but the tides and currents of received errors, and unwarranted and abused experience, have been so strong, as they were not equal to keep a right course according to the law. Herein, though I could not be ignorant either of the difficulty of the matter, which he that taketh in hand shall soon find, or much less of my own unableness, which I had continual sense and feeling of; yet, because I had more means of absolution than the younger sort, and more leisure than the greater sort, I did think it not impossible to work some profitable effect; the rather because where an inferior wit is bent and constant upon one subject, he shall many times, with patience and meditation, dissolve and undo many of the knots, which a greater wit, distracted with many matters, would rather cut in two than unknit: and at the least, if my invention or judgment be too barren or too weak, yet by the benefit of other arts, I did hope to dispose or digest the authorities and opinions which are in cases of uses in such order and method, as they should take light one from another, though they took no light from me.” Mr. Hargrave, the celebrated lawyer already referred to, considers the Reading as "a very profound treatise on the subject, so far as it goes, and shows that he had the clearest conception of one of the most abstruse parts of our law." And his chaplain was not far wrong when he said of his lord's law writings, that though some great masters of the law did outgo him in bulk and particularities of cases, yet in the science of the grounds and mysteries of the law, he was exceeded by none.

His other law writings consist of arguments in various cases in which he was employed as counsel, and in reference to matters of public moment, upon which his opinion was desired, or which he deemed of sufficient importance to justify him in delivering his sentiments publicly-A Proposal for the Reform of the Law-Speeches in his office of lord-keeper, &c. &c. In all of these we may notice excellences and defects, similar to those we have already referred to in speaking of the general character of his legal writings,—and it may be observed, that