current in the world than false theories." So true is the saying of Hamlet" There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy." But averse from experiment, and gregariously credulous—

"L'homme est de glace aux vérités ;

Il est de feu pour les mensonges."

1.-JULIUS CÆSAR SCALIGER.1 In his commentary on Theophrastus touching the Causes of Plants, he repeatedly asserts, as the Aristotelic doctrine, the admission of Occult Causes. Thus, (L. ii. c. 5)—“ Hoc dixit (Theophrastus), nequis ab eo nunc exigat occultas illarum, quas subticet, causas. Quasi dicat-Sapienti multa licet ignorare." In like manner, (L. iv. c. 13.)—"Hunc quoque locum simul cum aliis adducere potes adversus eos qui negant Peripateticis ab occulta proprietate quicquam fieri. Apud hunc philosophum sæpe monuimus inveniri. Est autem asylum humanæ imbecillitatis, ac simile perfugium illi Periclis-ɛiç Tà déovτa." This we may translate-"Secret service money."-The same he had also previously declared in his book De Subtilitate; where, for example (Ex. ccxviii, §8), he says:— "Ad manifestas omnia deducere qualitates summa impudentia est;" for there are many of these, "quæ omnino latent animos temperatos, illudunt curiosis ;" and he derides those, "qui irrident salutare asylum illud, occultæ proprietatis."

2.-ALSTEDIUS. (PHYSICA (1630), Pars. I. c. xiii. reg. 4.)—" Quod Augustinus ait, Multa cognoscendo ignorari, et ignorando, cognosci,' hic imprimis habet locum, ubi agitur de Occultis Qualitatibus, quaram investigatio dicitur Magia Naturalis, id est, præstantissima naturæ indagatio in qua verbum modestia, Nescio, subinde usurpandum est. Verbum modestiæ dico, non autem stultitiæ."

3.-VOLTAIRE. (Dictionnaire Philosophique, voce Occultes.)—"Qualites Occultes.-On s'est moqué fort longtemps des qualités occultes; on doit se moquer de ceux qui n'y croient pas. Répétons cent fois, que tout principe, tout premier ressort de quelque œuvre que ce puisse être du grand Demiourgos, est occulte et caché pour jamais aux mortels." And so forth.(Physique Particulière, ch. xxxiii.)-"Il y a donc certainement des lois éternelles, inconnues, suivant lesquelles tout s'opère, sans qu'on puisse les expliquer par la matière et par le mouvement. Il y a dans toutes les Académies une chaire vacante pour les vérités inconnues, comme Athènes avait un autel pour les dieux ignorés.”2

1 I have quoted the elder Scaliger, under all the three heads of this article, for a truth in his language is always acutely and strikingly enounced. The writings of no philosopher, indeed, since those of Aristotle, are better worthy of intelligent study; and few services to philosophy would be greater than a systematic collection and selection of the enduring and general views of this illustrious thinker. For, to apply to him his own expressions, these "zopyra," these "semina æternitatis," lie smothered and unfruitful in a mass of matters of merely personal and transitory interest. I had hoped to have attempted this in the appendix to a work "De vita, genere et genio Scaligerorum;" but this I hope no longer.

2 Besides the few testimonies adduced, I would refer, in general, for some excellent observations on the point, to Fernelius "De Abditis Rerum Causis," and to the "Hypomnemata" of Sennertus.

APPENDIX II. LOGICAL.

(A.) OF SYLLOGISM, ITS KINDS, CANONS, NOTATIONS, ETC.

TOUCHING the principle of an explicitly Quantified Predicate, I had by 1833 become convinced of the necessity to extend and correct the logical doctrine upon this point. In the article on Logic, reprinted above, and first published in April, 1833, the theory of Induction there maintained proceeds on a thorough-going quantification of the predicate, in affirmative propositions. (P. 160, sq.)

Before 1840, I had, however, become convinced, that it was necessary to extend the principle equally to negatives; for I find by academical documents, that in that year, at latest, I had publicly taught the unexclusive doctrine.

The following is an extract from the "Prospectus of Essay toward a new Analytic of Logical Forms," appended to the edition of Reid's Works, published by me in 1846

"In the first place, in the Essay there will be shown, that the Syllogism proceeds, not as has hitherto, virtually at least, been taught, in one, but in the two correlative and counter wholes (Metaphysical) of Comprehension and (Logical) of Extension;—the major premise in the one whole, being the minor premise in the other, &c. Thus is relieved, a radical defect and vital inconsistency in the present logical system.

