II.

Nec manus nuda, nec intellectus sibi permissus, multum valet; instrumentis et auxiliis res perficitur; quibus opus est, non minus ad intellectum, quam ad manum. Atque ut instrumenta manus motum aut cient aut regunt; ita et instrumenta mentis intellectui aut suggerunt aut cavent.

III.

Scientia et potentia humana in idem coincidunt, quia ignoratio causae destituit effectum. Natura enim non nisi parendo vincitur: et quod in contemplatione instar causae est, id in operatione instar regulae est.

IV.

Ad opera nil aliud potest homo, quam ut corpora naturalia admoveat et amoveat: reliqua natura intus transigit1.

V.

Solent se immiscere naturae (quoad opera 5) mechanicus, mathematicus, medicus, alchemista, et magus; sed omnes (ut nunc sunt res) conatu levi, successu tenui".

2 The same thought is often briefly expressed in English under the form: Knowledge is Power.' It may be remarked that Power always implies Knowledge, but Knowledge does not always give power. To do a thing, we must know how to do it, but there are some departments of knowledge which, however interesting in themselves or valuable as instruments of mental discipline, do not appear to increase our power over Nature.

Bacon seldom loses any opportunity of insisting on the practical applications of science. Professor Playfair truly remarks that the want of connection between the sciences and arts was one of the principal defects which Bacon deplored in the philosophy of his time.

3 We must patiently observe Nature, if we wish to acquire any control over her operations. Our 'rules' are merely copies and adaptations of the 'causes' which we see at work in the external world. The same sentence, slightly altered, is repeated in Aphorism 129. See note on it in that place. We cannot create; we can only combine or separate bodies already existing. 'In Art,' says Playfair, ‘man does nothing more than bring things nearer to one another, or carry them farther off; the rest is performed by Nature, and on most occasions by means of which we are quite ignorant.'

5 So far as concerns the active or operative part of knowledge, that is to say, Art as distinguished from Science.

Mr. Kitchin has the following note: As to the Mechanician, the Mathematician and the Physician, Bacon's remarks were being falsified at

VI.

Insanum quiddam esset, et in se contrarium, existimare ea, quae adhuc nunquam facta sunt, fieri posse, nisi per modos adhuc nunquam tentatos.

VII.

Generationes mentis et manus numerosae admodum videntur in libris et opificiis. Sed omnis ista varietas sita est in subtilitate eximia, et derivationibus paucarum rerum, quae innotuerunt; non in numero axiomatum 7.

the very time he wrote.-Mechanics had produced fly-clocks, telescopes, and other useful contrivances.- Mathematics boasted of Kepler and Galileo; and the discoveries of Harvey and Gilbert were opening out a new world for Medical research. But Bacon could scarcely have discerned all this, and his jealousy' (or, as I should rather say, distrust) of his contemporaries (cf. I. 54) would scarcely have allowed him to acknowledge their worth. Besides this he was utterly ignorant of Mathematics (see Hallam, Lit. Eur. vol. II. iii. 3. § 78). Alchemy was certainly thoroughly empirical and faulty; for "at this time Chemistry seemed to have an elective attraction for everything that was absurd and unfounded.” (Playfair.) And Magic, which still exerted great influence, was as bad. Sir T. Browne, Rel. Med. i. 31, gives some account of it; which is worth consulting as it gives the views of a physician and contemporary of Bacon. Cf. also De Augm. Sc. iii. 5, and Adv. of Learning, Bk. ii.'

In Aph. 85, Bacon distinguishes between Natural and Superstitious Magic. Natural Magic is treated in the De Augmentis, lib. iii. cap. 5, as supplementary to the Inquisition of Forms, and vindicated, when distinguished from the 'false and ignoble kind,' as a legitimate branch of enquiry. Si igitur desiderari eam partem Metaphysicae quae de Formis agit posuimus, sequitur ut Naturalis etiam Magia, quae ad eam est relativa, similiter desideretur. Verum hoc loco postulandum videtur, ut vocabulum istud Magiae, in deteriorem partem jampridem acceptum, antiquo et honorifico sensui restituatur. Etenim Magia apud Persas pro sapientia sublimi, et scientia consensuum rerum universalium, accipiebatur; atque etiam tres illi reges, qui ab Oriente ad Christum adorandum venerunt, Magorum nomine vocabantur. Nos vero eam illo in sensu intelligimus, ut sit scientia quae cognitionem Formarum Abditarum ad opera admiranda deducat; atque, quod dici solet, activa cum passivis conjungendo magnalia naturae manifestet.'

