'At my request a young Oxonian prepared me a list of fit, capable, and hopeful persons, addicted to the design of the Royal Society, and willing to entertain correspondencies, and to assist in them. They seemed to me by their qualifications, and number, very considerable; some in every college, and in every hall. Only in one college, there was but one named; but it is excused, that his list was much too short, and that he wanted time to complete it, and for some reasons he would not be seen to advise with others for fuller information. There are excellent professors, some lecturers, and very many students of useful arts amongst them. And in time they may have their meetings in some of their publick schools, after fit lectures; and the wings of the Stubbians are already broken, and their reputation withers, as Dr. Bathurst told me.' Boyle's Works, Ed. of 1744, vol. v. p. 498, b.

Mr. Napier, to whom I am indebted for the two next references, thinks that the new philosophy' had made still greater progress at Cambridge. This conclusion is based mainly on a passage in Antony Wood (Bliss's ed. of the Athenae Oxonienses, 1817, vol. iii. p. 1244), who, in his Life of Glanvill, wonders, considering that that house [Exeter College] was then one of the chief nurseries for youth in the university, why he should afterwards lament that his friends did not first send him to Cambridge, because, as he used to say, that new philosophy and the art of philosophising were there more than here in Oxon, and that his first studies in this university did not qualify him for the world of action and business.' This evidence, which I have thought better to give in full, may not be of much value as settling the claims of the rival Universities, but, at all events, it is sufficient to shew that Cambridge had already a reputation for the new philosophy.' Of this, perhaps, we receive additional testimony in Baker's Reflections upon Learning, first published in 1699. This author was a Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, and is now well known for his history of that College, recently published and edited by Mr. Mayor. In the former work (Chapter on Logic), after making some interesting remarks on the Method of Bacon, he proceeds: After the way of free thinking' (notice, again, this expression) 'had been lai'd open by my Lord Bacon, it was soon after greedily follow'd, for the Understanding affects Freedom as well as the Will, and men will pursue liberty, tho it ends in confusion.' p. 59. This reflection, however, may have simply a general reference, and may not have been specially suggested by the experience of the writer's own University.

30

It would be superfluous to extend this enquiry beyond the point at which we have now arrived, as, at the end of the seventeenth century, we are already in the full tide of experimental research, when the fame and influence of Bacon were, as I believe, universally acknowledged 3o. But, before I proceed to consider the nature of this influence, it is necessary that I should entertain a question which has been the occasion of considerable dispute, namely, the cause of the complete, and, as it has seemed to some, singular silence as to Bacon which is maintained by his illustrious successor, Newton. Some refer it to contemptuous indifference. Thus, Sir David Brewster, whose judgment Rémusat accepts, roundly asserts that 'Newton would have enriched science with the same splendid discoveries, if the name and the writings of Bacon had never been heard of,' and says oddly enough, as I have already pointed out, that 'Boyle treated him with the same disrespectful silence? On the other hand, Horace Walpole 32 calls Bacon 'the Prophet of Arts, which Newton was sent afterwards to reveal,' and Reid speaks of Newton, as 'having, in the third book of his Principia and in his Optics, had the rules of the Novum Organum constantly in his eye.' Between these conflicting views I shall attempt to decide, considering, first, the external evidence of Bacon's influence on Newton, secondly, the internal evidence, so far as it can be derived from Newton's own writings, and, lastly, the interpretation to be put upon his silence with respect to Bacon's name and works. Pemberton, in his View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy (1728), informs us distinctly that Newton 'approved of the following treatise, a great part of which we read together' (Preface). Now, in the Introduction to this work, the author almost at once begins to speak of the irrational method formerly pursued in scientific enquiries, by 'framing conjectures,' 'undertaking intire systems,' 'fathoming at once the greatest depths of nature,' &c. 'Whereas the only method, that can afford us any prospect of success in this difficult work, is to make our enquiries with the utmost caution, and by very slow degrees.' 'This neglect,' he proceeds, 'of the proper means to enlarge our knowledge, joined with the presumption to attempt what

20 See, for instance, Tatler, No. 267; Spectator, No. 554. But the merits and influence of Bacon were now so much taken for granted, that, naturally enough, less was probably said about them than in the previous generation.

31 Brewster's Life of Newton, vol. ii. p. 403.

* Royal and Noble Authors, vol. i. P. 162.

Reid's Account of Aristotle's Logic, ch. 6. sect. 2 (Hamilton's Ed. of Reid's Works, p. 712 b).

was quite out of the power of our limited faculties, the Lord Bacon judiciously observes to be the great obstruction to the progress of science. Indeed that excellent person was the first who expressly writ against this way of philosophising; and he has laid open at large the absurdity of it in his admirable treatise, intitled Novum Organon Scientiarum; and has there likewise described the true method, which ought to be followed.' He then goes on to give a copious account of some portions of the First Book of the Novum Organum, especially of the Duo viae' (Aph. 19) and the Idola,' and then continues: But what surprizing advancements in the knowledge of nature may be made by pursuing the true course in philosophical enquiries, when those searches are conducted by a genius equal to so divine a work, will be best understood by considering Sir Isaac Newton's discoveries.' In attempting to give an account of the 'principles whereon Sir Isaac Newton proceeds,' the author evidently has Bacon's method constantly in view, and, in expounding the third of the 'Regulae Philosophandi,' he again mentions him by name: 'The only caution here required is ***** as the Lord Bacon very judiciously directs.' Now, supposing Newton to have seen this Introduction, as seems very probable, the controversy may be regarded, I think, as determined, and we may, at least, conclude that Newton would have been ready to acknowledge his obligations to the precepts and warnings, contained in the First Book of the Novum Organum.

