of the Unconditioned.

Now a large number of

persons regard total inconceivability as involving incredibility. Hence, when Hamilton declares that the Unconditioned is totally inconceivable, that it cannot be affirmed at all in conformity with the conditions of our intellect, &c., they naturally suppose that the Unconditioned of which he thus speaks is both incogitable and incredible-a mere nonentity or zero. And if other expositors ascribe to him the opinion that the Unconditioned of which he thus speaks is not unreal or incredible, they are apt to resent this as grossly unjust, as imputing to him a flagrant absurdity.

That partial inconceivability does not involve incredibility is generally admitted: it is probable, indeed, that nothing is conceived fully or adequately by the human mind. If Hamilton merely said that the Unconditioned, though partially inconceivable, nevertheless could be a legitimate object of belief, his statement would occasion no difficulty. But if it is said that the Unconditioned is wholly inconceivable, as inconceivable as a circular square, or a virtuous logarithm, and yet that its existence ought to be believed, then a great number of persons feel themselves staggered; and they think that Hamilton cannot have taught such a doctrine.

It is urged, indeed, that conception is of the how, and belief of the that; that because we cannot conceive how A is possible, we are not thereby incapacitated from believing that A exists. A cir

N

cular square and a virtuous logarithm are inconceivable, i.e. we cannot conceive how a square can be circular, or how a logarithm can be virtuous; but this, it is urged, does not render us incapable of believing that a square is circular, or that a logarithm is virtuous. But these representations do not satisfy the expositors in question, who declare that when they find themselves unable to understand how a circle can be square, or how a logarithm can be virtuous,-when they find themselves unable to conceive, or mentally take together the attributes verbally united in the written symbols,— they do find themselves greatly impeded in believing that circular squares or virtuous logarithms exist. Accordingly, this class of interpreters do not like to attribute to Hamilton the doctrine that the Unconditioned is totally inconceivable and incogitable, and yet credible, real, existent. And they try to relieve him from the difficulty attending such a doctrine, by supposing that there are two different Unconditioneds, one nugatory, the other divine; that some of his language has reference to one of these, and some of it to the other.

Another class of expositors regard such a view as feeble and erroneous, calculated to damage Hamilton, and to mar his doctrine. According to them, the principal merit of Hamilton's labours consists in this, that he effects the complete disjunction of cogitability from credibility. In support of this view they appeal to the language of Hamilton himself as for instance, when he says:

"What I have said as to the infinite being (subjectively) inconceivable, does not at all derogate from our belief of its (objective) reality. In fact, the main scope of my speculation is to show articulately, that we must believe, as actual, much that we are unable (positively) to conceive, as even possible."* When once, say they, we frankly recognise that inconceivability even of the most extreme kind is no proof of incredibility, then we shall be able to understand that the Unconditioned may be as inconceivable as a circular square, or a virtuous logarithm, or coloured time, and yet that it may not be incredible, or a zero. We shall understand that Hamilton may regard its notion as purely negative, and may pronounce it to have no affirmation, either subjective or objective, under the conditions of our intellect, and yet may believe it to exist. An Unconditioned thing or Being may be wholly incogitable, all our attempts to think about such an object or about affirmations concerning it may be frustrated by contradiction; and yet belief that an Unconditioned Being exists may be perfectly legitimate, and even necessary. This, say they, is the grand truth, which Hamilton has demonstrated by strict logical reasoning in the most irrefragable manner.

* Letter to Mr. Calderwood. Lectures, vol. ii. p. 535.

CHAPTER VI.

To illustrate the differences of opinion which have arisen concerning the true meaning of Hamilton's doctrine of the Unconditioned, I propose here to examine the accounts given of it by Mr. Mill, who opposes Hamilton, and by a recent writer in the Contemporary Review, who defends Hamilton, and complains that Mr. Mill has wholly misunderstood him. In paying attention to this latter work I shall perhaps be blamed by some critics, who think that an author loses dignity in noticing "ephemeral literature." But I do not myself share this view. Writers of great ability, amongst others Dr. Dorner and Mr. Mansel, have contributed to the journal in question; and a writing of ability does not lose in importance because it appears in the pages of a Review. It may be remembered that Hamilton's article on the Unconditioned made its appearance in this very manner.

Mr. Mill says: "The question really at issue in Sir W. Hamilton's celebrated and striking review of Cousin's Philosophy is this: Have we or have

we not an immediate intuition of God? The name of God is veiled under two extremely abstract phrases, the Infinite' and 'the Absolute.'"* Mr. Mill proceeds to say: "In this contest it is almost superfluous for me to say that I am entirely with Sir W. Hamilton. The doctrine that we have an immediate or intuitive knowledge of God, I consider to be bad metaphysics, involving a false conception of the nature and limits of the human faculties, and grounded on a superficial and erroneous psychology. Whatever relates to God I hold with Sir W. Hamilton to be matter of inference; I would add, of inference a posteriori."†

The writer in the Contemporary Review asserts that Mr. Mill has wholly missed the meaning of Hamilton's doctrine concerning the incognisability of the Absolute and the Infinite, and says that he will make this clear. He takes objection at once to Mr. Mill's statement that "the name of God is veiled under two extremely abstract phrases, 'the Infinite and the Absolute,"" and complains that by substituting the word God in place of the Infinite, Mr. Mill altogether perverts Hamilton's argument. He has failed, we are told, to see that the Infinite treated of by Hamilton is "the pseudo-Infinite," which is entirely different from "the true Infinite," and so far from being identical with God, or like God, is the name of nothing at all.

We have, however, seen, from the previous

• Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 32.

† Ibid. p. 33.