An as

4. There is a great difference between an assertory oath and a promissory oath.* sertory oath is made to a man before God, and I must swear so as a man may know what I mean but a promissory oath is made to God only, and I am sure he knows my meaning. So in the new oath it runs, "whereas I believe in my conscience, &c. I will assist thus and thus: " that "whereas" gives me an outloose; for if I do not believe so, for aught I know I swear not at all.

5. In a promissory oath, the mind I am in is a good interpretation; for if there be enough happened to change my mind, I do not know why I should not. If I promise to go to Oxford to-morrow, and mean it when I say it, and afterwards it appears to me that 't will be my undoing, will you say I have broke my promise if I stay at home? Certainly I must not go.

6. The Jews had this way with them, concerning a promissory oath or vow: if one of them had vowed a vow, which afterwards appeared to him to be very prejudicial by reason of something he either did not foresee or did not think of when he made his vow; if he made it known to three of his countrymen,

* See Bishop Sanderson, De Juramenti Promissorii Obligatione, p. 9, edit. Lond. 1696, 8vo.

they had power to absolve him, though he could not absolve himself: and that they picked out of some words in the text. Perjury hath only to do with an assertory oath; and no man was punished for perjury by man's law till queen Elizabeth's time; 't was left to God, as a sin against him the reason was, because 't was so hard a thing to prove a man perjured. I might misunderstand him, and he swears as he thought.

7. When men ask me whether they may take an oath in their own sense, 't is to me as if they should ask whether they may go to such a place upon their own legs; I would fain know how they can go otherwise.

8. If the ministers that are in sequestered livings will not take the engagement, threaten to turn them out and put in the old ones, and then I'll warrant you they will quietly take it.

9. Now oaths are so frequent, they should be taken like pills, swallowed whole; if you chew them, you will find them bitter if you think what you swear, 't will hardly go down,

ORACLES.

ORACLES ceased presently after Christ, as soon as nobody believed them;

*

just as we

have no fortune-tellers, nor wise men, when nobody cares for them. Sometimes you have a season for them, when people believe them, and neither of these, I conceive, wrought by the devil.

OPINION.

1. OPINION and affection extremely differ. I may affect a woman best, but it does not follow I must think her the handsomest woman in the world. I love apples best of any fruit, but it does not follow I must think apples to be

* About this period the credit of oracles certainly began to decline; but Van Dale has clearly shown that they did not, as has very generally been supposed, cease at the birth of Jesus Christ. (De Oraculis Veterum Ethnicorum, p. 476. edit. 2dæ. Amst. 1700, 4to.) See likewise Fontenelle, Hist. des Oracles, p. 220, edit. Paris, 1698, 8vo. Selden has undoubtedly assigned the true cause of their abolition. On the subject of the Sibylline oracles, a long and learned note occurs in Lord Hailes's edition of Lactantius, De Justitiâ, p. 162. Edinb. 1777. 8vo.

the best fruit. Opinion is something wherein I go about to give reason why all the world should think as I think. Affection is a thing wherein I look after the pleasing of myself.

2. 'T was a good fancy of an old Platonic: the gods, which are above men, had something whereof man did partake, (an intellect, knowledge,) and the gods kept on their course quietly. The beasts, which are below man, had something whereof man did partake, (sense and growth,) and the beasts lived quietly in their way. But man had something in him, whereof neither gods nor beasts did partake, which gave him all the trouble, and made all the confusion in the world; and that is opinion.

3. 'T is a foolish thing for me to be brought off from an opinion, in a thing neither of us know, but are led only by some cobweb-stuff; as in such a case as this, "Utrum angeli invicem colloquantur?" If I forsake my side in such a case, I show myself wonderful light, or infinitely complying, or flattering the other party but if I be in a business of nature, and hold an opinion one way, and some man's experience has found out the contrary, I may, with a safe reputation, give up my side.

4. T is a vain thing to talk of a heretic, for a man for his heart can think no otherwise than he does think. In the primitive times

there were many opinions, nothing scarce but some or other held: one of these opinions being embraced by some prince, and received into his kingdom, the rest were condemned as heresies; and his religion, which was but one of the several opinions, first is said to be orthodox, and so have continued ever since the apostles.

PARITY.

THIS is the juggling trick of the parity, they would have nobody above them, but they do not tell you they would have nobody under them.

PARLIAMENT.

1. ALL are involved in a parliament. There was a time when all men had their voice in choosing knights. About Henry the Sixth's time they found the inconvenience; so one parliament made a law, that only he that had forty shillings per annum should give his voice, they under should be excluded. They made the law who had the voice of all, as well under forty shillings as above; and thus it continues