*

Maclaurin, again, in his Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries (published, after his death, in 1748), evidently regards the connection between Bacon and Newton as a very close one. The whole of his remarks on Bacon are well worth attention (see pp. 56-62). I can only give one or two brief extracts. 'Sir Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, who was cotemporary with Galileo and Kepler, is justly held amongst the restorers of true learning, but more especially the founder of experimental philosophy.' **** 'He proposed his plan in his Instauratio Magna, with so much strength of argument, and so just a zeal, as renders that admirable work the delight of all who have a taste for solid learning.' * In his Novum Organum 'his chief design is to shew how to make a good induction, as Aristotle's was to teach how to make a good syllogism. Had the philosophers, since Lord Verulam's time, adhered more closely to his plan, their success had been greater; and Sir Isaac Newton's philosophy had not found the learned so full of prejudices against it, in favour of some systems lately invented and

mightily extolled by speculative men; that while all admired the sublime geometry which shone throughout his work, few for some time appeared to be disposed to hearken to his philosophy, or in a condition to judge of it impartially. However, Lord Bacon's exhortations and example had a good effect; and experimental philosophy has been much more cultivated since his time than in any preceding period. Geometry and philosophy advanced together at a great pace, and gave mutual aid to each other.'

Though Newton's works contain no direct reference to Bacon, there are passages which make it very difficult to suppose that he was not acquainted with, at least, the first book of the Novum Organum either through his own reading or through the common tradition of its teaching. Of the Regulae Philosophandi (contained in Horsley's Edition of Newton's Works, vol. iii. pp. 2–4), the third has already been referred to in my extract from Pemberton. But, for our present purpose, the fourth is still more to the point. It runs as follows:

'In Philosophia experimentali, Propositiones ex phaenomenis per inductionem collectae, non obstantibus contrariis hypothesibus, pro veris aut accurate, aut quam proxime, haberi debent, donec alia occurrerint Phaenomena, per quae aut accuratiores reddantur, aut exceptionibus obnoxiae."

'Hoc fieri debet, ne argumentum inductionis tollatur per hypotheses.'

This rule, both in substance and expression, is thoroughly Baconian, and, I venture to suggest, could hardly have been stated as it is by any one not acquainted with the Baconian philosophy.

At the end of the third book of the Optics (Horsley's Ed., vol. iv. pp. 263, 264), there is a longer and fuller passage, much to the same effect:

'As in Mathematicks, so in Natural Philosophy, the investigation of difficult things by the method of analysis 3*, ought ever to precede the method of composition. This analysis consists in making experiments and observations, and in drawing general conclusions from them by induction, and admitting of no objections against the conclusions, but such as are taken from experiments, or other certain

34 On Newton's use of the words Analysis and Synthesis, see Dugald Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, pt. ii. ch. 4. sect. 3. subsect. a (Hamilton's Ed., vol. iii. p. 272, &c.).

truths. For hypotheses are not to be regarded in Experimental Philosophy. And although the arguing from experiments and observations by induction be no demonstration of general conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing which the nature of things admits of, and may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how much the induction is more general. And if no exception occur from phaenomena, the conclusion may be pronounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any exception shall occur from experiments; it may then begin to be pronounced, with such exceptions as occur. By this way of analysis we may proceed from compounds to ingredients; and from motions to the forces producing them; and, in general, from effects to their causes; and from particular causes to more general ones, till the argument end in the most general. This is the method of Analysis. And the Synthesis consists in assuming the causes discovered, and established as principles, and by them explaining the phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the explanations.'

This passage, while undoubtedly showing, as it seems to me, an acquaintance with the Baconian method, is remarkable as denying to induction the force of demonstration (a limitation which we may, perhaps, account for from Newton's mathematical habit of mind and the preponderance of his mathematical pursuits), as well as for the fact that it does not appear to recognise any other form of induction than that 'per enumerationem simplicem.' Both these circumstances incline me to believe that Newton had not studied, or did not remember, or did not accept the teaching of the early part of the Second Book of the Novum Organum, though the precepts and warnings of the First Book, in their most general form, had produced a deep impression upon him and had, in great measure, suggested to him the aims and methods of his own investigations 5.

How then are we to account for his silence, as respects the name

35 Dr. Hippus, the author of the Account of the Novum Organum in the Library of Useful Knowledge (pt i. p. 10), adopting a remark of Dugald Stewart (Elements, Ed. Hamilton, vol. ii. p. 236), adduces Newton's application of the word 'axiom' to the Laws of Motion and the higher generalisations of Optics, as a proof of the influence exercised on him by Bacon's logical phraseology. This argument may have some weight, but, as I shall point out in a note on Bk. i. Aph. 7, Newton does not use the word 'axiom' with so much latitude as does Bacon, and, moreover, in the manuals of logic which he probably read as a young man, so far from finding the word restricted, as at present, to self-evident propositions in mathematics, he would find it used as the equivalent of Proposition in general.