which constituted the technical offence; but the principle is the same as when a less criminal motive is alleged. Courts of justice, of necessity, interpret by external indications the secret workings of the mind; but as such conclusions must in general be inferential merely, they ought never to be made the subject of testimonial opinion. A serious violation of this rule occurred upon the trial of Mary Blandy in 1752, for the murder of her father, when Dr. Addington was allowed to state his opinion, that the agitation which the prisoner evinced, proceeded from no concern for her parent, but from the apprehension of unhappy consequences to herself*. Similar testimony would not now be admitted. Whenever motives are suggested as arising out of external circumstances, it is required that such circumstances shall be distinctly proved. Except in questions of science, witnesses are permitted to depose only to facts; it is the province of the jury alone to determine as well whether those facts lead to any inference as to actuating motives, as also the particular character of any such conclusion. It occasionally happens that actions of great enormity are committed, for which it is impos * State Trials, vol. xviii. p. 1117. sible to discover any motive. In such cases, which are not of frequent occurrence, upon principles of reason and justice essential to common security, the actor is held to be legally accountable*, unless it be clearly and indubitably shown that he is incapable of distinguishing the moral qualities and tendencies of his actions†. SECTION 2. DECLARATIONS OF INTENTION. It is not uncommon with persons about to engage in crime, to make obscure and mysterious allusion to purposes and intentions of revenge, or to boast to others, whose standard of moral conduct is the same as their own, of what they will do, or to give vent to expressions of revengeful purposes, or of malignant satisfaction at the anticipated occurrence of some serious mischief. Such declarations are of great moment, when clearly connected by independent evidence with some subsequent criminal action. The just effect of such language is to show the * Rex v. Philip Nicholson for the murder of Mr. and Mrs. Bonar; Celebrated Trials, vol. vi. p. 125. ↑ See the trial of Jonathan Martin for setting fire to York Minster at the York spring assizes 1831, taken in short hand by Mr. Fraser. PREPARATIONS FOR THE COMMISSION OF CRIME. 65 existence of the disposition, from which criminal actions proceed, to render it less improbable that a person proved to have used it would commit the offence charged, and to explain the real motive and character of the action. But proof of such language cannot be considered to dispense with the obligation of strict proof of the criminal facts; for though malignant feelings may possess the mind, and lead to intemperate and even criminal expressions, they nevertheless may exercise but a transient influence, without leading to action. SECTION 3. PREPARATIONS FOR THE COMMISSION OF CRIME. Premeditated crime must necessarily be preceded not only by impelling motives, but by appropriate preparations. Possession of the instruments or means of crime, under circumstances of suspicion, as of poison, coining instruments, combustible matters, picklock keys, dark-lanthorns, or other destructive or criminal weapons, instruments or materials, and many other acts of apparent preparation for crime,-are important facts in the judicial investigation of imputed crime. Where a man had in his possession a large quantity of counterfeit coin unaccounted F 66 PREPARATIONS FOR THE COMMISSION OF CRIME. for, and there was no evidence that he was the maker, it was held to raise a presumption that he had procured it with intent to utter it*. But the personal character for probity, and the civil station of the party, are highly material in connexion with facts of this kind. A medical man, for instance, in the ordinary course of his profession has legitimate occasion for the possession of poisons, a locksmith for the use of picklock keys. Facts of the kind referred to become more powerful indications of guilty purpose, if false reasons are assigned to account for them; as, for instance, in the case of possessing poison, that it was procured to destroy vermin, which is the excuse commonly resorted to in such cases. A female convicted at the Warwick summer assizes, August 1831, of the murder of her uncle by poison, alleged that she had bought arsenic to poison mice, and pointed to a mouse which she said had been killed by it, whereas it was proved that the mouse had not died from poison†. The bare possession of the means of crime, or other mere acts of preparation, without more conclusive evidence, are not in themselves of great * Rex v. Fuller, Russell and Ryan's Crown Cases, p. 308. Rex v. Mary Ann Higgins, London Medical Gazette, vol. ix. p. 896; and Annual Register for 1831. RECENT POSSESSION OF THE FRUITS OF CRIME. 67 weight, because, as in the case of the presumed existence of motives, the intended guilt may not have been consummated; and until that takes place there is the locus penitentiæ. But as preparations must necessarily precede the commission of premeditated crime, some traces of them may generally be expected to be discovered; and if there be not clear and decisive proof of guilt, the absence of any evidence of such preliminary measures is a circumstance strongly presumptive of innocence. SECTION 4. RECENT POSSESSION OF THE FRUITS OF CRIME. The possession of the fruits of crime recently after its commission, affords a strong ground for presuming that the party in whose possession they are found was the actual offender, unless he can satisfactorily account for such possession, and more especially if the property be of an unusual kind, or from its value or other circumstances be inconsistent with and unsuited to his station*. The foundation of the presumption in such cases is the consideration that, if the possession were lawfully acquired, the party would be * Carrington and Payne, vol. ii. p. 459; Mascardus, De Probationibus, vol. ii. Conclusio DcccxxxIV. |