Merely because the relation between the action and the sentiment of Conscientiousness is no longer the same. Love of Approbation, Self-esteem, and, perhaps, Acquisitiveness, have been enlisted as motives to produce the action, while the opposition of Cautiousness has been, in a great measure, removed; and exactly in proportion to the amount at which we estimate their influence, will our sense of the virtue be diminished. In the same way, if we analyze any action, or any class of actions, to which the title of virtuous has been justly conceded, the same result will appear,-that wherever the selfish feelings and desires are contemplated as motives to act, our account of the agent's virtue is proportionally lowered.

We hold then, 1st, That virtue is a term expressive of the relation of the sentiments of Benevolence, Veneration, and Conscientiousness to certain actions contemplated by us, in which the enlightened exercise of these sentiments is involved. 2d, That virtue, obligation, and duty, are all felt and recognized by the same moral emotion; or rather, that these are nothing more than the same emotions variously referred in their relation to the person and the circumstances. And, 3d, That merit, instead of being identical with virtue, is a term which, in truth, expresses the relation to any virtuous action of those feelings and desires whose direct operation is opposed to the virtue in which the merit is involved. In one word, that virtue, obligation, and duty, are all felt and recognized by the three sentiments pointed out, as prompting to those actions, involving the relations of man to his Creator and to his fellow. That merit, on the other hand, in the sense in which the term is usually understood, is perceived in consequence of the operation of the feelings and desires, whose direct object is purely selfish.

In surveying the wide diversity of opinion, which, on the subject of virtue, the moral history of mankind presents, it appears to us, that these phenomena, various and seemingly contradictory as they are, do nevertheless admit of a very simple explanation by the theory that has just been submit

ted. This will become more apparent on considering the causes which tend to modify and obstruct the operation of the emotions to which we have referred the perception and recognition of morality.

That branch of the subject, however, is both too large and too important to be embraced by the present paper. Leaving it, therefore, for a subsequent occasion, we shall only add here some general remarks on the theory of virtue we have unfolded. It has appeared, from the cursory analysis that has been given of the propensities and sentiments of our nature, that these two great sources of human action, in reference to the objects they have in view, naturally arrange themselves into two distinct classes; those, viz., whose direct end is to prompt to some change in the relation of self to the object or event by which they are excited, and those which prompt to some change in the relation of the object in reference to which they are called into activity to the self by which that object is contemplated. The interest of self is sought exclusively by the one, the interest of the community by the other. It is apparent, that virtue can never be associated with the activity of the former, however beneficial may be the results to which they lead; it has, accordingly, been referred solely to the exercise of the latter. Whensoever the action to which the first and inferior class of desires and sentiments lead is at variance with the dictates of the second and higher class, that action must necessarily be hurtful and immoral; for the very obvious reason, that it is condemned by the sentiments whose exclusive object is the interest and advantage of those whom that action affects. To suppose these should condemn what they themselves are seeking to obtain is a contradiction in terms. The activity of these selfish and lower desires and feelings may exist in three different relations to the higher sentiments so often enumerated; in the relation of unison and harmony, and then they support and adorn the virtue to which the others alone give birth; in the relation of indifference, and then the ac

These

tion is without any moral character; or in the relation of opposition, and then the action is vicious and immoral. are laws which nature has imposed on our mental constitution, and the laws of nature are immutable. Virtue and vice, then, it follows by necessary consequence, have each a determinate and unchangeable character. If in Hindostan it be regarded as a dictate of Benevolence to expose an aged parent on the banks of the Ganges, and a dictate of Veneration to join in the monstrous obscenities of the idol worship of Juggernaut, and if in ancient Sparta a dexterous theft was justified by law, the anomaly involved in such actions is apparent only, not real. If Benevolence appear to be employed in shortening the life of a fellow-creature, and Veneration in doing homage to an image devoid of any quality of superiority, and if Conscientiousness appear to have seen nothing to condemn in the crime of theft committed under certain circumstances, it is not because these sentiments have been dictating in India and at Lacedemon what they condemn in England, but because, in these instances, their real dictates were either entirely subdued, or were shrouded in the darkness of a benighted intellect, and brutalized by the supremacy of animal desire. The sentiments, every Phrenologist is aware, do not themselves perceive the objects fitted to excite their activity. This is the province of intellect. And it is merely because ignorance and superstition disable this medium from conveying correct impressions of things as they really exist in their several relations, that the apparent inconsistency, in the cases we have just noticed, takes place. The moral emotions, when duly enlightened, are invariable in their dictates.

