LXI.

At idola theatri innata non sunt, nec occulto insinuata in intellectum 10; sed ex fabulis theoriarum, et perversis legibus demonstrationum, plane indita et recepta. In his autem confutationes tentare et suscipere consentaneum prorsus non est illis, quae a nobis dicta sunt. Quum enim nec de principiis consentiamus, nec de demonstrationibus, tollitur omnis argumentatio. Id vero bono fit fato, ut antiquis suus constet honos". Nihil enim illis detrahitur, quum de via omnino quaestio sit. Claudus enim (ut dicitur) in via antevertit cursorem extra viam. Etiam illud manifesto liquet, currenti extra viam, quo habilior sit et velocior, eo majorem contingere aberrationem.

Nostra vero inveniendi scientias ea est ratio, ut non multum ingeniorum acumini et robori relinquatur; sed quae ingenia et intellectus fere exaequet 12. Quemadmodum enim ad hoc

10 The words 'insinuata in intellectum' apply to the Idola Fori. For the various divisions of the Idola given in the different works of Bacon, see notes on Aphs. 38, 39. We have here a trace of the old division into 'innata,' including the Idola Tribus and Idola Specus, and 'adscititia,' which were co-extensive with the Idola Theatri. Cp. pp. 170, 171. The Idola Fori, as falling under neither division, created a difficulty, and seem here to be regarded as intermediate between the two.

The two divisions of the Idola Theatri, namely, those arising from false systems of philosophy and those arising from perverse laws of demonstration, are sometimes treated by Bacon, as, for instance, in the Distributio Operis, as if they were distinct classes of Idola. Corresponding to them, he proposes to furnish in the Novum Organum a 'Redargutio Philosophiarum' and a 'Redargutio Demonstrationum.' But these 'Redargutiones,' it will be found, are not kept altogether distinct in the Aphorisms which follow. To the remaining 'Idola' corresponds the 'Redargutio Rationis humanae nativae.' Cp. p. 171.

11 In this and similar passages, which abound throughout the Novum Organum, it is impossible not to detect an air of contemptuous superiority. "Why should I contend with the ancients for the palm of genius, when it is enough for me that I am on the right road, and they on the wrong Let them run as fast as they like. They will only run the further from the truth.'

one.

12 Commenting on this passage, Macaulay (Essay on Bacon) says: 'This really seems to us as extravagant as it would have been in Lindley Murray to announce that every body who should learn his Grammar would write as good English as Dryden, or in that very able writer, the Archbishop of Dublin, to promise that all the readers of his Logic would reason like Chillingworth, and that all the readers of his Rhetoric would speak like

ut linea recta fiat, aut circulus perfectus describatur, multum est in constantia et exercitatione manus, si fiat ex vi manus propria, sin autem adhibeatur regula, aut circinus, parum aut nihil; omnino similis est nostra ratio. Licet autem confutationum particularium nullus sit usus; de sectis tamen et generibus hujusmodi theoriarum nonnihil dicendum est; atque etiam paulo post de signis exterioribus, quod se male habeant; et postremo de causis tantae infelicitatis et tam diuturni et generalis in errore consensus; ut ad vera minus difficilis sit aditus, et intellectus humanus volentius expurgetur et idola dimittat.

LXII.

Idola theatri, sive theoriarum, multa sunt, et multo plura esse possunt, et aliquando fortasse erunt. Nisi enim per multa jam saecula hominum ingenia circa religionem et theologiam occupata fuissent; atque etiam politiae civiles (praesertim monarchiae) ab istiusmodi novitatibus, etiam in contemplationibus, essent aversae; ut cum periculo et detrimento fortunarum suarum in illas homines incumbant, non solum praemio destituti, sed etiam contemptui et invidiae expositi; complures aliae proculdubio philosophiarum et theoriarum sectae, similes illis, quae magna varietate olim apud Graecos

Burke. That Bacon was altogether mistaken as to this point will now hardly be disputed. His philosophy has flourished during two hundred years, and has produced none of this levelling. The interval between a man of talents and a dunce is as wide as ever; and is never more clearly discernible than when they engage in researches which require the constant use of induction.'

