5. Not on the mind natus
rally imprinted, because
not known to children,
idiots, &c.
6,7. That men know them
when they come to the
use of reason, answered.
8. If reason discovered them,
that would not prove them
innate.
9-11. It is false, that reason dis-
covers them.
12. The coming to the use
of reason, not the time
we come to know these
maxims.
13. By this, they are not dis-
tinguished from other
knowable truths.
14. If coming to the use of
reason were the time of
their discovery, it would
not prove them innate.
15, 16. The steps by which the
mind attains several truths.
17. Assenting as soon as pro-
posed and understood,
proves them not innate.
18. If such an assent be a
mark of innate, then that
one and two are equal
to three; that sweetness
is not bitterness; and a
thousand the like, must be
innate.
19. Such less general propofi-
tions known before these
universal maxims.
26. One and one equal to
two, &c. not general, nor
useful, answered.
11. These maxims not being
known sometimes till pro-
posed, proves them not in-
CHA P. III.
No innate practical principles.
SECT.
1. No moral principles so
clear and so generally re-
ceived as the fore-menti-
oned speculative maxims.
2. Faith and justice not own-
ed as principles by all
3. Obj. Though men deny
them in their practice, yet
they admit them in their
thoughts, answered.
4. Moral rules need a proof,
ergo, not innate.
5. Instance in keeping com-
pacts.
6. Virtue generally approved,
not because innate, but be.
cause profitable.
7. Men's actions convince us,
that the rule of virtue is
CHAP. I.
Of ideas in general.
1. Idea is the object of
thinking.
2. All ideas come from sen-
sation or reflection.
3. The objects of sensation
one source of ideas.
4. The operations of our
minds, the other source
of them.
5. All our ideas are of the
one or the other of these.
6. Observable in children.
7. Men are differently fur-
nished with these, accord-
ing to the different objects
they converse with.
8. Ideas of reflection later,
because they need atten
tion.
9. The soul begins to have
ideas, when it begins to
perceive.
10. The soul thinks not al-
ways; for this wants
proofs.
11. It is not always conscious
of it.
12. If a fleeping man thinks
without knowing it, the
sleeping and waking man
are two persons.
13. Impossible to convince
those that sleep without
dreaming, that they think.
14. That men dream without
remembering it, in vain.
urged.
15. Upon this hypothesis, the
thoughts of a sleeping man
ought to be most rational.
16. On this hypothesis the
soul must have ideas not
derived from sensation or
reflection, of which there
is no appearance.
17. If I think when I know
it not, no body else can
know it.
18. How knows any one that
the soul always thinks?
For if it be not a self-evi-
dent proposition, it needs
proof.
19. That a man should be busy
in thinking, and yet not
retain it the next mo-
ment, very improbable.
20-23. No ideas but from sensa-
tion, or reflection, evi-
dent, if we observe chil
dren,
24. The original of all our
15. These are the beginnings 25, 26. Extension being insepara-
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