Next to Fichte in the order of time, but differing widely from him as it respects the tendency of their respective systems, appears Schelling, the projector of the "natural philosophy" so called; a branch of transcendentalism which was afterwards more fully developed, and reduced to a system by Oken. If Fichte confined himself too exclusively to the subjective, Schelling on the other hand treats principally of the object, and endeavours to show that the outward world is of the same essence with the thinking mind, both being different manifestations of the same divine principle. He is the ontologist of the Kantian school. All knowledge, according to him,* consists in an agreement between an object and a subject. In all science, therefore, there are these two elements or poles, subject and object, or nature and intelligence; and corresponding to these two poles there are two fundamental sciences, the one beginning with nature and proceeding upward to intelligence, the other beginning with intelligence and ending in nature. The first is natural philosophy, the second transcendental philosophy. Of all the Germans who have trod the path of metaphysical inquiry under the guidance of Kant, Schelling is the most satisfactory. In him intellectual philosophy is more ripe, more substantial, more promising, and, if we may apply such a term to such speculations, more practical than in any of the others. Though in one sense a follower of Kant, he begins a new period, and may be considered as the founder of a new school. Of the other successors of Kant, Hegel, Oken, Fries, Reinhold, Krug, Plattner and others, our information would not enable us to say much, and our limits forbid us to say any thing. The three whom we have particularized are the only ones who appear to us to possess much individuality, or to have exercised much influence in the philosophical world. In designating these, we have done all that this brief sketch requires. We need only add, that the best histories of philosophy, and, with the exception of Cousin's, the only good ones we have, are productions of German philosophers. If now it be asked, as probably it will be asked, whether any definite and substantial good has resulted from the labors of Kant and his followers, we answer, Much. More * Schelling. Transcendentaler Idealismus. But in than metaphysics ever before accomplished, these men have done for the advancement of the human intellect. It is true the immediate, and if we may so speak, the calculable results of their speculations are not so numerous nor so evident as might have been expected: these are chiefly comprised under the head of method. Yet even here we have enough to make us rejoice that such men have been, and that they have lived and spoken in our day. We need mention only the sharp and rightly dividing lines that have been drawn within and around the kingdom of human knowledge; the strongly marked distinctions of subject and object, reason and understanding, phenomena and noumena; - the categories established by Kant; the moral liberty proclaimed by him as it had never been proclaimed by any before; the authority and evidence of law and duty set forth by Fichte; the universal harmony illustrated by Schelling. mentioning these things, which are the direct results of the critical philosophy, we have by no means exhausted all that that philosophy has done for liberty and truth. The preeminence of Germany among the nations of our day in respect of intellectual culture, is universally acknowledged; and we do fully believe that whatever excellence that nation has attained in science, in history, or poetry is mainly owing to the influence of her philosophy, to the faculty which that philosophy has imparted of seizing on the spirit of every question, and determining at once the point of view from which each subject should be regarded, - in one word, to the transcendental method. In theology this influence has been most conspicuous. We are indebted to it for that dauntless spirit of inquiry which has investigated, and for that amazing erudition which has illustrated, every corner of biblical lore. Twice it has saved the religion of Germany, - once from the extreme of fanatic extravagance, and again, from the verge of speculative infidelity. But, though most conspicuous in theology, this influence has been visible in every department of intellectual exertion to which the Germans have applied themselves for the last thirty years. It has characterized each science and each art, and all bear witness to its quickening power. A philosophy which has given such an impulse to mental culture and scientific research, which has done so much to establish and to extend the spiritual in man, and the ideal in nature, needs no apology; it commends itself by its fruits, it lives in its fruits, and must ever live, though the name of its founder be forgotten, and not one of its doctrines survive. We have wandered far from the subject of our critique, It is time we should return and take our final leave. It was not our intention in this brief review of Mr. Coleridge's literary merits to criticize in particular any one of the works whose titles stand at the head of this article. But the "Aids to Reflection," as containing an account of the author's religious views, demand a passing notice in a work like this, In his biography, Mr. Coleridge describes the state of his mind, with respect to religion, previous to his leaving England, by saying that his head was with Spinoza, and his heart with Paul and John; which means, we presume, that he found it impossible to reconcile his religion with his philosophy. In another passage, he tells us that he was at this time a Unitarian, "or more accurately a Psilanthropist," which term he chooses to consider as synonymous with the former. We understand it very differently. Psilanthropism, according