Bacon's promise never has been, and never can be fulfilled. In the Inductive Sciences, there is the same scope for the play of the Imagination, for the work of the creative and inventive faculty, as in Art or Poetry; and there is at least as much occasion for acuteness and rapidity of reasoning as in what are called the exact sciences. The greatest discoveries in science have always been made by men with a keen perception of the analogies of nature, and, consequently, with an aptitude for framing bold, and, at the same time, just hypotheses. The study of scientific method may, and, I believe, does, strengthen and cultivate a man's original powers, but it can never create them or supply their place. It must not be forgotten, however, that, in the work of science, even the humblest intellect can do good service in the way of collecting and arranging materials for subsequent investigation.

I shall recur to this topic in a note on the parallel passage in Aph. 122.

floruerunt, introductae fuissent. Quemadmodum enim super phaenomena aetheris plura themata coeli confingi possunt; similiter, et multo magis, super phaenomena philosophiae fundari possunt et constitui varia dogmata. Atque hujusmodi theatri fabulae habent etiam illud, quod in theatro poetarum usu venit; ut narrationes fictae ad scenam narrationibus ex historia veris concinniores sint et elegantiores, et quales quis magis vellet.

In genere autem, in materiam philosophiae sumitur aut multum ex paucis, aut parum ex multis 13; ut utrinque philosophia super experientiae et naturalis historiae nimis angustam 14 basin fundata sit, atque ex paucioribus, quam par est, pronunciet. Rationale 15 enim genus philosophantium ex experientia arripiunt varia et vulgaria, eaque neque certo comperta, nec diligenter examinata et pensitata; reliqua in meditatione atque ingenii agitatione ponunt.

Est et aliud genus philosophantium, qui in paucis experimentis sedulo et accurate elaborarunt, atque inde philosophias

13 Multum ex paucis' evidently refers to the Empirical School, as described below and in many other passages, and, consequently, 'parum ex multis' must refer to the Rational or Sophistic School. But its meaning, as referred to this school, is not obvious, the charge against it usually being that it founds propositions of too wide a degree of generality on too slender a basis of fact. Can the phrase mean that the first inferences drawn by the Rational School, instead of being true 'axiomata minime generalia' and therefore just covering the facts and no more, are of too vague and general a character, being based on a cursory view of a great number of facts, to be of any service with respect to subsequent inductions? The whole passage might then be paraphrased as follows: 'The Empirical School examines minutely a small number of facts, and bases far too many inferences upon them; the Rational or Sophistic School examines cursorily a large number of facts, and infers from them too few conclusions, while those conclusions are of so vague a character as to be practically useless.' It must be remembered that the 'axiomata minime generalia,' or first inferences from the facts, would, according to Bacon's ideal, be very numerous, and would furnish the basis for subsequent inductions of various degrees.

14 In the first case, the basis of facts is too small; in the second case, the axiomata minime generalia,' from which subsequent axioms are to be inferred, are too few.

15 Called below 'Sophistic.' This division of philosophers trusts too much to mere reasoning, as the next trusts too much to mere experience.

educere et confingere ausi sunt; reliqua miris modis ad ea detorquentes 16.

Est et tertium genus eorum, qui theologiam et traditiones ex fide et veneratione immiscent; inter quos vanitas nonnullorum ad petendas et derivandas scientias a spiritibus scilicet et geniis 17 deflexit; ita ut stirps errorum et philosophia falsa genere triplex sit: sophistica,, empirica, et superstitiosa.

LXIII.

Primi generis exemplum in Aristotele maxime conspicuum est, qui philosophiam naturalem dialectica sua corrupit 18: quum mundum ex categoriis effecerit 19; animae humanae, nobilissimae substantiae, genus ex vocibus secundae intentionis tribuerit 20; negotium densi et rari, per quod corpora subeunt

16 He here probably alludes specially to Paracelsus.

17 The allusion here is probably to the Neo-Platonists and Cabbalists, or possibly again to Paracelsus, or, perhaps, to the followers of what Bacon elsewhere calls 'Superstitious Magic.'

1 See note 90 on Aph. 54.

19 This may be a specific reference to the opening chapters of the De Coelo, for an account of which the student, who is not familiar with the physical works of Aristotle, may consult Mr. Lewes' Aristotle, ch. 7 (pp. 136, &c.). Or it may refer generally to Aristotle's frequent practice of substituting for the physical explanation of a physical phenomenon its reduction to one of the Categories or to some other arbitrary metaphysical distinction of his own. Or, lastly, it may mean that Aristotle dogmatically attempted to include all forms of existence under one or other of his Categories. Whether, if this last be Bacon's meaning, he has rightly interpreted Aristotle's doctrine of Categories, this is not the place to enquire. The work called the 'Categories' is of doubtful authority, but the distinction itself occurs or is implied in many other works, which are undoubtedly Aristotelian.