And while we are thus led to the conclusion, that there is a principle of virtue in our nature, in itself pure and unchanging, we shall be restrained from glorying too much when contemplating the high elevations to which it may conduct individuals of our species, by remembering that the very source which supplies the proud idea of the merit of hu

man virtue points at the same moment to the dangers by which that virtue is environed,-to the snares in our degenerate nature by which it is surrounded,-to the struggle in which it is always engaged, and in which it is so often overcome; and, casting our eyes along the page of human history, we shall be compelled with humility to acknowledge, that if the lamp of virtue be, in truth, still shining in the human heart, here with a brighter and there with a dimmer lustre, its flame, if it be not fed by a heavenly hand, is all too feeble to withstand the noxious vapours and the gusts of evil passion to which it is exposed: for,

"Man in nature's richest mantle clad, "And graced with all philosophy can add,

Though fair without and luminous within,
"Is still the progeny and heir of sin.

"Thus taught, down falls the plumage of his pride;
"He feels his need of an unerring guide,

"And knows, that, falling, he shall rise no more,
"Unless the power that bade him stand, restore.”

ARTICLE II..

PRACTICAL PHRENOLOGY.

THERE is a great difference between believing a doctrine and practising it; and as the latter alone can be truly beneficial, we proceed to some further examples of the application of Phrenology in real life.

Choice and Direction of Servants.-If it be true that, ceteris paribus, size in an organ is an index of power in a faculty, and if certain mental qualities fit an individual for a particular situation, it is clear that Phrenology is calculated to be of great use in the choice of servants, clerks, partners, and in forming all confidential relations. It is necessary, however, to know the particular combination of faculties that is requisite for a certain duty; and this can be discovered only by ex

tensive practical observations. Were even the most expert Phrenologist to attempt to specify, a priori, the development that would give most satisfaction in a given employment, he would run great hazard of falling into error; but let the duties of a particular situation be carefully analyzed, the education and development of several persons who discharge them successfully be ascertained, and that of others who fail in them be also noted, and a sure practical rule will be obtained. Nature is constant in her operations, and similar causes will invariably be followed by similar effects. We have applied Phrenology in this way, and with the most decided advantages. The first principle to be attended to is, that if an organ be large, and possess ordinary activity, it will give spontaneous suggestions; and that if it be very small, it will act feebly of itself, and require the constant application of external stimulus. For example, an individual with a small head, and particularly with small organs of reflection, was intrusted with the feeding of poultry, and was desired to tell that more corn was needed some days before the old stock was exhausted; but this effort of reflection could not be made. The individual, after repeated admonitions, dealt out the last feed, before it occurred to him to intimate that more was wanted, although he knew that the corn was brought from a distance. In ordinary speech this would be attributed to carelessness, or thoughtlessness, and the last was undoubtedly the cause; but the defect originated in the brain of the individual, and the only permanently successful remedy in such a case would be, for some one with more reflection to ask frequently how much corn remained, and thus apply the external stimulus to the weak reflecting faculties of the individual in question. In like manner, if we suppose in another servant the lower ridge of the eyebrows to be decidedly deficient, or, in other words, the organs of Order, Colouring, Weight, Size, Form, Locality, and Lower Individuality, to be small, there would be no internal and self-arising love of order, symmetry, and