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not a thing so eafy as is conceived, to convey the conceit of one man's mind into the mind of another, without lofs or mistaking, fpecially in notions new and differing from those that are received. That never any knowledgewas delivered in the fame order it was invented, no not in the mathematicks, though it should feem otherwise,in regard that the propofitions placed last do use the pro-pofitions or grants placed first for their proof and demonstration, that there are forms and methods of tradition wholly diftin&t and differing, according to their ends whereto they are directed. That there are two ends of tradition of knowledge, the one to teach and inftruct for use and practice, the other to impart or intimate for reexamination and progreffion. That the former of these ends requireth a method not the fame, whereby it was invented and induced, but fuch as is moft compendious and ready, whereby it may be used and applyed. That the latter of the ends, which is where a knowledge is delivered to be continued and spun on by a fucceffion of labours, requireth a method whereby it may be tranfpo

fed to another in the fame manner as it was collected, to the end it may be difcerned both where the work is weak, and where it breaketh off. That this latter method is not only unfit for the former end, but also impoffible. for all knowledge gathered and infinuated by anticipations, because the mind working inwardly of it felf, no man can give a juft account how he came to that knowledge which he hath received, and that therefore this method is peculiar for knowledge gathered by interpretation. That the discretion antiently observed, though by the prefident of many vain perfons and deceivers difgraced

graced, of publishing part and reserving part to a private fucceffion, and of publishing in a manner whereby it shall not be to the capacity nor tafte of all, but shall as it were fingle and adopt his reader, is not to be laid afide, both for the avoiding of abuse in the excluded, and the strengthening of affection in the admitted. That there are other virtues of tradition, as that there be no occafion given to error, and that it carry a vigour to root and spread against the vanity of wits and injuries of time, all which, if they were ever due to any knowledge delivered, or if they were never due to any human knowledge heretofore delivered, yet are now due to the. knowledge propounded.

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F the impediments which have been in the affections, the principal whereof hath been despairor diffidence, and the ftrong apprehenfion of the difficulty obfcurity and infiniteness which belongeth to the invention of knowledge, and that men have not known their own strength; and that the fuppofed difficulties and vaftness of the work is rather in fhew and mufter, than in state or fubftance, where the true way is taken. That this diffidence hath moved and caufed fome never to enter into search, and others, when they have been entred, either to give over, or to feek a more compendious courfe than can ftand with the nature of true fearch. That of thofe that have refufed and prejudged.enquiry, the more fober and grave fort of wits have depended upon authors and traditions, and the more vain and credu


lous reforted to revelation and intelligence with fpirits and higher natures. That of those that have entred into search, some having fallen upon fome conceipts, which they after confider to be the fame which they have found in former authors, have fuddenly taken a perfuafion that a man shall (but with much labour) incur and light upon the fame inventions which he might with ease receive from others, and that it is but a vanity and selfpleafing of the wit to go about again, as one that would rather have a flower of his own gathering, than much better gathered to his hand. That the fame humour of floth and diffidence fuggefteth, that a man shall but revive fome ancient opinion which was long ago propounded, examined and rejected. And that it is easy to err in conceipt, that a man's obfervation or notion is the fame with a former opinion, both because new conceipts muft of neceffity be uttered in old words, and because upon true and erroneous grounds men may meet in confequence or conclufion, as feveral lines or circles that cut in fome one point. That the greatest part of those that have descended into search, have chofen for the most artificial and compendious courfe, to induce principles out of particulars, and to reduce all other propositions unto principles, and fo instead of the nearest way, have been led to no way, or a meer labyrinth. That the two contemplative ways have some resemblance with the old parable of the two moral ways, the one beginning with incertainty and difficulty, and ending in plainnefs and certainty; and the other beginning with shew of plainness and certainty, and ending in difficulty and incertainty. Of the great and manifeft error and untrue conceipt

conceipt or estimation of the infinitenefs of particulars, whereas indeed all prolixity is in difcourfe and derivations: and of the infinite and moft laborious expence of wit that hath been employed upon toys and matters of no fruit or value. That although the period of one age cannot advance men to the furthest point of interpretation of nature (except the work fhould be undertaken with greater helps than can be expected) yet it cannot fail in much less space of time to make return of many fingular commodities towards the state and occafions of man's life. That there is lefs reafon of diftruft in the course of interpretation now propounded, than in any knowledge formerly delivered, because this course doth in fort equal mens wits, and leaveth no great advantage or preheminence to the perfect and excellent motions of the fpirit. That to draw a streight line, or to make a circle perfect round by aim of hand only, there must be a great difference between an unfteady and unpractifed hand, and a steady and practifed; but to do it by rule or compafs, it is much alike.



F the impediments which have been in the two extream humours of admiration of antiquity and love of novelty, and again of over-fervile reverence, or over-light fcorn of the opinions of others.




F the impediments which have been in the affection of pride, fpecially of one kind, which is the difdain of dwelling and being converfant much in experiences and particulars, fpecially fuch as are vulgar in occurrency, and base and ignoble in ufe. That befides 'certain higher myfteries of pride, generalities feem to have a dignity and folemnity, in that they do not put men in mind of their familiar actions, in that they have lefs affinity with arts mechanical and illiberal, in that they are not fo fubject to be controuled by perfons of mean obfervation, in that they seem to teach men that they know not, and not to refer them to that they know. All which conditions directly feeding the humour of pride, particulars do want. That the majefty of generalities, and the divine nature of the mind in taking them (if they be truly collected, and be indeed 'the direct reflexions of things) cannot be too much magnified. And that it is true, that interpretation is the very natural and direct intention, action and progreffion of the understanding, delivered from impediments. And that all anticipation is but a deflexion or declination by accident.



F the impediments which have been in the state of heathen religion, and other fuperftitions and errors of religion. And that in the true religion there hath not, nor is any impediment, except it be by acci

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