their conduct will become lefs cenfurable. A tyrannical form of government naturally produces cruelty of difpofition; and men must have been fome time in the habit of enjoying freedom, before they can either experience or exhibit all its advantages. But as to the late affociations in England, I am apprehensive, that they have contributed much more, than the people are aware, to the commencement of hoftilities with France. If these affociations had a tendency to encourage the ministry to involve the nation in a war, to which before they might be too much inclined, but concerning which they might be irrefolute, from their doubts refpecting the temper of the people, they may then justly be confidered as very serious evils. For I know of nothing that is fo likely to be fatal to the welfare and profperity of this country, and to the fecurity of the

prefent

prefent establishment, as a war with the French nation.

Mr. GRANTLEY. It is certain, that war muft greatly contribute to increase our taxes, and to leffen our trade, and may eventually be productive of great national calamity.

Mr. MORDAUNT.

Many men of large property seemed very ready to join in the affociations. But I do not think, that their conduct has at all contributed to increase the fecurity, or the value of their property. As to those perfons, whofe property is chiefly lodged in the funds, they could hardly have adopted any measure more pernicious, than that of fupporting any ministration, which should be inclined to involve the nation in an unneceffary war. Such an event must have a natural tendency to lower the funds, though this may not be its immediate effect. The present cri

ad

tical state of Holland, and of other parts of Europe, may have occafioned foreigners to depofit large fums in our funds, which would, for fome time at leaft, prevent that diminution in their value, which was otherwise to be expected. But the prefent state of things cannot last long; and no men will probably be greater fufferers by a war than the stock-holders.

Mr. GRANTLEY. There feems much reason in what you have advanced. I have myself confiderable property in the funds; and, if I had before viewed the matter in this light, I fhould not have been quite fo ready to join in the associations.

Mr. MORDAUNT. A war with a nation confifting of twenty-five millions of people, and that nation contending for its liberties, is certainly a business of a very serious nature; and, however it may terminate, it is a war in which no honour can be

VOL. III.

e

obtained

obtained on the part of Great Britain. I feel for the honour, as well as for the interest of my country; and, therefore, it gives me deep concern, whenever I fee it at once injured and difgraced. What the confequences may be of a war with France, no man can with certainty predict. But that great present evils must be the refult, cannot be questioned with the leaft appearance of reason. Superficial and uninformed men, little acquainted with the history of nations and of wars, may be much elated" at a few advantages, which may be gained

over the French at the commencement of a war; but these advantages, if they should be obtained, may produce little effect with respect to the final termination of the war, and to the state of things when a peace shall take place. Defeats of the French in Holland, or in Flanders, may not materially affect the French revolution; nor

can

can it with any degree of reafon be expected, that the antient government will ever be reftored. Such an event can, indeed, be wifhed for by no man, who is not an enemy to the liberty of the human fpecies; fuch an event could be favourable only to the establishment of defpotism in Europe. I would ask then, What honour will Great Britain derive from a junction with German defpots; and whether the eradication of the principles of liberty will be a compenfation for the millions that will be expended, and for the lives that will be loft? Are the blood and treasure of England to be lavished in a war, from which the people of this country have not the most remote profpect of the least poffible advantage? Whence are we to derive any compensation for the increase of taxes, the loss of trade, and the decay of our manufactures? What are the objects of the prefent