who being silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired it might be certified for his part, "that there was one that knew how to hold his peace.""

Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which is Laws, I think good to note only one deficience; which is, that all those which have written of laws, have written either as philosophers, or as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light, because they are so high For the lawyers, they write according to the states where they live, what is received law, and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom of a law-maker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are in nature certain fountains of justice, whence all civil laws are derived but as streams and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains. Again, the wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a platform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into consideration, by what means laws may be made certain, and what are the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty of law; by what means laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what are the impediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what influence laws touching private right of meum and tuum have into the public state, and how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and delivered, whether in texts or in acts, brief or large, with preambles, or without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time, and what is the best means to keep them from being too vast in volumes, or too full of multiplicity or crossness; how they are to be expounded, when upon causes emergent, and judicially discussed; and when upon responses and conferences touching general points or questions; how they are to be pressed, rigorously or tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to be mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts; again, how the practice, profession, and erudition of law is to be censured and governed; and many other points touching the administration, and, as I may term it, animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less, because I propose, if God give me leave, having begun a work of this nature, in aphorisms, to propound it hereafter, noting it in the mean time for deficient. And for your majesty's laws of England, I could say much of their dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they cannot but excel the civil laws in fitness for the government; for the civil law was, "Non hos quæsitum munus in usus;" it was not made for the countries which it governeth: hereof I cease to speak, because I will not intermingle matter of action with matter of general learning.

De prudentia legislatoria, sive de fontibus juris.

THUS have I concluded this portion of learning

touching civil knowledge, and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; and with human philosophy, philosophy in general; and being now at some pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth to me, si nunquam fallit imago, as far as a man can judge of his own work, not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while they are in tuning their instruments, which is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards. So have I been content to tune the instruments of the Muses, that they may play that have better hands. And surely, when I set before me the condition of these times, in which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit in all the qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails of ancient writers; the art of printing, which communicateth books to men of all fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation, which hath disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history; the leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so generally⚫ in civil business, as the states of Græcia did, in respect of their popularity, and the state of Rome in respect of the greatness of their monarchy; the present disposition of these times at this instant to peace; the consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies of religion, which have so much diverted men from other sciences; the perfection of your majesty's learning, which as a phoenix may call whole volleys of wits to follow you; and the inseparable propriety of time, which is ever more and more to disclose truth;-I cannot but be raised to this persuasion, that this third period of time will far surpass that of the Græcian and Roman learning; only if men will know their own strength, and their own weakness both; and take, one from the other, light of invention, and fire of contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition of truth, as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or ornament; and employ wit and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar and of popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man should please himself, or others, in the reprehension of them, they shall make that ancient and patient request, "Verbera, sed audi." Let men reprehend them, so they observe and weigh them. For the appeal is lawful, though it may be it shall not be needful, from the first cogitations of men to their second, and from the nearer times to the times farther off. Now let us come to that learning, which both the former times were not so blessed as to know, sacred and inspired Divinity, the sabbath and port of all men's labours and peregrinations.

THE prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason, as to the will of man; so that as we are to obey his law, though we find a reluctation in our will; so we are to believe his word, though we find a reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense, we give consent to the matter, and not to the author, which is no more than we would do towards a suspected

and discredited witness: but that faith which was "accounted to Abraham for righteousness," was of such a point, as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein was an image of natural reason.

are full of non-significants and surd characters. But most especially the christian faith, as in all things, so in this, deserveth to be highly magnified, holding and preserving the golden mediocrity in this point, between the law of the heathen, and the law of Ma

Wherefore we conclude, that sacred theology, which in our idiom we call divinity, is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature for it is written, " Cœli enarrant gloriam Dei:" but it is not written, " Cœli enarrant voluntatem Dei:" but of that it is said, "Ad legem et testimonium, si non fecerint secundum verbum istud," etc. This holdeth not only in those points of faith which concern the great mysteries of the Deity, of the creation, of the redemption, but likewise those which concern the law moral truly interpreted: "Love your enemies: do good to them that hate you: be like to your heavenly Father, that suffereth his rain to fall upon the just and unjust." To this it ought to be applauded, "Nec vox hominum sonat," it is a voice beyond the light of nature. So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a libertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moralities, as if they were opposite and malignant to nature: “ Et quod natura remittit, invida jura negant." So said Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander's messengers; "That he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other of the wise men of Græcia, and that he held them for excellent men but that they had a fault, which was, that they had in too great reverence and veneration a thing they called law and manners." So it must be confessed that a great part of the law moral is of that perfection, whereunto the light of nature cannot aspire: how then is it, that man is said to have, by the light and law of nature, some notions and conceits of virtue and vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus: because the light of nature is used in two several senses; the one, that which springeth from reason, sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven and earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an inward instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of his first estate in which latter sense only he is participant of some light and discerning touching the perfection of the moral law: but how? sufficient to check the vice, but not to inform the duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as well moral as mystical, is not to be attained, but by inspiration and revelation from God.

