ditioned about which Hamilton reasons is nothing at all, and that in proving its incognisability, Hamilton proves merely the incognisability of a zero? O! it is exclaimed, this is a gross error. Though the notion of the Unconditioned is a mere zero, the Unconditioned itself is not a zero: its existence cannot be denied without Atheism. All the best divines teach that though we speak of God as conditioned, yet in reality God is unconditioned, unpropertied, devoid of faculties. proving that we cannot know the Unconditioned, Hamilton proves that we cannot know God as he really is, and thus effectually annihilates Metaphysical Theology; a result of immense value.

In

By shifting backwards and forwards from one of these views to the other, and by occasionally mixing them both together, it may be hoped to obtain for Hamilton's doctrine the protection of obscurity. But such a method of procedure is not calculated, on the whole, to be more successful than that of the ostrich, when, burying its head in the sand, it imagines itself to be invisible, and safe from its pursuers.

CHAPTER VII.

WE have already seen from our examination of Hamilton's statements, that he evidently regards knowledge of the Unconditioned as greatly superior to knowledge of the Conditioned. The former is knowledge of actual fact, of that which really is; while the latter is knowledge only of that which seems, the reflection of a reality we cannot know, -an ignorance or nescience rather than a knowledge.

But why, it may naturally be asked, does Hamilton regard that which is conditioned as shadowy and comparatively unreal, and that which is unconditioned as so much more real and important? What is the meaning which, in taking such a view, he attaches to the words Conditioned and Unconditioned?

He can hardly be using the word "condition" in the sense which properly belongs to the German word "bedingung," according to which the aggregate of conditions, "bedingungen," constitute the

cause.

For in this sense of the word, the condi

tioned (das Bedingte) is not shadowy or unreal. That which is contingent, that which stands to something else in the relation of conditionatum to conditio (or of bedingtes to bedingung), may nevertheless be perfectly real. For instance, according to many theologians, the Second and Third Persons of the Trinity are not self-existent, but stand to the First Person in the relation of bedingtes to bedingung, and yet the Second and Third Persons are considered by these Theologians to be perfectly real. Again: the great body of Theologians regard the world-sun, stars, earth, animals, men, angels, devils, as contingent, as standing to God in the relation of conditionatum to conditio, and yet as real. And Hamilton probably would concur in this view. To regard the selfexistent or non-contingent Being as alone real, and every thing else as unreal, would probably be denounced by him as Pantheism.

Mr. Mill considers this meaning of the word Condition (i.e. that in which it corresponds with the German word Bedingung), and shows that it does not suit Hamilton's doctrine.* After trying some other senses, which he does not find satisfactory, Mr. Mill suggests the following. "He means by Conditions something similar to Kant's Forms of Sense, and Categories of Understanding He is applying to the mind the scholastic maxim-'Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis.' He means that our per

* See Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 51 and 52.

ceptive and conceptive faculties have their own. laws, which not only determine what we are capable of perceiving and conceiving, but put into our perceptions and conceptions elements not derived from the thing perceived or conceived, but from the mind itself."*

Thus the doctrine, "to think is to condition," would mean, that in thinking we put into the object of thought elements derived from the mind. itself, so that the Phenomenon cognised by us differs from the Noumenon, the external co-efficient which co-operates with our faculties in producing the Phenomenon. The "conditioning"

action of the intellect thus understood is that described by Bacon, when he says that "intellectus humanus suam naturam naturæ rerum immiscet, eamque distorquet et inficit." The Noumenon, the real external agent, or thing as it is, is unconditioned, because not altered or distorted by the action of the intellect.

When this is the sense attached to the words "conditioned" and "unconditioned," we readily understand why Hamilton considers the Unconditioned as real, and the Conditioned as only the distorted reflection of a reality-as that which seems to us, not that which actually is.

The writer in the Contemporary Review, previously noticed, gives an explanation of the matter much agreeing with that of Mr. Mill. He says: "The assertion that all our knowledge is relative,

• Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 54.

in other words, that we know things only under such conditions as the laws of our cognitive faculties impose upon us, is a statement which looks at first sight like a truism, but which really contains an answer to a very important question-'Have we reason to believe that the laws of our cognitive faculties impose any conditions at all? that the mind in any way reacts on the objects affecting it, so as to produce a result different from that which would be produced were it merely a passive recipient?' 'The mind of man,' says Bacon, 'is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things shall reflect according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced.' Can what Bacon says of the fallacies of the mind be also said of its proper cognitions? Does the mind, by its own action, in any way distort the appearance of the things presented to it; and if so, how far does. the distortion extend, and in what manner is it to be rectified? To trace the course of this inquiry from the day when Plato compared the objects perceived by the senses to the shadows thrown by the fire on the wall of a cave, to the day when Kant declared that we know only phenomena, not things in themselves, would be to write the history of philosophy. We can only at present call attention to one movement in that history, which was, in effect, a revolution in philosophy. The older philosophers in general distinguished