in state, are liberal; and while virtue is in declination, are voluptuary; so I doubt that this age of the world is somewhat upon the descent of the wheel. With arts voluptuary I couple practices joculary; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the pleasures of the senses. As for games of recreation, I hold them to belong to civil life and education. And thus much of that particular human philosophy which concerns the body, which is but the tabernacle of the mind.

For Human Knowledge which concerns the Mind, it hath two parts; the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of the soul or mind, the other that inquireth of the faculties or functions thereof. Unto the first of these, the considerations of the original of the soul, whether it be native or adventive, and how far it is exempted from laws of matter, and of the immortality thereof, and many other points, do appertain which have been not more laboriously inquired than variously reported; so as the travail therein taken seemeth to have been rather in a maze

than in a way. But although I am of opinion that this knowledge may be more really and soundly inquired, even in nature, than it hath been; yet I hold that in the end it must be bounded by religion, or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion: for as the substance of the soul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and earth by the benediction of a "producat," but was immediately inspired from God: so it is not possible that it should be otherwise than by accident, subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the subject of philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state of the soul must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance. Unto this part of knowledge touching the soul there be two appendices; which, as they have been handled, have rather vapoured forth fables than kindled truth, divination and fascination.

Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into artificial and natural; whereof artificial is, when the mind maketh a prediction by argument, concluding upon signs and tokens; natural is, when the mind hath a

1 Let it bring forth.

presention by an internal power, without the inducement of a sign. Artificial is of two sorts; either when the argument is coupled with a derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is only grounded upon a coincidence of the effect, which is experimental whereof the latter for the most part is superstitious; such as were the heathen observations upon the inspection of sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of bees; and such as was the Chaldean astrology, and the like. For artificial divination, the several kinds thereof are distributed amongst particular knowledges. The astronomer hath his predictions, as of conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like. The physician hath his predictions of death, of recovery, of the accidents and issues of diseases. The politician hath his predictions; "O urbem venalem, et cito perituram, si emptorem invenerit!" which stayed not long to be performed, in Sylla first, and after in Cæsar. So as these predictions are now impertinent, and to be referred over. But the divination which springeth from the internal nature of the soul, is that which we now speak of; which hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive and by influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the supposition, that the mind, when it is withdrawn and collected into itself, and not diffused into the organs of the body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotion; which therefore appeareth most in sleep, in extacies, and near death, and more rarely in waking apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences and observances which make the mind most to consist in itself: by influxion, is grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or glass, should take illumination from the foreknowledge of God and spirits; unto which the same regimen doth likewise conduce. For the retiring of the mind within itself, is the state which is most susceptible of divine influxions; save that it is accompanied in this case with a fervency and elevation, which the ancients noted by fury, and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other.

Fascination is the power and act of imagi

2 O, venal city that must soon perish if it find a purchaser!

nation, intensive upon other bodies than the body of the imaginant: for of that we spake in the proper place: wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the disciples of pretended natural magic have been so intemperate, as they have exalted the power of the imagination to be much one with the power of miracle working faith; others, that draw nearer to probability, calling to their view the secret passages of things, and specially of the contagion that passeth from body to body, do conceive it should likewise be agreeable to nature, that there should be some transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit without the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits have grown, now almost made civil, of the mastering spirit, and the force of confidence, and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry how to raise and fortify the imagination: for if the imagination fortified have power, then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it. And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a great part of ceremonial magic. For it may be pretended that ceremonies, characters, and charms, do work, not by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil spirits, but serve only to strengthen the imagination of him that useth it; as images are said by the Roman church to fix the cogitations, and raise the devotions of them that pray before them. But for mine own judgment, if it be admitted that imagination hath power, and that ceremonies fortify imagination, aud that they be used sincerely and intentionally for that purpose; yet I should hold them unlawful, as opposing to that first edict which God gave unto man, "In sudore vultus comedes panem tuum.' For they propound those noble effects, which God hath set forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour, to be attained by a few easy and slothful observances. Deficiences in these knowledges I will report none, other than the general deficience, that it is not known how much of them is verity, and how much vanity.