The use, notwithstanding, of reason, in spiritual things, and the latitude thereof, is very great and general; for it is not for nothing that the apostle calleth religion our reasonable service of God, insomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the old law were full of reason and signification, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and magic, that

the religion of the heathen had no constant belief or confession, but left all to the liberty of argument; and the religion of Mahomet, on the other side, interdicteth argument altogether: the one having the very face of error, and the other of imposture; whereas the faith doth both admit and reject disputation with difference.

The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts the former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? By way of illustration, and not by way of argument. The latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument. In the former, we see, God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us; and doth graft his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. For the latter, there is allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and respective, although not original and absolute. For after the articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from, and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction. In nature this holdeth not, for both the principles are examinable by induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and besides, those principles or first positions have no discordance with that reason, which draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not in religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller nature, namely, wherein there are not only posita but placita; for in such there can be no use of absolute reason: we see it familiarly in games of wit, as chess, or the like; the draughts and first laws of the game are positive, but how ? merely ad placitum, and not examinable by reason: but then how to direct our play thereupon with best advantage to win the game, is artificial and rational. So in human laws, there be many grounds and maxims, which are placita juris, positive upon authority, and not upon reason, and therefore not to be disputed: but what is most just, not absolutely but relatively, and according to those maxims, that affordeth a long field of disputation. Such therefore is that secondary reason, which hath place in divinity, which is grounded upon the placets of God. Here therefore I note this deficience, that there hath not been, to my un- mo rationis derstanding, sufficiently inquired and humanæ in handled the true limits, and use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic: which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of true conceiving that which

De usu legiti

divinis.

Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great and blessed use thereof; for this point, well laboured and defined of, would, in my judgment, be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but the fury of controversies, wherewith the church laboureth. For it cannot but open men's eyes, to see that many controversies do merely pertain to that which is either not revealed, or positive, and that many others do grow upon weak and obscure inferences or derivations; which latter sort, if men would revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the gentiles, would be carried thus; Ego, non Dominus; and again, Secundum consilium meum; in opinions and counsels, and not in positions and oppositions. But men are now over-ready to usurp the style, Non ego, sed Dominus; and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those which have not sufficiently learned out of Solomon, that "the causeless curse shall not come."

Divinity hath two principal parts; the matter informed or revealed, and the nature of the information or revelation: and with the latter we will begin, because it hath most coherence with that which we have now last handled. The nature of the information consisteth of three branches; the limits of the information, the sufficiency of the information, and the acquiring or obtaining the information. Unto the limits of the information belong these considerations; how far forth particular persons continue to be inspired; how far forth the church is inspired; and how far forth reason may be used: the last point whereof I have denoted as deficient. Unto the sufficiency of the information belong two considerations; what points of religion are fundamental, and what perfective, being matter of farther building and perfection upon one and the same foundation; and again, how the gradations of light according to the dispensation of times, are material to the sufficiency of belief.

De gradibus Here again I may rather give it in unitatis in ci- advice, than note it as deficient, that the vitate Dei. points fundamental, and the points of farther perfection, only ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished; a subject tending to much like end, as that I noted before; for as that other were likely to abate the number of controversies, so this is like to abate the heat of many of them. We see Moses when he saw the Israelite and the Algyptian fight, he did not say, "Why strive you?" but drew his sword, and slew the Egyptian: but when he saw the two Israelites fight, he said,

"You are

For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the true and sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountains of the water of life. The interpretations of the Scriptures are of two sorts: methodical, and solute or at large. For this divine water, which excelleth so much that of Jacob's well, is drawn forth much in the same kind, as natural water useth to be out of wells and fountains; either it is first forced up into a cistern, and from thence fetched and derived for use; or else it is drawn and received in buckets and vessels immediately where it springeth. The former sort whereof, though it seem to be the more ready, yet, in my judgment, is more subject to corrupt. This is that method which hath exhibited unto us the scholastical divinity, whereby divinity hath been reduced into an art as into a cistern, and the streams of doctrine or positions fetched and derived from thence.

