tive, and not original, as in a water, that, besides his own spring-head, is fed with other springs and streams. So then, according to these two differing illuminations or originals, knowledge is first of all divided into Divinity and Philosophy. In philosophy, the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God, or are circumferred to nature, or are reflected or reverted upon himself. Out of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges, Divine philosophy, Natural philosophy, and Human philosophy or humanity. For all things are marked and stamped with this triple character, of the power of God, the difference of nature, and the use of man. But because the distributions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point; but are like branches of a tree, that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and continuance, before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs; therefore it is good, before we enter into the former distribution, to erect and constitute one universal science, by the name of Philosophia prima, primitive or summary philosophy, as the main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide themselves; which science, whether I should report as deficient or no, I stand doubtful, For I find a certain rhapsody of natural theology, and of divers parts of logic; and of that other part of natural philosophy, which concerneth the principles; and of that other part of natural philosophy, which concerneth the soul or spirit; all these strangely commixed and confused: but being examined, it seemeth to me rather a depredation of other sciences, advanced and exalted unto some height of terms, than any thing solid or substantive of itself. Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is current, that the same things are handled but in several respects. As for example, that logic considereth of many things as they are in notion; and this philosophy, as they are in nature; the one in appearance, the other in existence: but I find this difference better made than pursued. For if they had considered quantity, similitude, diversity, and the rest of those external characters of things, as philosophers, and in nature; their inquiries must of force have been of a far other kind than they are. For doth any of them, in handling quantity, speak of the force of union, how, and how far it multiplieth virtue? Doth any give the reason, why some things in nature are so common and in so great mass, and others so rare, and in so small quantity? Doth any, in handling similitude and diversity, assign the cause why iron should not move to iron, which is more like, but move to the loadstone, which is less like? Why, in all diversities of things, there should be certain participles in nature, which are almost ambiguous, to which kind they should be referred? But there is a mere and deep silence touching the nature and operation of those common adjuncts of things, as in nature; and only a resuming and repeating of the force and use of them, in speech or argument. Therefore because in a writing of this nature I avoid all subtilty, my meaning touching this original or universal philosophy is thus, in a plain and gross description by negative; "That it be a receptacle for all such profitable observations and axioms, as fall not within the compass of any of the special parts of philosophy or sciences, but are more common and of a higher stage." Now that there are many of that kind, need not to be doubted. For example: is not the rule, "Si inaqualibus æqualia addas, omnia erunt inæqualia," an axiom as well of justice as of the mathematics? And is there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion? Is not that other rule, "Quæ in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter se conveniunt," a rule taken from the mathematics, but so potent in logic, as all syllogisms are built upon it? Is not the observation, "Omnia mutantur, nil interit," a contemplation in philosophy thus, that the quantum of nature is eternal? in natural theology thus; that it Philosophia de fontibus requireth the same omnipotence to make somewhat nothing, which at the first made nothing somewhat? according to the Scripture, "Didici quod omnia opera, quæ fecit Deus, perseverent in perpetuum; non possumus eis quicquam addere, nec auferre." Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely and largely discourseth concerning governments, that the way to establish and preserve them, is to reduce them ad principia; a rule in religion and nature, as well as in civil administration? Was not the Persian magic a reduction or correspondence of the principles and architectures of nature, to the rules and policy of governments? Is not the precept of a musician, to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or sweet accord, alike true in affection? Is not the trope of music, to avoid or slide from the close or cadence, common with the trope of rhetoric, of deceiving expectation? Is not the delight of the quavering upon a stop in music, the same with the playing of light upon the water? "Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus." Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs of reflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait determined and bounded? Neither are these only similitudes, as men of narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the same footsteps of nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or matters. This science therefore, as I understand it, I may prima, sive justly report as deficient; for I see sometimes the scientiarum. profounder sort of wits, in handling some particular argument, will now and then draw a bucket of water out of this well for their present use; but the springhead thereof seemeth to me not to have been visited; being of so excellent use, both for the disclosing of nature, and the abridgement of art. This science being therefore first placed as a common parent, like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue, "Omnes cœlicolas, omnes supera alta tenentes," we may return to the former distribution of the three philosophies, divine, natural, and human. And as concerning divine philosophy, or Natural Theology, it is that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed divine, in respect of the object, and natural in respect of the light. The bounds of this knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion: and therefore there was never miracle wrought by God to convert an atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to confess a God: but miracles have been wrought to convert idolaters and the superstitious, because no light of nature extendeth to declare the will and true worship of God. For as all works do shew forth the power and skill of the workman, and not his image, so it is of the works of God, which do shew the omnipotency and wisdom of the Maker, but not his image: and therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from the sacred truth; for they supposed the world to be the image of God, and man to be an extract or compendious image of the world; but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the world that honour, as to be the image of God, but only the work of his hands; neither do they speak of any other image of God, but man: wherefore by the contemplation of nature, to induce and inforce the acknowledgement of God, and to demonstrate his power, providence, and goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been excellently handled by divers. But on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature or ground of human knowledges, to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment not safe: "Da fidei, quæ fidei sunt.” For the heathen themselves conclude as much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain; "That men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven." So as we ought not to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason; but con trariwise, to raise and advance our reason to the divine truth. So as in this part of knowledge, touching divine philosophy, I am so far from noting any deficience, as I rather note an excess; whereunto I have digressed, because of the extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy hath received, and may receive, by being commixed together; as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy. Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which is an appendix of theology, both divine and natural, and is neither inscrutable nor interdicted: for although the Scripture saith," Let no man deceive you in sublime discourse touching the worship of angels, pressing into that he knoweth not," etc. yet notwithstanding, if you observe well that precept, it may appear thereby that there be two things only forbidden, adoration of them, and opinion fantastical of them, either to extol them farther than appertaineth to the degree of a creature, or to extol a man's knowledge of them farther than he hath ground. But the sober and grounded inquiry, which may arise out of the passages of Holy Scriptures, or out of the gradations of nature, is not restrained. So of degenerate and revolted spirits, the conversing with them, or the employment of them, is prohibited, much more any veneration towards them. But the contemplation or science of their nature, their power, their illusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom. For so the apostle saith, "We are not ignorant of his stratagems." And it is no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits, than to inquire the force of poisons in nature, or the nature of sin and vice in morality. But this part, touching angels and spirits, I cannot note as deficient, for many have occupied themselves in it: I may rather challenge it, in many of the writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastical. LEAVING therefore divine philosophy or natural theology, not divinity, or inspired theology, which we reserve for the last of all, as the haven and sabbath |