The substance of this Aphorism, greatly expanded, occupies the two first paragraphs of the Cogitata et Visa. These paragraphs are too long to be extracted, but they may be read by the student with advantage. See also Filum Labyrinthi sive Formula Inquisitionis, ad init. (E. and S., vol. iii. pp. 496, 497).

7 The word Axioma is used by Bacon of any general proposition. In Aphorism 103, Axiomata are contrasted with 'Opera' and 'particularia.'

VIII.

Etiam opera, quae jam inventa sunt, casui debentur et

In Aphorism 104, he speaks of 'axiomata generalissima' ('qualia sunt principia, quae vocant, artium et rerum'), 'axiomata media,' and 'axiomata minora' or 'infima.' Of the last he says, 'Etenim axiomata infima non multum ab experientia nuda discrepant.'

In the works of Aristotle, the word agiwua, even when confined to its logical sense, is employed in no less than three significations. Sometimes it is used for any proposition whatever, as, for instance, in Topics, ix. or Soph. El., 24 (ed. Bekker, p. 179 b. 12-15): αὕτη δ ̓ οὐκ ἔσται, ἄν τις μὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἀλλ ̓ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἢ πῶς ἔχειν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀξίωμα λαμβάνῃ, οἷον εἰ ὅδε éori narηp, cori de σós. Cp. Topics, viii. 1 (p. 156 a. 23), viii. 3 (p. 159 a. 4, 5). Secondly, Aristotle shews that he is aware of the signification in which the term was employed by mathematicians, who then, as now, designated the first principles of their science as 'axioms.' AcкTéov dè ñótepov μιᾶς ἢ ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης περί τε τῶν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι καλουμένων ἀξιωμάτων καὶ Tepi Ths ovσias. Metaphysics, iii. 3 (1005 a. 19–21). Lastly, he employs the term in a peculiarly technical sense of his own, to designate those ultimate principles or postulates which are necessary not to the knowledge of this or that particular science but to any knowledge whatsoever. In this sense, ağıμara are contrasted with éves, the first principles of this or that particular science. Αμέσου δ ̓ ἀρχῆς συλλογιστικῆς θέσιν μὲν λέγω ἣν μὴ ἔστι δεῖξαι, μηδ' ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν μαθησόμενόν τι ἣν δ ̓ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν ὁτιοῦν μαθησόμενον, ἀξίωμα· ἔστι γὰρ ἔνια τοιαῦτα· τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστ ̓ ἐπὶ τοῖς TOLOÚTOIS eiðaμev ovoμa λéyew. An. Post. i. 2 (p. 72 a. 14-18). Cp. i. 10. As an example of Axioms' in this sense may be adduced the 'Law of Contradiction,' which Aristotle describes (Metaphysics, iii. 3, p. 1035 b. 33, 34) as φύσει ἀρχὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιωμάτων πάντων.

Some logicians, especially those of the school of Ramus, use the word Axioma as the equivalent of Propositio or Judicium. Thus Milton (Ars Logica, lib. ii. cap. 2) defines and defends this use of the word as follows: 'Axioma est dispositio argumenti cum argumento', qua esse aliquid aut non esse indicatur. Axioma saepe Aristoteli significat propositionem sive sententiam ita claram, ut quasi digna sit cui propter se fides habeatur. Alias axioma et propositionem sive sententiam quamlibet pro eodem is habet: et recte quidem: ut enim sententia a sentio, i. e. existimo vel arbitror, ita axioma a verbo Graeco quod idem significat, derivatur. Atque hujus vocis generalem hanc significationem apud veteres Dialecticos receptam fuisse, ex Cicerone, Plutarcho, Laertio, Gellio, Galeno lib. xvi. c. 8 etc. constat.' Cicero, following the Stoics, appears invariably to use the word in this 'Nempe fundamentum dialecticae est, quidquid enuntietur (id autem appellant agiwua, quod est quasi effatum) aut verum esse aut falsum.' Acad. II. 29. Omne pronuntiatum (sic enim mihi in praesentia occurrit, ut appellarem ağiwμa; utar post alio, si invenero melius) id ergo est pronuntiatum, quod est verum aut falsum.' Tusc. i. 7. Bacon's usage of

sense.

1 'Argumentum autem cum argumento est id quod arguit cum eo quod arguitur.'

experientiae, magis quam scientiis: scientiae enim, quas nunc habemus, nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam concinnationes rerum antea inventarum; non modi inveniendi, aut designationes novorum operum.

IX.

Causa vero et radix fere omnium malorum in scientiis ea una est; quod dum mentis humanae vires falso miramur et extollimus, vera ejus auxilia non quaeramus.

