APPENDIX A. ON KANT'S IDEALISM. IN the foregoing chapters concerning the teaching of Kant I have made no reference to the Commentary on his Critique by Dr. Kuno Fischer, which has recently been translated, with additional disquisitions, by Mr. Mahaffy. I was not aware of the existence of this work till after the preceding chapters were sent to the press. Since that was done I have seen the work in question, and finding in it interesting matter relating to subjects which I had previously noticed, I add here remarks having reference to some points of importance. I notice that Mr. Mahaffy signalises very clearly the difference between Kant's doctrine concerning transcendental illusion and that ascribed to him by Sir W. Hamilton; and after having explained this, he asks, not unnaturally, "Was there ever a more flagrant falsification of a philosopher's opinions ?"* * Mahaffy's Translation of Fischer's Commentary, Introduction, p. lxiv. Both Dr. Fischer and Mr. Mahaffy express opinions of much interest concerning Kant's Idealism; and the question whether he taught a uniform doctrine on this subject. Dr. Fischer agrees with Schopenhauer in thinking that he did not do so; that in the First Edition of the Critique he taught a pure Idealism, in a clear and unambiguous manner, while in his Second Edition he marred and contradicted this. Mr. Mahaffy disputes this view of the case, holding that there was no such change; that both editions teach consistently the same doctrine. In examining Hamilton's teaching we saw that very different opinions may be entertained concerning the nature of Phenomena. Thus it may be held that all Phenomena are modes of the Ego; or it may be held that some Phenomena are external material things, not modes of the Ego. In order to understand the real meaning of Kant's doctrine, it is essential that we should know what view he holds concerning the nature of Phenomena. Unless we know this, we cannot understand the nature of Noumena (Dinge an sich selbst). And as the distinction between Phenomena and Noumena lies. at the very root of Kant's philosophy, uncertainty on the above points casts doubt and obscurity over the whole of his doctrine. One of the portions of matter introduced into Kant's Second Edition, which is regarded by Schopenhauer and Dr. Fischer as incompatible with the decided Idealism of the First, is the so takes to prove called Refutation of Idealism. In this Kant under"the existence of external objects in space". "das Daseyn der Gegenstände im Raum ausser mir." And he calls these objects in Space "Dinge" and "wirkliche Dinge.' So that, having previously contended that objects in Space are merely Phenomena, not things in themselves (Dinge an sich selbst), he now contends that these objects are Things, real things, and really external. Here, therefore, his doctrine seems to assume a Realistic form, similar to the Realism of Hamilton; which combines the two positions: 1. that we can know only Phenomena; and 2. that some Phenomena are real external things, differing from the Ego and its modes. Dr. Fischer wholly refuses to regard Phenomena in this realistic light; maintaining that Phenomena in all cases are nothing but modes of the Ego, representations within us; and that if we deny this, and regard them as real external things, not modes of the Ego, we spoil the whole of Kant's doctrine. Dr. Fischer's opinions being of much interest, I quote some of his statements. He says: "The objects of knowledge are: either things without us, real things (res), or merely representations within us (idea). Let us call the first view Realism, the second Idealism; and let us put to Kant the question: What objects, according to his system, are cognoscible? Which are the only * Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, ed. Hartenstein, p. 211 et seq. possible objects of our cognition, res or idea? He has already determined all knowledge to be experience, because its only objects are phenomena. But the phenomena are felt by our perception, represented by our intuition, connected by our imagination, made objective by our understanding and its concepts. There is in phenomena nothing which is not subjective. They are nothing but our representations, and can be nothing else. It is perfectly inconceivable how a thing existing apart from our power of representation-a thing per se-could come with all its properties into our faculty of representation, and ever become a representation. But, if there be no representation of a thing, how can there be a knowledge of it? It follows from this, that the only possible objects of knowledge can never be anything but our representations. This is the very basis of the Critick of the Pure Reason, and its original form is perfectly in accordance with this spirit. In this sense, it is thoroughly idealistic. The whole problem of cognition lies on this safe basis. If the objects of all possible cognition are merely phenomena that is, representations in us-and altogether subjective, how is a cognition of them possible, which must yet be universal and necessary? How is an objective experience of them possible? This is the question of the Critick. This question makes the investigation both novel and difficult. Berkeley knew that all our objects were only representations; but had no suspicion how from such objects any cognition should ever come; so his doctrine lapsed into the scepticism of Hume. We must not, then, identify Kant with Berkeley, as Garven did, in his well-known criticism. Kant, indeed, agreed with Berkeley in this, that he too allowed no objects of knowledge but representations; but he differed from Berkeley in this, that he discovered the universal and necessary representations, which are not themselves objects, but produce objects the necessary forms of representation both of the understanding and the sensibility; and in this very discovery consists the Critick of the Pure Reason. "To make the distinction between himself and Berkeley plain, Kant might have laid much more stress on the critical character of his investigations, but should never have weakened their idealism. This was the mistaken line which he took in his Second Edition. Here he wrote, as an appendix to the 'Postulates of Empirical Thinking,' that 'Refutation of Idealism' which was directed immediately against Berkeley. And his whole demonstration comes to this, that it is only the existence of things without us which first renders possible the perception of ourselves. As if, in the true spirit of the Critick, things without us could be anything else than things in space-as if space could be anything else than our representation— as if things without us could be anything but our spatial representations! This is no refutation of Berkeley, but merely a flat denial of Idealism, by |