to our definition, means Humanitarianism, - a doctrine which has no more necessary connexion with the Unitarian faith than with the Roman Catholic. In the "Aids to Reflection," our author would have us believe that he has accomplished at last the wished for reconciliation between his head and his heart. To us the breach seems as wide as ever. In this work he appears as a zealous Trinitarian, and a warm defender of the doctrines of the English church. We have no doubt of his sincerity; but unless we err greatly, he has either misunderstood his own views, or grossly misinterpreted the doctrines of his church. His view of the Trinity, as far as we can understand it, is as consistent with Unitarianism, to say the least, as his former psilanthropic scheme. His opinion of the atonement is far from Orthodox; the idea of vicarious suffering he rejects with disdain. The strong expressions used by St. Paul in reference to this subject, he tells us are not intended to designate the act of redemption, but are only figurative expressions descriptive of its effects. The act of redemption he calls a "mystery," which term, as it may mean any thing, means, in reality, nothing. The other doctrines fare in the same way. Every thing is first mystified into a sort of imposing indistinctness, and then pronounced to be genuine Orthodoxy. The truth is, Mr. Coleridge, though a great scholar, was not qualified in point of biblical learning for an undertaking like this. Many of his assertions, we are persuaded, would not have been hazarded, had he not taken his understanding of the New Testament for granted, but studied that book with the same diligence and perseverance which he appears to have bestowed upon other works. With these exceptions, however, we consider the "Aids to Reflection" as a very valuable work. The distinctions between prudence and morality, and between natural and spiritual religion, are sound and important. On the whole, in summing up Mr. Coleridge's merits, we cannot but regard him as endowed with an intellect of the highest order, as a profound thinker, and a powerful writer, though not a successful poet or an amiable critic. As a translator, he has no equal in English literature. His prejudices are strong,* his tastes confined, his pedantry often oppressive, his egotism unbounded. Yet we can never read a chapter in any one of his prose works, without feeling ourselves intellectually exalted and refined. Never can we sufficiently admire the depth and richness of his thoughts, the beauty of his illustrations, the exceeding fitness and force of all his words. If he is too minute in details to shine in the higher walks of literature, too anxious in the elaboration of single parts, to succeed in the total effect, it must be allowed that few compositions will bear so close an inspection, and still maintain their color and their gloss so well as his. If he divides nature and life and human art into too many particulars, it cannot be denied that his divisions, like those of the prism, give to each particular an individuality and a glory, which it did not possess while merged and lost in the whole to which it belonged. If he has produced far less than might have been expected from a mind so ready and so rich, we will nevertheless cheerfully accord to him the credit which he claims in his own appeal against a similar charge. " Would * Mr. Coleridge's prejudices against the French nation, and all that belongs to them, are unreasonable and absurd in the extreme. He is said, upon one occasion, during the delivery of a public lecture, in the presence of a numerous assembly, to have thanked God in the most serious manner for so ordering events, "that he was entirely ignorant of a single word of that frightful jargon, the French language." that the criterion of a scholar's utility were the number and moral value of the truths which he has been the means of throwing into the general circulation, or the number and value of the minds whom by his conversation or letters he has excited into activity, and supplied with the germs of their after-growth. A distinguished rank might not even then be awarded to my exertions, but I should dare look forward with confidence to an honorable acquittal." * ART. VIII. - Remarks on the Influence of Mental Cultiva tion upon Health. By AMARIAH BRIGHAM. Hartford. F. J. Huntington. 1832. 12mo. pp. 116. THOUGH it has a grave title, this is a lively book, abounding in curious illustration, and occasionally seasoned with a spice of pleasant satire. Let no one, therefore, forbear to read it, under the impression that it is a dry disquisition, for it is as far from being so as possible. There is, moreover, a plenty of good sense in these "Remarks," and though we cannot always give our full assent to the propositions which are advanced by their writer, we are of opinion that he has spoken on an important subject seasonably and well. Mr., or Dr. Brigham, - if he is a physician, he ought to have told us so on his title-page, - is not afraid to express his disapprobation of the way in which instruction is too apt to be forced and crowded upon the mind in these very busy times; nor are we afraid of declaring that to a considerable extent we agree with him. He is of opinion that it is all wrong to be undermining the physical constitution of children, by making them puny prodigies of learning, - and we are of the same opinion. He insists that the brain may be overworked and overloaded as well as the stomach; and that by an injudicious fatigue of the mental faculties, the stomach is deranged, and people get the dyspepsia, - and we think so too. These positions we regard as perfectly sound, and supported by facts which are before our daily observation. Some of the reasonings of Dr. Brigham which * Biographia Literaria, Chapter 10. VOL. XIV. - N. S. VOL. IX. NO. I. 17 |