X.

Subtilitas naturae subtilitatem sensus et intellectus multis partibus superat; ut pulchrae illae meditationes et specula

the word seems to differ from this only in restricting it to general propositions, that is, in excluding the axioma particulare' and the ' axioma proprium' of the Ramists.

The word is frequently restricted to self-evident propositions, whether common to all sciences, or peculiar to some particular science. Thus Chauvin in his Lexicon Philosophicum defines an Axiom as sententia generalis cuilibet attendenti nota,' and we commonly speak of truths, which require no proof, as axiomatic.'

Newton's use of the word appears to be less general than that of Bacon. Though he does not restrict it to self-evident propositions, or to those truths which are common to all sciences, he appears to use it exclusively of the first principles of any particular science. Thus, in the Principia, he speaks of the Axiomata sive Leges Motus,' and at the beginning of the Optics he enumerates five Axioms, such as that 'The Angles of Reflexion and Refraction lie in one and the same Plane with the Angle of Incidence,' 'The Angle of Reflexion is equal to the Angle of Incidence,' etc. would answer to the Axiomata Generalissima' of Bacon.

These

We have seen that Cicero proposes the word 'pronuntiatum' as a translation of agioua in its more general sense, when used as the equivalent of proposition. The words 'maxim,' 'principle,' or 'dignitas' sometimes replace it in its more restricted senses.

The student will find a long note on the etymology and meaning of the word 'Axiom' in Hamilton's edition of Reid, pp. 764-6.

8 éμmeipia, empiricism, mere experience, as distinguished from properly directed observation and experiment. For a distinction between the different kinds of experience and their bearing on discovery, see De Augmentis, lib. v. cap. 2.

9 Mr. Kitchin here very appositely quotes Aristotle, Metaph. a. 1. Ἴσως δὲ καὶ τῆς χαλεπότητος οὔσης κατὰ δύο τρόπους, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἀλλ ̓ ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ αἴτιον αὐτῆς. Ωσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μεθ ̓ ἡμέραν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων.

tiones humanae et causationes 10 res malesana sint, nisi quod non adsit qui advertat "1.

XI.

Sicut scientiae 12, quae nunc habentur, inutiles sunt ad inventionem operum; ita et logica, quae nunc habetur, inutilis est ad inventionem scientiarum.

To the same effect we find a passage in Galileo's Dialogo dei Massimi Sistemi, Giornata Prima (Sir Thomas Salusbury's Translation, pp. 84, 85): Sagredus. I ever accounted extraordinary madness that of those who would make human comprehension the measure of what nature hath a power or knowledge to effect; whereas on the contrary there is not any the least effect in Nature, which can be fully understood by the most speculative wits in the world. This their so vain presumption of knowing all, can take beginning from nothing, unless from their never having known anything; for if one hath but once only experienced the perfect knowledge of one only thing, and but truly tasted what it is to know, he shall perceive that of infinite other conclusions, he understands not so much as one.'

10 A post-classical word. 'Controversies.' Du Cange explains it as 'Lis, controversia, placitum,' and, amongst other authorities, quotes Gregor. Magn. lib. i. epist. 9: Fines, de quibus causatio mota est;' Concilium Arelatense, an. 813. can. 16: 'Ne in Dominicis diebus publicae mercatae, neque causationes disceptationesque exerceantur.'

The word occurs in the sense of an 6 excuse' or 'apology' as early as the time of Aulus Gellius ('Atque id fecerunt ne causatio ista aegri corporis perpetuam vacationem daret fidem detrectantibus, jurisque actiones declinantibus,' Noctes Atticae, lib. xx. cap. 1), but that does not seem to be its meaning in this place.

11 We cannot place ourselves sufficiently apart from the crowd in which we move, to obtain anything like an adequate idea of its eccentricities and delusions.

12 Aphorisms xi-xiv should be considered in connection with each other. They contain the sum of Bacon's complaint against the old logic. Though the scholastic logic recognised Induction as a form of reasoning, it failed to see its importance, and had not attempted to lay down any rules for its employment. Hence, practically, it was exclusively a syllogistic logic. Now it is the function of syllogism to develope the consequences of a principle, not to examine the principle itself. But, unless we examine the principle, how can we be certain of the truth of the consequences? We may only be multiplying error instead of truth. The conclusion of every new syllogism may be only one error the more, and, from the false confidence which the mere reiteration of a proposition begets in the mind, a principle which at first was received with hesitation may come to be regarded as unassailable, and be assumed as placed beyond all doubt. When men have reared a vast superstructure of reasoning, they are naturally unwilling to examine the foundations. What is