The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man is of two kinds; the one respecting his understanding and reason, and the other his will, appetite, and affection; whereof the former produceth position or decree, the latter action or execution.

It is true

"Quales decet esse sororum."2

Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but is invested with or at least. wise usurpeth no small authority in itself, besides the duty of the message. For it was well said by Aristotle, "That the mind hath over the body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman; but that reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate hath over a free citizen;" who may come also to rule in his turn. For we see that, in matters of faith and religion, we raise our imagination above our reason; which is the cause why religion sought ever access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams. And again, in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no cause to alter the former division. For as for poesy, it is rather a pleasure or play of imagination, than a work or duty thereof. And if it be a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as the imagination produceth, but of such sciences as handle and consider of the imagination; no more than we shall speak now of such knowledges

as

reason produceth, for that extendeth to all philosophy, but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire of the faculty of reason: so as poesy had its true place. As for the power of the imagination in nature,

1 Messenger.

2 As the faces of sisters should be.

9:1

and the manner of fortifying the same, we have mentioned it in the doctrine "De anima, whereunto most fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for imaginative or insinuative reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to refer it to the arts of reason. So therefore we content ourselves with the former division, that human philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, hath two parts, Rational and Moral.

The part of Human Philosophy, which is rational, is of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but a net of subtilty and spinosity. For as it was truly said, that knowledge is "pabulum ani

mi; "2 SO in the nature of men's appetite to

this food, most men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain have returned "ad ollas carnium," and were weary of manna; which, though it were celestial, yet seemed less nutritive and comfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, civil history, morality, policy, about the which men's affections, praises, fortunes do turn and are conversant; but this same "lumen siccum "3 doth parch and, offend most men's watery and soft natures. But, to speak truly of things as they are in worth, rational knowledges are the keys of all other arts;

for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, "that the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the form of forms: so these be truly said to be the art of arts: neither do they only direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen; even as the habit of shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to draw a stronger bow.

The arts intellectual are four in number; divided according to the ends whereunto they are referred for man's labour is to invent that which is sought or propounded: or to judge that which is invented; or to retain that which is judged; or to deliver over that which is retained. So as the arts must be four; art of inquiry or invention; art of examination or judgment; art of custody or memory; and art of elocution or tradition.

Invention is of two kinds, much differing: the one of arts and sciences; and the other, of speech and arguments. The former of these I do report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a deficience as if, in the making of an inventory touching the estate of a defunct, it should be set down, that there is no ready money. For as money will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the West Indies had never been discovered if the use of the mariner's needle had not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions, and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no farther discovered, if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over.

That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment standeth plainly confessed; for first, logic doth not pretend to invent sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a cuique in suâ arte credendum. " And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, "That medicines and cures were first found out, and then after the reasons and causes were discoursed ; and not the causes first found out, and by light from them the medicines and cures discovered." And Plato, in his Theætetus, noteth well, "That particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no sufficient direction; and that the pith of all sciences, which maketh the artsman differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every particular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience." And therefore we see, that they which discourse of the inventions and originals of things, refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to men. "Dictamnum genetrix Cretæa carpit ab Ida, Puberibus caulem foliis et flore comantem Purpureo: non illa feris incognita capris Gramina, cum tergo volucres hæsere sagittæ. "4

4 The passage describes Venus healing her son Eneas when he had been treacherously wounded by the Rutulians. It is thus translated by Dryden : But now the goddess-mother, mov'd with grief And pierc'd with pity, hastens her relief; A branch of healing dittany she brought, Which in the Cretan fields, with care she sought:

[Rough

So that it was no marvel, the manner of antiquity being to consecrate inventors, that the Ægyptians had so few human idols in their temples, but almost all brute.

"Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis, Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, coutraque Minervam,""&c.

