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prerogative, as God doth his power of working miracles." And yet notwithstanding, in your book of a free monarchy, you do well give men to understand, that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a king, as well as the circle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to alledge this excellent writing of your majesty, as a prime or eminent example of Tractates concerning special and respective duties, wherein I should have said as much if it had been written a thousand years since: neither am I moved with certain courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in presence; no, it is flattery to praise in absence, that is, when either the virtue is absent, or the occasion is absent, and so the praise is not natural but forced, either in truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his oration pro Marcello, which is nothing but an excellent table of Cæsar's virtue, and made to his face; besides the example of many other excellent persons wiser a great deal than such observers, and we will never doubt, upon a full occasion, to give just praises to present or


But to return, there belongeth farther to the handling of this part, touching the duties of professions and vocations, a relative or opposite touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession, which hath been likewise handled. But how? Rather in a satire and cynically, than seriously and wisely; for men have rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions, than with judgment to discover and sever that which is corrupt. For, as Solomon saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure, shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no matter for his instruction: "Quærenti derisori scientiam, ipsa se abscondit: sed studioso fit obviam." But the maDe cautelis naging of this argument with integrity and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted. For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk, that if he see you first, you die for it; but if you see him first, he dieth: so is it with deceits and evil arts,

et malis artibus.

which, if they be first espied, lose their life; but if they prevent, they indanger. So that we are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought to do: for it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest; that is, all forms and natures of evil: for without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them, without the help of the knowledge of evil: for men of corrupted minds presuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and believing of preachers, schoolmasters, and mens exterior language. So as, except you can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality ; "Non recipit stultus verba prudentiæ, nisi ea dixeris, quæ versantur in corde ejus."

Unto this part touching respective duty doth also appertain the duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant: so likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties; not as they are parts of government and society, but as to the framing of the mind of particular persons.

The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth handle it also not simply alone, but comparatively, whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties between person and person, case and case, particular and public as we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which was so much extolled; yet what was said?

Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores.

So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again, we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their associates, and cast


forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant being an usurper, they were divided in opinion, some holding that servitude was the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was better than a civil war; and a number of the like cases there are of comparative duty: amongst which that of all others is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice, which Jason of Thessalia determined against the truth: " Aliqua sunt injuste facienda, ut multa juste fieri possint." But the reply is good, "Auctorem præsentis justitiæ habes, sponsorem futuræ non habes;" men must pursue things which are just in present, and leave the future to the divine providence. So then we pass on from this general part touching the exemplar and description of good.

Now therefore that we have spoken of this fruit of life, it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image, or statua, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and motion: whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in De cultura these words, "Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. Inutile enim fere fuerit, virtutem quidem nosse, acquirendæ autem ejus modos et vias ignorare: non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, quærendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat; utrumque enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse et ejus compotes fieri: hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo." In such full words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part: so saith Cicero in great commendation of Cato the second, that he had applied himself to philosophy, "non ita disputandi causa, sed ita vivendi." And although the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold any consultations touching the reformation of their life, as Seneca excellently saith, "De partibus vitæ quisque deliberat, de summa nemo," may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with that aphorism of Hippocrates, "Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, iis mens ægrotat;" they need medicine not only to assuage the disease, but to awake the sense.

And if it be said, that the cure of

mens minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true but yet moral philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, that "the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress," and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the handmaid, to discern of the mistress's will; so ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself, within due limits, many sound and profitable directions.

This part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry, the rather because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and action is often conversant, and such wherein the common talk of men, which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass, is wiser than their books. It is reasonable therefore that we propound it in the more particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have written. We will therefore enumerate some heads or points thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, and whether

it be extant.

First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical, we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of application only. The husbandman cannot cominand, neither the nature of the earth, nor the seasons of the weather, no more can the physician the constitution of the patient, nor the variety of accidents. So in the culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command; points of nature, and points of fortune; for to the basis of the one, and the conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied. these things therefore, it is left unto us to proceed by application;

Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo:

and so likewise,

Vincenda est omnis natura ferendo.


But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary, which is that properly which we call accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto which we do apply; for we cannot fit a garment, except we first take measure of the body.

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So then the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound and true distributions, and descriptions of the several characters and tempers of mens natures and dispositions, specially having regard to those differences which are most radical, in being the fountains and causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention: for if it deserve to be considered," that there are minds which are proportioned to great matters, and others to small," which Aristotle handleth or ought to have handled by the name of magnanimity, doth it not deserve as well to be considered," that there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others to few?" So that some can divide themselves, others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in few things at once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pusillanimity. And again," that some minds are proportioned to that which may be dispatched at once, or within a short return of time; others to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of pursuit,"

Jam tum tenditque fovetque.

So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly ascribed to God, as a magnanimity. So farther deserved it to be considered by Aristotle, "that there is a disposition in conversation, supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man's self, to sooth and please; and a disposition contrary to contradict and cross:" and deserveth it

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