In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity, a compacted strength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two first they fail to find, and the last they ought not to seek. For as to brevity, we see, in all summary methods, while men purpose to abridge, they give cause to dilate. For the sum, or abridgment, by contraction becometh obscure; the obscurity requireth exposition, and the exposition is deduced into large commentaries, or into common places and titles, which grow to be more vast than the original writings, whence the sum was at first extracted. So, we see, the volumes of the schoolmen are greater much than the first writings of the fathers, whence the master of the sentences made his sum or collection. So, in like manner, the volumes of the modern doctors of the civil law exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which Trebonian compiled the digest. So as this course of sums and commentaries is that which doth infallibly make the body of sciences more immense in quantity, and more base in substance.

And for strength, it is true, that knowledges reduced into exact methods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth to support and sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory than substantial: like unto buildings which stand by architecture and compaction, which are more subject to ruin, than those that are built more strong in their several

:

And as for perfection, or completeness in divinity, it is not to be sought; which makes this course of artificial divinity the more suspect. For he that will reduce a knowledge into an art, will make it round and uniform but, in divinity, many things must be left abrupt and concluded with this: "O altitudo sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei! quam incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus, et non investigabiles viæ ejus!" So again the apostle saith, "Ex parte scimus;" and to have the form of a total, where there is but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies by supposition and presumption. And therefore I conclude, that the true use of these sums and methods hath place in institutions or introductions preparatory unto knowledge; but in them, or by deducement from them, to handle the main body and substance of a knowledge, is in all sciences prejudicial, and in divinity dangerous.

As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at large, there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some of them rather curious and unsafe, than sober and warranted. Notwithstanding, thus much must be confessed, that the Scriptures being given by inspiration, and not by human reason, do differ from all other books in the author; which by consequence doth draw on some difference to be used by the expositor. For the inditer of them did know four things which no man attains to know; which are, the mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, the secrets of the heart of man, and the future succession of all ages. For as to the first, it is said, "He that presseth into the light, shall be oppressed of the glory." And again, “No man shall see my face and live." To the second, "When he prepared the heavens I was present, when by law and compass he enclosed the deep." To the third, "Neither was it needful that any should bear witness to him of man, for he knew well what was in man." And to the last, "From the beginning are known to the Lord all his works."

From the former of these two have been drawn certain senses and expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the bounds of sobriety; the one anagogical, and the other philosophical. But as to the former, man is not to prevent his time: "Videmus nunc per speculum in ænigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem;" wherein, nevertheless, there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as the polishing of this glass, or some moderate explication of this enigma. But to press too far into it, cannot but cause a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of man: for in the body there are three degrees of that we receive into it, aliment, medicine, and poison; whereof aliment is that which the nature of man can perfectly alter and overcome;

and partly converteth nature; and poison is that which worketh wholly upon nature, without that, that nature can in any part work upon it: so in the mind, whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at all work upon and convert, is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a dissolution of the mind and understanding.

But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of late time by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have pretended to find the truth of all natural philosophy in the Scriptures; scandalizing and traducing all other philosophy as heathenish and profane. But there is no such enmity between God's word and his works; neither do they give honour to the Scriptures, as they suppose, but much embase them. For to seek heaven and earth in the word of God, whereof it is said, "heaven and earth shall pass, but my word shall not pass," is to seek temporary things amongst eternal and as to seek divinity in philosophy, is to seek the living amongst the dead; so to seek philosophy in divinity, is to seek the dead amongst the living; neither are the pots or lavers, whose place was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in the holiest place of all, where the ark of the testimony was seated. And again, the scope or purpose of the Spirit of God is not to express matters of nature in the Scriptures, otherwise than in passage, and for application to man's capacity, and to matters moral or divine. And it is a true rule, "Auctoris aliud agentis parva auctoritas:" for it were a strange conclusion, if a man should use a similitude for ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from nature or history, according to vulgar conceit, as of a basilisk, an unicorn, a centaur, a Briareus, an Hydra, or the like, that therefore he must needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof positively to be true. To conclude therefore, these two interpretations, the one by reduction or enigmatical, the other philosophical or physical, which have been received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and cabalists, are to be confined with a "noli altum sapere, sed time."

But the two latter points, known to God, and unknown to man, touching the secrets of the heart, and the successions of time, do make a just and sound difference between the manner of the exposition of the Scriptures and all other books. For it is an excellent observation which hath been made upon the answers of our Saviour Christ to many of the questions which were propounded to him, how that they are impertinent to the state of the question demanded; the reason whereof is, because not being like man, which knows man's thoughts by his words, but knowing man's thoughts immediately, he never answered their words, but their thoughts: much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, which being written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the church, yea, and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and respectively towards that present occasion, whereupon the words