THE

PHRENOLOGICAL JOURNAL.

No XII.

ARTICLE I.

ON THE PHRENOLOGICAL THEORY OF VIRTUE.

THERE is perhaps no subject connected with the philosophy of the human mind on which more has been written, and on which, at the same time, a greater diversity of opinion has appeared, than on the theory of virtue. A term whose meaning the most ordinary mind thinks it can readily apprehend, has been bandied from one school to another, from the remote age of Aristotle to the times in which we now live, and it still remains a question, Whether it has ever received a true and satisfactory explanation? If indeed our search after the true meaning of this mysterious substantive were confined to the theories in which the problem is professedly solved, so essentially different are these in their principles, and so various in their results, we might readily doubt whether that which we sought had any real existence-whether we were not renewing, by such a pursuit, the visions of alchemy; searching after a bodiless creation, which had a name only, but no local habitation upon earth.

And is virtue then of a nature so capricious and unstable as necessarily to appear under a new form to every successive VOL. III. No XII. 2 M

inquirer? Is this summum bonum, to a knowledge of which man has for two thousand years been labouring to attain, no better than an ignis fatuus, deluding the eye with a momentary light which leads only to deeper darkness—a mirage in the desert, cheating the traveller with the appearance of smiling vegetation, when a nearer approach shows all around to be only arid and unproductive sand? Fallen as human nature unquestionably is, we are far from holding it to be so entirely degraded. If that philosophy which has the constitution and phenomena of the human mind for the objects of its research has hitherto done little either to analyze the principle by which the virtue of an action is perceived, or that variety in the decisions of this principle, and that instability in its operations which the annals of our race exhibit, the fact of its existence is not the less ascertained. For it must be admitted by every one who has either reflected on the operations of his own mind, or observed with any degree of attention its phenomena in actual life, that there is some principle implanted in every man who is not so degraded as to have forfeited all claim to that title by which the Creator designated the last and noblest of his works, in consequence of whose operations one class of actions and opinions is condemned, and another is approved. Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna: quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat!

It may at first sight perhaps appear to be an instance of rather unwarranted presumption, to make a charge of unsatisfactoriness so bold and unlimited against the theories which have been successively formed in order to explain the nature of virtue. A single reflection, however, may suffice to satisfy the Phrenologist at least, that such a charge is by no means groundless. The philosophers by whom these theories were formed were unacquainted with the real constitution of the human mind. And therefore, allowing all that is unquestionably due to the capabilities of the gigantic

minds which have been employed in this investigation, it is apparent that this ignorance must necessarily be fatal to their success. Until we obtain a knowledge of all the primitive faculties of the mind, it is morally impossible to analyze, with any considerable degree of precision, the principles which different combinations of these faculties may produce. The truth of this assertion is strikingly attested by the fact, that the very existence of a faculty which every Phrenologist must hold to be a prime element in a virtuous character, I mean Conscientiousness, has been a subject of dispute down even to the present age. I need only mention the names of Hobbes, Mandeville, and Hume.

As these philosophers, however, in forming their theories of virtue, seldom, if ever, fell into the error of assuming the existence of faculties which had in reality no place in the human mind, although their mode of conducting investigations in regard to its constitution necessarily left them in ignorance of some of its most influential elements, there is perhaps not one of these theories which does not contain some portion of truth; while it would be equally difficult to find one entirely free from error. We may apply to them indeed the words used by Dr Adam Smith in relation to the theories which he imagined were to be displaced by his own. It is to be feared, however, that it too must feel the influence of its author's criticism. "As they are all of them in this respect "founded upon natural principles, they are all of them in "some measure in the right. But as many of them are de"rived from a partial and imperfect view of human nature, "there are many of them too in some respects in the "wrong."

These theories, with one exception, afterwards to be noticed, may be arranged into three classes, in which Propriety, Prudence, and Benevolence, are severally held to be the constituents or measures of virtue. Now, with respect to those of the first classs, as in every virtuous action there is certainly a suitableness of the affection from which we act to the

66

object which excites it," there is no doubt in every such action a manifest Propriety. Yet as it is equally obvious, that such propriety may be no less apparent in actions to which the title of virtuous would be an absurdity, it follows that Propriety cannot be the measure of a quality of whose existence it is by no means an invariable index. The same observation will apply with equal force to either of the other two classes. It is certainly demonstrable, that in the practice of virtue there is the truest prudence; but the fact is equally unquestionable, that this virtue has in innumerable intances been exhibited, while the intellect was unable to see the chain of causation which would have led to the same result as a matter of prudence. The decision of Aristides, on the project of treacherously burning the ships of the other states then at profound peace with the Athenians, may be mentioned as an illustrious instance of this truth. "Aris"tides," observes Mr Combe, in the valuable work he has re"cently published, "reported to his fellow-citizens, that no"thing could be more advantageous, but nothing more un"just, than such a project. His intellect appeared to view the "execution of the scheme as beneficial and prudent, while, at "the same time, he felt it to be morally wrong." The same remark may also be added in reference to prudence which has been offered in relation to the first class of theories, That many actions partake largely of the quality of prudence, which it were nevertheless an abuse of language to characterize as virtuous. In reference to the Benevolent systems, exactly the converse of this might be easily demonstrated in bar of their claim to universality of application, That while we would readily accede the title of virtuous to every action emanating from the impulse of a well-regulated Benevolence, we would claim the very same appellation for many actions, by which Benevolence, instead of being gratified, is painfully wounded. An instance, to which we would refer, is to be found in one of the many interesting productions of the author of Waverley. When Jeanie Deans, at the risk of