In the second place, the self-evident truth-That we can only rationally deal with what we already understand, determines the simple logical postulate― To state explicitly what is thought implicitly. From the consistent application of this postulate, on which Logic ever insists, but which Logicians have never fairly obeyed, it follows:-that, logically, we ought to take into account the quantity, always understood in thought, but usually, and for manifest reasons, elided in its expression, not only of the subject, but also of the predicate, of a judgment. This being done, and the necessity of doing it, will be proved against Aristotle and his re peaters, we obtain, inter alia, the ensuing results:

1o, That the preindesignate terms of a proposition, whether subject or predicate, are never, on that account, thought as indefinite (or indeterminate) in quantity. The only indefinite, is particular, as opposed to definite, quantity; and this last, as it is either of an extensive maximum undivided, or of an extensive minimum indivisible, constitutes quantity universal (general), and quantity singular (individual.) In fact, definite and indefinite are the only quantities of which we ought to hear in Logic;

for it is only as indefinite that particular, it is only as definite that individual and general, quantities have any (and the same) logical avail.

20, The revocation of the two Terms of a Proposition to their true re lation; a proposition being always an equation of its subject and its predicate.

3o, The consequent reduction of the Conversion of Propositions from three species to one-that of Simple Conversion.

4o, The reduction of all the General Laws of Categorical Syllogisms to a Single Canon.

5o, The evolution from that one canon of all the Species and varieties of Syllogism.

6o, The abrogation of all the Special Laws of Syllogism.

70, A demonstration of the exclusive possibility of Three syllogistic Figures; and (on new grounds) the scientific and final abolition of the Fourth.

8o, A manifestation that Figure is an unessential variation in syllo gistic form; and the consequent absurdity of Reducing the syllogisms of the other figures to the first.

9°, An enouncement of one Organic Principle for each Figure.

10°, A determination of the true number of the legitimate Moods, with

110, Their amplification in number;

12°, Their numerical equality under all the figures; and,

13°, Their relative equivalence, or virtual identity, throughout every

schematic difference.

14°, That, in the second and third figures, the extremes, holding both the same relation to the middle term, there is not, as in the first, an opposition and subordination between a term major and a term minor, mutually containing and contained, in the counter wholes of Extension and Comprehension.

15°, Consequently, in the second and third figures, there is no determinate major and minor premise, and there are two indifferent conclusions; whereas, in the first, the premises are determinate, and there is a single proximate conclusion.

16°, That the third, as the figure in which Comprehension is predominant, is more appropriate to Induction.

17o, That the second, as the figure in which Extension is predominant, is more appropriate to Deduction.

18°, That the first, as the figure in which Comprehension and Extension are in equilibrium, is common to Induction and Deduction indifferently."

What follows was subjoined, as a Note, to the "Essay on the New Analytic of Logical Forms," by Mr. Thomas Spencer Baynes, which obtained the prize proposed in 1846, but was only published in 1850. The foot-notes are now added.

"The ensuing note contains a summary of my more matured doctrine of the Syllogism, in so far as it is relative to the preceding Essay.

All mediate inference is one-that incorrectly called Categorical; for the Conjunctive and Disjunctive forms of Hypothetical reasoning are reducible to immediate inferences.

Mentally one, the Categorical Syllogism, according to its order of enouncement, is either Analytic (A) or Synthetic (B). Analytic, if (what is inappropriately styled) the conclusion be expressed first, and (what are inappropriately styled) the premises be then stated as its reasons. Synthetic, if the premises precede, and, as it were, effectuate the conclusion.1 These general forms of the syllogism can with ease be distinguished by a competent notation; and every special variety in the one has its corresponding variety in the other.

Taking the syllogism under the latter form (B) (which, though perhaps less natural,2 has been alone cultivated by logicians, and to which, therefore, exclusively all logical nomenclature is relative)-the syllogism is again divided into the Unfigured (a) and the Figured (b).

The Unfigured Syllogism (a) is that in which the terms compared do not stand to each other in the reciprocal relation of subject and predicate, being in the same proposition, either both subjects or both predicates.3 Here the dependency of Breadth and Depth (Extension and Intension, Extension and Comprehension, &c.), does not subsist, and the order, accordingly, of the premises is wholly arbitrary. This form has been overlooked by the logicians, though equally worthy of development as any other; in fact, it affords a key to the whole mystery of Syllogism. And

1 [This, in the first place, relieves the syllogism of two one-sided views. The Aristotelic syllogism is exclusively synthetic; the Epicurean (or Neoclesian) syllogism was-for it has been long forgotten-exclusively analytic; while the Hindoo syllogism is merely a clumsy agglutination of these counter-forms, being nothing but an operose repetition of the same reasoning, enounced, 1°, analytically, 2°, synthetically. In thought, the syllogism is organically one; and it is only stated in an analytic or synthetic form, from the necessity of adopting the one order or the other, in accommodation to the vehicle of its expression-Language. For the conditions of language require, that a reasoning be distinguished into parts, and these detailed before and after other. The analytic and synthetic orders of enouncement are, thus, only accidents of the syllogistic process. This is, indeed, shown in practice; for our best reasonings proceed indifferently in either order.