There is a parallel passage in the Cogitata et Visa (E. and S., vol. iii. p. 601): 'Hujus autem philosophiae [sc. Philosophiae Naturalis, quam a Graecis accepimus] jam consensu principem Aristotelem, intacta fere ac illibata Natura, in communibus notionibus, atque earum inter se comparatione, collisione, et reductione inutiliter versatum esse. Neque sane quicquam solidi ab eo sperari, qui etiam mundum e categoriis effecerit : Parum enim interesse, utrum quis materiam formam et privationem, an substantiam qualitatem et relationem, principia rerum posuerit.'

2 This is probably a criticism of a passage in the De Anima, ii. 1 (5), which, however, applies, not to the human soul only, but to life in general: διὰ ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. Without some explanation of this definition, Bacon's criticism is unintel

majores et minores dimensiones sive spatia, per frigidam distinctionem actus et potentiae transegerit 21; motum singulis corporibus unicum et proprium, et, si participent ex alio motu, id aliunde moveri, asseruerit 22: et innumera alia, pro lig`ble, and, bearing in mind the account, given in note 86 on Aph. 51, of the technical terms ενέργεια and ἐντελέχεια, this may easily be supplied.

The lifeless body, as, for instance, the embryo, may be regarded as capable of life. It attains its actuality, as soon as it begins to live. Thus, vʊxý is the actual manifestation (évreλéxea) of that life which every organized body has potentially. But why πрóτη? We must recollect that divapis and ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια are purely relative terms; what is a δύναμις in one relation may be an ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια in another. Now ψυχή, as we have seen, is the ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια οἱ σῶμα, but ψυχή, when once manifested, begins to perform various functions (such as, in the case of man, are perception, thought, &c.). These acts or functions are themselves évépyetat, of which yux', in its dormant state, may be regarded as the duvauis. Hence, while the manifestations of yvx are, as it were, δευτέραι ἐνέργειαι, ψυχή itself is a πρώτη ενέργεια.

That the technical terms of which the definition of x is composed represent 'second intentions' or 'second notions' is plain enough. The student, who is not acquainted with the distinction between 'first' and 'second' notions, should refer to Sir W. Hamilton's Essay on Logic (Discussions, p. 139) or Dr. Mansel's edition of Aldrich's Logic, cap. 1. § 3. div. 8, note. It is possible, however, that Bacon may use the phrase in its later sense, as employed by Aldrich and others, in which case it is equally applicable to the terms of the definition criticised.

21 Bacon is here probably referring to a passage in the Physics, iv. 5 (6) [p. 213 a. 1-4]: οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀὴρ ἔχει πρὸς ὕδωρ ̓ οἷον ὕλη γάρ, τὸ δ ̓ εἶδος τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ ὕλη αέρος, ὁ δ ̓ ἀὴρ οἷον ἐνέργειά τις ἐκείνου· τὸ γὰρ ὕδωρ δυνάμει ἀήρ ἐστιν, ὁ δ ̓ ἀὴρ δυνάμει ὕδωρ ἄλλον τρόπον. Water is regarded as condensed air, and air as rarefied water, and, therefore, either may, in a certain sense, be regarded as being the other potentially. 'Actus' and 'potentia,' of course, correspond respectively with ἐνέργεια and δύναμις.

Mr. Ellis in his Preface to the Historia Densi et Rari (vol. ii. pp. 236-7) refers to another passage in Aristotle (Categ. ch. 8. p. 10 a. 16-24), where the dense and the rare are explained as due to different modes of the disposition of particles, the particles in dense bodies being near one another, and in rare bodies standing further apart. This is Bacon's own explanation. 22 This is an allusion to the Scholastic distinction of 'Motus Proprius' and 'Motus Alienus.' All bodies were supposed to have some one motion, and one motion only, proper to them. But, in addition to this motion, they might participate in one or more other motions communicated to them by other bodies. Thus, for instance, the wheel of a watch has a proper motion of one kind only, but, besides this, it may share in the motion of the wearer of the watch. And if the wearer of the watch is sailing on the sea, it participates in no less than three 'extraneous and common' motions, namely the motion of the wearer, the motion of the