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the distinction vanishes on examination, or rather is found to be merely verbal. He has discussed, but avowedly does not know how to settle the question as to whether the cause precedes the effect. He has also noticed the circumstance, that in some cases when the cause ceases the effect also seems to cease, whereas in others the effect appears to remain; but he has not been able to give a full explanation of the phenomenon. The effect remains when the assemblage of circumstances which constitute the cause abides. It is thus a book remains on the table as long as the table is in a position to uphold it. It is thus oxygen and hydrogen abide in water till an element with a stronger affinity with one of them succeeds in drawing it off. In other cases the concurrence of agencies acting as the cause is ever liable to be broken up, and the effect ceases when the complex cause has disappeared. It is thus that the book is upheld in my hand, only so long as I stretch out my arm thus that the room is illuminated by day only so long as the sun shines, and by night only so long as the lamp continues to burn. In all cases a change. implies a new agent, or a new concurrence of agencies.

But we are now in the heart of our author's logical discussions. Mr. Mill's Logic has never been subjected to a careful review on the part either of his supporters or opponents. It deserves such an examination because of its excellencies, and it requires it because of its errors, which many students are accepting along with the truths. I undertake this review in the immediately succeeding chapters.



FORMAL Logic is usually represented as dealing with the Notion, Judgment, and Reasoning. Mr. Mill has no separate exposition of the Notion. He treats instead, of Names: as if Names did not stand for Thoughts, the nature of which should have been previously investigated. This is surely a defect in an elaborate Logical Treatise. In his controversial work he has given us his theory of the Notion or Conception. It will be necessary to examine it.

The Notions, that is, apprehensions of things, which the mind can entertain, are of three sorts :-First, There is the Singular Concrete Notion, such as Homer, Virgil, Dante, Milton, this man, this dog, that daisy, that book. This notion is singular, as it embraces a single object. It is concrete, as it contemplates the object as possessing an aggregate of qualities. The consideration of the nature of this notion does not, properly speaking, come under Formal Logic, which has to do only with Discursive Thought; that is, thought in which there is a process from something given or allowed to something

founded upon it. It is furnished to us by intuition, primarily by the senses and consciousness, and does not imply any logical operation. But then it comes into Logic when it is combined with the abstract and general notion in the proposition and argument. Thus, when we say, 'Locke was an independent thinker,' the subject is a singular concrete notion compared with a general notion in the predicate. Logic, therefore, cannot overlook this notion, but it may hand over the special discussion of its origin and validity to psycho logy or metaphysics. Mr. Mill gives us a correct enough account of it, though he does not specially investigate its nature: "A concrete name is a name which stands for a thing" (B. I. c. ii. 4).

Second, There is the Abstract Notion. It is the apprehension of a part of an object as a part, say of the head of a horse as the head of a horse. More technically it

“An abstract name

is the apprehension of an attribute. is a name which stands for an attribute of a thing" (Ib.) In this latter sense the part cannot exist separate from the whole thus transparency cannot exist apart from a transparent object, such as glass or ice. But though an abstract quality cannot exist apart from an object, it is not to be regarded as a nonentity or a fiction of the mind. Rationality cannot exist apart from a rational being, but it has a real existence in a rational being, such as man.

On account of the defective view which he takes of the intellectual faculties of man, Mr. Mill has not been able to furnish an adequate account of the Abstract No

tion. Speaking of the notion of length without breadth,{ "According to what appears to me the sounder opinion,

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the mind cannot form any such notion; it cannot con"ceive length without breadth” (B. 1. c. viii. 7). And in his recent work, "The existence of Abstract Ideas! "the conception of the class qualities by themselves, and "not as embodied in an individual--is effectually pre"cluded by the law of Inseparable Association" (p. 314). The ambiguous word 'conceive' has once more cast up without his telling us in what sense he employs it. I should say that in these passages he uses it in the sense of 'image,' in which signification the statement is true. I believe that length cannot exist except in an extended object which has also breadth, and I am sure that I can image length only in an extended object. He adds, that the mind " can only, in contemplating objects, attend to “ their length, exclusively of their other sensible quali"ties, and so determine what properties may be predi"cated of them in virtue of their length alone." This is not a sufficiently comprehensive account of the Abstract Notion; but it implies that there is more than a mere image. If we inquire carefully into its nature, we shall find that as a thought it implies not only attention but a comparative act. We apprehend the attribute to be an attribute of the concrete object, thus comparing the part and whole. This apprehension is the Abstract Notion, and we can compare the attribute apprehended with other attributes, or with concrete objects of various kinds, and make affirmations or denials. Thus, on perceiving a cone of sugar as a concrete object, we can in

abstract thought fix on the figure, and from the contemplation of it we might by a further abstraction fix on the conic sections, and by a process of reasoning evolve their properties. In all this we should be dealing, not with mere hypotheses, but abstracted realities; and the conclusions we reach will be found true of all cones, and of all sections of the cone, including the elliptic figures in which the planets move.1

Third, There is the General Notion, such as man, poet, animal. We are so constantly forming notions of this sort, that it should not be difficult to evolve the processes involved in it. The two first steps are,—(1.) that we observe a resemblance among objects; (2.) that we fix on the points of resemblance. The first is accomplished by the mind's power of perceiving agreements, and the second by an operation of abstraction. No absolute rule can be laid down as to which of these processes is the prior. I believe that in most cases there is first a perception more or less vague of a likeness, and then the separate consideration of the points of likeness. But in other cases we seem rather to fix primarily on an attribute, and conjoin by it all the objects which we discover to possess it. Thus, in zoology the naturalist fixes on the possession of a backbone, and

1 Regarding Logic as the Science of the Laws of Discursive Thought, as above defined, the Abstract Notion is clearly embraced in it, as in it we draw an attribute out of the concrete object given, and we must endeavour to unfold the Laws of Thought involved in it. The following may serve provisionally till a better list be furnished :-I. The Abstract Quality implies a Concrete Object. II. When the Concrete Object is real the Abstract Quality taken from it is also real. III. When the Abstract is a Quality, it is not to be regarded as having an independent existence; its existence is in a Concrete Object.

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