seems to have been right only by accident; for as to the kind and quality of these causes, he searched no farther than his own brain, and neglected those undeniable phænomena with which his causes are not to be reconciled.

Sir Isaac Newton, on the other hand, was very diligent in studying those phænomena which belong chiefly to the class of natural effects; in the adjusting of which he makes a great figure; but unhappily solves the whole government of the created world by a nostrum, which hath never yet been understood; and in the application of which he was not very consistent with himself, as we fhall find hereafter.

The followers of Newton and Descartes having thus admitted something which is arbitrary in the very foundation of their schemes, we can never expect to see their disputes brought to any iffue, so long as there are men equally learned and ingenious on both sides to perpetuate them.

While these able philosophers are contending with each other, some in the pursuit of fame, and others in the pursuit of truth, without being able to agree where and with whom it is to be found, I should not dare to

interpose in such a subject, unless I suspected natural philosophy to be a much easier thing than they have made of it; and such as a plain man, who only consults the proper evidence, and pretends to no more wisdom than the rest of mankind, may be able to strike some light upon. This, however,

cannot be done in such a manner as to be attended with any good effect, till it is first determined, whether the operations of nature are immediately owing to mechanical causes, or whether they are conducted after a manner unknown to us in empty spaces. Those who affert the latter are supposed to do it with demonstration on their side. It would be vain, therefore, to describe the mechanism of the world, and descend to the consideration of any particular effects, so long as even the general method of solving effects by the operation of mechanical agents is thought to be an absurdity. This method of philosophising is the very thing, against which, some of the demonstrations, that have gained most credit with the learned, are directly levelled: and the writings of our modern reasoners, whether metaphysicians or mathematicians, are stored with objections, not only against the reality, but

even the possibility of a mechanical agency. To these their objections I shall now address myself particularly, and endeavour to shew, that not one amongst them all is of any force. As to their prejudices, I do not undertake to remove them: but leave it to time, and a farther knowledge of things, to wear off all such impressions as will not bear to be reasoned with.

CHAP. II.

A Reply to the principal Objections in Dr. CLARKE'S Letters to Mr. LEIBNITZ.

T will be allowed me, that the celebrated

IT

Dr. Samuel Clarke, when he undertook to defend the Newtonian philosophy against Mr. Leibnitz, an able Cartesian, understood what he was disputing about, and hath said the best that was to be said upon the occasion. If this should give but little trouble, we have not much to fear from any body else.

He has brought together several arguments against the doctrine of a general mechanism

mechanism in nature; the first of which, if it can be called an argument, consists in barely afferting the impossibility of it. Certain portions of matter, says he, are obliged to follow each others motions by an adhesion of parts, which no mechanism can account for*.

Now, that the parts of bodies are made to adhere together, and some of them very strongly, is an undoubted matter of fact; that no mechanism can account for this, or that it cannot be occasioned by the action and pressure of some mechanical agent, is what Dr. Clarke ought to have proved: instead of which, he takes it for granted; and would put the labouring oar into the hands of his adversaries. For, having mentioned this opinion of Mr. Leibnitz, that the continuation of motion in the heavenly bodies, the formation of planets, &c. are mechanical operations: whoever, says he, entertains this opinion, is, I think, obliged in reason to be able to explain particularly, by what laws of mechanism the planets and comets can continue to move in the orbs they do through unresisting

VOL. VIII.

C

*Collection of papers between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke, p. 363.

ing spaces; and by what mechanical laws both plants and animals are formed*.

But this is the strangest task that ever was imposed since the labours of Hercules: for we must first allow this author to empty the celestial spaces of all matter, and then fall to work to account for the motion of the planets in these spaces by mechanism and we must do it particularly, so as to give general satisfaction, without failing in a single article. If these spaces be void of all resisting matter, it follows of course that they are also void of all impelling matter; for the fluid that cannot resist in some cases, will never be able to impel in others. So that this reasonable demand, as he thinks it, is no other than thiswe are to explain all

things mechanically; but then we must take care to do it without mechanism. It is not the method of a fair disputant, to require an adversary to disarm himself, and to submit to such a state of the case, as will render it impossible for him to succeed, and prove him to be very weak indeed, if under such circumstances he should ever set about it.

Besides,

* Collection of papers between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke, p. 36s.