And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the first inventions to men; yet you will rather believe that Prometheus first struck the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when he first struck the flints he expected the spark: and therefore we see the West Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the European, because of the rareness with them of flint that gave the first occasion. So as it should seem that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the pot-lid that flew open for artillery, or generally to chance or anything else, than to logic, for the invention of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of invention which Virgil describeth much other:

"Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes Paulatim." 2

For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in use; which is a perpetual intending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being for so Cicero saith very truly, "Usus uni rei deditus et naturam et artem sæpe vincit."3 And therefore if it be said of men,

Labor omnia vincit

Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas !"4 Rough is the stem, which woolly leaves surround; The leaves with flowers, the flowers with purple crown'd:

Well known to wounded goats: a sure relief To draw the pointed steel, and ease the grief. 1 They worship gods of every monstrous shape, The bull, the dog, the ibis, and the ape; And set these horrid deities above The lovely progeny of mighty Jove. 2 That old Experience pondering on its store And turning all its treasures o'er and o'er, By slow degrees should gain Invention's part And work its way to new and wondrous art. 3 Experience and practice devoted to one subject, often overcome both nature and art.

4 O'er all things labour triumphs in the end; To urgent need all difficulties bend.

it is likewise said of beasts, "Quis psittaco docuit suum xaigs?" Who taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree, where she espied water, that the water might rise so as she might come to it? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea of air, and to find the way from a field in flower a great way off, to her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and grow? Add then the word "extundere," which importeth the extreme difficulty, and the word "paulatim," which importeth the extreme slowness, and we are where we were, even amongst the Egyptians' gods; there being little left to the faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty of art, for matter of invention.

8

Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of, and which seemeth familiar with Plato (whereby the principles of sciences may be pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by derivation from the principles;) their form of induction, I say, is utterly vicious and incompetent: wherein their error is the fouler, because it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt nature; but they contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced nature. For he that shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of, "Aërei mellis cœlestia dona,' distilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the field and garden, shall find that the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they describe it. For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can assure, in many subjects upon those particulars which appear of a side, that there are any other on the contrary side which appear not? As if Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse which were brought before him, and failed of David, which was in the field. And this form, to say truth, is so

gross, as it

had not been possible for wits so subtile as have managed these things to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful towards particulars; which their manner was to use but as "lictores et viatores," for sarjeants and whifflers, "ad summovendam turbam," to make way and make room for their opinions, rather than in their true use and service. Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and human truth: for as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a child; so in human, they reputed the attending the inductions whereof we speak, as if it were a second infancy or childhood.

Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced, yet nevertheless certain it is that middle propositions cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature by syllogism, that is, by touch and reduction of them to principles in a middle term. It is true that in sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity (because it pleaseth God to apply himself to the capacity of the simplest), that form may have use; and in natural philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, "Quæ assensum parit, operis effœta est:"3 but the subtilty of nature and operations will not be enchained in those bonds: for arguments consist of propositions, and propositions of words; and words are but the current tokens or marks of popular notions of things; which notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out of particulars, it is not the laborious examinations either of consequences of arguments, or of the truth of propositions, that can ever correct that error, being as the physicians speak in the first digestion; and therefore it was not without cause, that so many excellent philosophers became sceptics and academics, and denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension; and held opinion, that the knowledge of man extended only to appearances and probabilities. It is true that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of irony, "Scientiam dissimu

1 Policemen and constables.

2 To remove the crowd.

3 When a proposition wins assent, it has done its work.

lando simulavit:"4 for he used to disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his knowledge; like the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign but would not acknowledge so much: and in the later Academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of "acatalepsia," I doubt, was not held sincerely for that all those which excelled' in "copia" of speech seem to have chosen that sect, as that which was fittest to give glory to their eloquence and variable discourses; being rather like progresses of pleasure, than journeys to an end. But assuredly many scattered in both Academies did hold it in subtilty and integrity but here was their chief error; they charged the deceit upon the senses; which in my judgment, notwithstanding all their cavillations, are very sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always immediately, yet by comparison, by help of instrument, and by producing and urging such things as are too subtile for the sense to some effect comprehensible by the sense, and other like assistance. But they ought to have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses. This I speak, not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek help: for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be easily done by help of a ruler or compass.

This part of invention, concerning the invention of sciences I purpose, if God give me leave, hereafter to propound, having digested it into two parts; whereof the one I term "Experientia Literata," and the other" Interpretatio Naturæ:"8 the former being but a degree and rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a promise.

The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention: for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know: and the use of this invention is no other but, out of