In the second place, this central view vindicates the Syllogism from the objection of Petitio Principii, which professing logically to annul logic, or at least to reduce it to an idle tautology, defines syllogistic-the art of avowing in the conclusion what has been already confessed in the premises. This objection (which has at least an antiquity of three centuries and a half) is only applicable to the synthetic or Aristotelic order of enouncement, which the objectors, indeed, contemplate as alone possible. It does not hold against the analytic syllogism; it does not hold against the syllogism considered aloof from the accident of its expression; and being proved irrelevant to these, it is easily shown in reference to the synthetic syllogism itself, that it applies only to an accident of its external form.]

2 [I say less natural. For if it be asked-"Is C in A?" surely it is more natural to reply Yes (or C is in A), for C is in B, and B in A (or, for B is in A, and C in B); than to reply-B is in A, and C in B (or, C is in B, and B in A), therefore, C is in A. In point of fact, the analytic syllogism is not only the more natural, it is even presupposed by the synthetic. To express in words, we must first analyze in thought the organic whole-the mental simultaneity of a simple reasoning; and then, we may reverse in thought the process, by a synthetic return. Further, we may now enounce the reasoning in either order; but, certainly, to express it in the essential, primary, or analytic order, is not only more natural, but more direct and simple, than to express it in the accidental, secondary, or synthetic. This also avoids the objection of P. P.].

3 [As: Convertible (identical, &c.) are: All C, and some B: as also all B and all A: therefore all C and some A.-This may be variously stated.]

what is curious, the Canon by which this syllogism is regulated (what may be called that of logical Analogy or Proportion), has, for above five centuries, been commonly stated as the one principle of reasoning, while the form of reasoning itself, to which it properly applies, has never been generalized. This Canon, which has been often erroneously, and never adequately enounced, in rules four, three, two, or one, is as follows:-In as far as two notions (notions proper or individuals), either both agree, or one agreeing, the other does not, with a common third notion; in so far, these notions do or do not agree with each other. The propositions of this syllogism in no-figure are marked in the scheme of pure logical notation by horizontal lines of uniform breadth.

In the Figured Syllogism (b), the terms compared are severally subject and predicate, consequently, in reference to each other, containing and contained in the counter wholes of Intension and Extension. Its Canon is :- What worse relation of subject and predicate subsists between either of two terms and a common third term, with which one, at least, is positively related; that relation subsists between the two terms themselves.In the scheme of pure logical notation a horizontal tapering line marks this relation; the subject standing at the broad, the predicate at the pointed end.

There are three, and only three, Figures-the same as those of Aristotle; and in each of these we may distinguish the orders of Breadth and of Depth.

The First Figure emerges, when the middle term is subject of the one extreme and predicate of the other; that is, when we pass from the one extreme to the other, through the middle, in the order whether of Extension or of Intension. In the notation of this Figure, we may of course arbitrarily make either of these orders to proceed from left to right, or from right to left; that is, two arrangements are competent.-There is here, determinately, one direct and one indirect conclusion.

The Second Figure arises, when the middle term is the predicate of both extremes; the order of Breadth proceeding from middle to extremes, the order of Depth from extremes to middle.

The Third Figure is determined, when the middle term is the subject of both extremes; the order of Extension proceeding from extremes to middle, the order of Intension from middle to extremes.

In the Second and Third Figures there is thus only one arrangement possible in logical notation. And as Extension and Intension are here in equilibrium, there is no definite major and minor premise, and consequently no indirect, but two indifferent conclusions. This is best marked by two crossing lines under the premises, each marking the extreme standing to the other as subject or as predicate.

Of course each Figure has its own Canon, but these it is not here requisite to state.1 The First Figure, besides its more general canon, has

[The several Canons for the several Figures may, however, now be given. They are for the

First Figure. What worse relation of determining (predicate), and of determined (subject), is held by either of two notions to a third, with which one at least is positively related;—that relation do they immediately (directly) hold to each other, and indirectly (mediately) its converse.'

Second Figure.-"What worse relation of determined (subject), is held by either