dent or intermixture of humour. That a religion which consisteth in rytes and forms of adoration, and not in confessions and beliefs, is adverse to knowledge, because men having liberty to enquire and discourse of theology at pleasure, it cometh to pass that all inquisition of nature endeth and limiteth it self in such metaphyfical or theological discourse; whereas if mens wits be shut out of that port, it turneth them again to discover, and so to feek reason of reason more deeply. And that such was the religion of the Heathen. That a religion that is jealous of the variety of learning, discourse, opinions and sects (as misdoubting it may shake the foundations) or that cherisheth devotion upon fimplicity and ignorance, as afcribing ordinary effects to the immediate working of God, is adverse to knowledge. That such is the religion of the Turk, and such hath been the abuse of Christian religion at fome several times, and in some several factions. And of the fingular advantage which the Christian religion hath towards the furtherance of true knowledge, in that it excludeth and interdicteth human reafon, whether by interpretation or anticipation, from examining or discussing of the mysteries and principles of faith.

CHAP. XXVI.

F the impediments which have been in the nature of fociety, and the policies of state. That there is no composition of estate or fociety, nor order or quality of perfons, which have not fome point of contrariety towards true knowledge. That Monarchies incline wits to profit and pleasure, and commonwealths to glory

and vanity. That Universities incline wits to sophiftry and affectation; Cloifters to fables and unprofitable fubtilty; Study at large to variety; and that it is hard to fay, whether mixture of contemplations with an active life, or retiring wholly to contemplations, do disable and hinder the mind more.

TEMPORIS PARTUS MASCULUS, five de Interpretatione Nature, lib. 3.

1. Perpolitio & applicatio mentis.

2. Lumen Naturæ ; feu formula Interpretationis. 3. Natura illuminata ; five veritas rerum.

R

CAP. I. Tradendi modus legitimus.

EPERIO (fili) complures in rerum fcientia, quam fibi videntur adepti, vel proferenda vel rurfus occultanda neutiquam è fide sua ac officio se gerere. Eodem damno, licet culpa fortaffis minore peccant, & illi qui probe quidem morati, fed minus prudentes funt, nec artem ac præcepta tenent quo quæque modo fint proponenda. Neque tamen de hac tradentium scientiarum five malignitate five inscitia querela est instituenda. Sane fi rerum pondera docendi imperitia fregissent, non immerito quis indignetur. Rerum vero ineptiis docendi importunitatem vel jure deberi exiftimandum est. Ego autem longe ab his diversus te impertiturus non ingenii commenta nec verborum umbras, nec religionem admiftam, nec obfervationes quafdam populares, vel experimenta quædam nobilia in theoriæ fabulas concinnata; fed revera naturam cum fœtibus fuis tibi addicturus & mancipaturus, num videor dignum argumentum præ manibus habere quod tractandi vel ambitione vel inscitia, vel vitio quovis polluam ? Ita fim (fili) itaque humani in universum imperii anguftias nunquam fatis deploratas ad datos fines proferam (quod mihi ex humanis folum in votis eft) ut tibi optima fide, atque ex altiffima mentis meæ providentia, & exploratissimo rerum & animorum statu hæc traditurus fim, modo omnium maximè legitimo. Quis tandem (inquies) est modus ille legitimus ? Quin tu mitte artes & ambages, rem exhibe nudam nobis, ut judicio nostro uti poffimus. Atque utinam (fili suaviffime) eo loco fint res veftræ ut hoc fieri posset. An tu cenfes, cum omnes omnium mentium aditus ac meatus obfcuriffimis idolis, iisque alte hærentibus & inustis obsessi & obstructi fint, veris rerum & nativis radiis finceras & politas areas adesse. Nova est ineunda ratio, qua mentibus obductiffimis illabi poffimus. Ut enim phreneticorum deliramenta arte & ingenio subvertuntur, vi & contentione efferantur, omnino ita in hac univerfali infania mos gerendus eft. Quid? leviores illæ conditiones, quæ ad legitimum fcientiæ tradendæ modum pertinent, an tibi tam expeditæ & faciles videntur? ut modus innocens fit; id eft, nulli prorfus errori anfam & occafionem præbeat? ut vim quandam infitam & innatam habeat, tum ad fidem conciliandam, tum ad pellendas injurias temporis, adeo ut fcientia ita tradita, veluti planta vivax & vegeta, quotidie ferpat & adolefcat? ut idoneum & legitimum fibi lectorem se ponat & quafi adoptet? Atque hæc omnia præftiterim, necne, ad tempus futurum provoco.

452

FILUM LABYRINTHI,

SIVE

FORMULA INQUISITIONIS.

AD FILIOS:

PARS PRIMA.

1. FRAUNCIS BACON thought in this manner. The knowledge whereof the world is now poffefsed, especiallie that of nature, extendeth not to magnitude and certaintie of workes. The Physician pronounceth many diseases incurable, and faileth oft in the rest. The Alchymists wax old and dye in hopes. The Magicians performe nothing that is permanent and profitable. The Mechaniques take small light from naturall philosophie, and doe but spynne on their own little thridds. Chaunce sometimes discovereth inventions, but that worketh not in years, but ages. So he saw well, that the inventions known are very unperfitt, and that newe are not like to be brought to light, but in great length of tyme, and that those which are, came not to light by philofophie.

2. He thought also this state of knowledge was the worse, because men strive (against themselves) to fave the credit of ignorance, and to fatisfie themselves in this povertie. for the Physician, besides the cauteles of practice, hath this generall cautele of art, that he dischargeth the weaknesse of his art upon supposed impoffibilities; neither can his art be condemned, when it felf judgeth. That philofophy also, out of which the knowledge of physick which nowe is in use is hewed, receyveth certain pofitions and opinions, which (if they be well weighed) induce this perswafion, that no great workes are to be expected from art, and the hand of man; as in particular, that opinion, that the beate of the funne and fire differ in kind; and that other, that composition is the work of man, and mixture is the work of nature, and the like; all tending to the circumscription of man's power, and to artificiall defpaire; killing in men, not onlie the comfort of imagination, but the industry of tryall : only upon vaine glorye, to have their art thought perfitt, and that all is impossible, that is not alreadie found. The Alchymist dischargeth his art upon his own errors, either fuppofing a misunderstanding of the wordes of his authors, which maketh him listen after auricular tradi tions; or els a failing in the true proportions and scruples of practise, which maketh him renew infinitelie his tryalls, and finding also that he lighteth upon some mean experiments and conclufions by the waye, feedeth upon them, and magnifieth them to the most, and supplieth the rest in hopes. The Magician, when he findeth something (as he conceiveth) above nature, effected; thinketh, when a breach is once made in nature, that it is all one, to perform great things and small; not feeing, that they are but subjects of a certaine kind, wherein magick and fuperftition hath played in all times. The mechani