account, and had cavalry lost its use on the field of battle? Above all, how could the enormous numbers furnished by 'the nation in arms' be handled with effect? Each one of these problems Von Moltke had to face, and he had little to enlighten him as to their solution. Each one of them has added a new chapter to strategy and tactics, and to bring them into line with modern developements the volumes of Clausewitz would have to be rewritten. But, despite the immense literary activity of military Europe, the task has not yet been accomplished; and until we have more experience to go upon, until we have the campaigns of another successful leader to compare with those of Von Moltke, until we have another instance of the war of masses,' until we see once more a host of half a million or more of men thrown across a hostile frontier, we doubt whether it will be attempted. How can a man,' asks Napier, who has never commanded an army in the field, dare to dogmatise on such a subject as strategy? A great and suc'cessful commander can do so safely, no other person can." Before the art of war had reached its present stage, strategy could be fairly criticised by men who had no practical experience of high command. Napoleon and the Archduke dogmatised; Clausewitz and Jomini embodied and expanded their teaching, and operations could be tested by their opinions. But to-day we are groping in the dark. Still, as in many of its aspects war is still unchanged, we can come to some conclusion as to whether the conqueror of Austria and France is entitled to rank with the acknowledged masters of the military art, and whether, as lessons in higher leading, his campaigns are worth studying as closely as those of his famous predecessors.

The two most striking episodes of his career are the operations which culminated in the battle of Königgrätz and those which brought about the surrender of the armies of the French Empire. It is impossible to underrate the difficulties with which the German staff had to contend in the second phase of the Franco-German war, when, at the bidding of Gambetta, a million of armed men sprang from the helm of France, and the flowing tide of victory was suddenly checked by an unexpected and formidable barrier. But we do not believe, strongly as we may appreciate the unbending resolution with which Von Moltke faced the storm, and the calm sagacity with which he guided the bark of the German fortunes through the troubled waters, that the ultimate defeat of the Republican levies was so remarkable

an achievement as the annihilation of the trained armies of the greatest Empires in Europe at Königgrätz and Sedan.

Mr. Morris is of opinion that the praises which have been lavished on the great strategist in France and England, as well as by his own countrymen, are extravagant, and he has taken upon himself the task of forming an impartial estimate of his achievements. With this purpose in view, he has been at pains to collect every adverse judgement that has been pronounced by French and Austrian writers, and to complete them by his own. He is certainly a most able advocatus diaboli, and we have not the slightest doubt that we are furnished with every single argument against Von Moltke's reputation as a commander. We had thought, at first, of dealing with these arguments seriatim, but we find unfortunately that Mr. Morris's statements are not always consistent and are often contradictory. For instance, he condemns the double line of operations in 1866 in no less than five distinct passages, and yet he gives the whole case away by telling us elsewhere that if fault is to be found with Von Moltke's strategy, this must 'be attributed in the main to a position of affairs which was ' in no sense of his own choosing.' Moreover, we frankly avow that Mr. Morris's methods are so diametrically opposed to our own ideas of judicious military criticism, his comparisons so misleading, and his errors as to fact so numerous, that in his accounts of the Austrian and French campaigns we find something to quarrel with on almost every page.

The campaign of 1866 is more roughly treated than that of 1870-1. Von Moltke, in planning the great movement which brought about the downfall of the Austrian Army at Königgrätz, not only set at naught an oft-repeated maxim of Napoleon's, but he even dared to imitate, on the selfsame theatre of war, a manœuvre of Frederick the Great, which is severely criticised in the St. Helena Memoirs. Il est de 'principe,' runs the maxim, 'que les réunions des divers 'corps d'armée ne doivent jamais se faire près de l'ennemi.' 'This remark,' says Mr. Morris, 'is of universal application,' and it is evident, from the quotations he has appended to the chapters on this campaign, that there are many critics of the same opinion. In bringing forward this array of authorities, and in basing his most valid objection to Von Moltke's strategy on Napoleon's dictum, our author has done good service. He has at least shown us that there are students of military history who do not realise the change which has been brought about by the introduction of the telegraph into warfare and

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if, with all his industry, writing three and twenty years after the event, with the lesson of 1870, where the same maxim was again successfully set at naught, before him, he still clings to obsolete ideas, we may fairly conclude that the campaign of 1866 is not yet properly understood. It may 'be confidently asserted,' he writes, that no impartial critic of repute approved of Von Moltke's direction of the war 'until after the triumphs of 1870-1.' It is no novelty, however, to find that new methods of warfare are reluctantly accepted and even fiercely criticised. Austrian generals censured Napoleon in 1796 for exactly the same reasons as Mr. Morris condemns Von Moltke. Suvoroff,' complained the Poles, is only fit to fight bears. If you expect him in 'front he attacks you in flank or rear. We fled more from 'surprise and alarm than because we were beaten.' It is not impossible that some of Von Moltke's critics are not yet abreast of the times. The ideas of ordinary men are wont to lag behind those of genius.

On the operations of 1866, however, rests, at least in part, Von Moltke's claim to the title of a great captain; and as his strategy in Bohemia has been subjected to far severer comment than his manoeuvres in Lorraine, we have thought it adviseable to discuss the Austrian campaign at length. Nor is this our only reason. Students of military history, misled by superficial criticism, may imbibe false ideas of strategy, or be taught to condemn methods of war which if rightly understood contain valuable lessons; whilst it is not without importance that the effect of modern inventions and of new methods of organisation should be generally recognised.

The campaign of 1866 was preceded by a diplomatic struggle of long duration. It is possible that there was an earnest endeavour on both sides to avert the appeal to arms. It is equally possible that both were sparring for an opening. However this may be, it is certain that statesmen and soldiers were not so closely in accord in Austria as in Prussia. Except in giving time for mobilisation, the Imperial Cabinet did little to help the generals. In Berlin, on the other hand, Bismarck and Von Moltke worked in the closest combination; the Chancellor kept in view the requirements of the Chief of the Staff, not only with regard to the time required for assembling the army on a war footing, but, so far as possible, with regard to the strategical situation. This was the more important, as it was apparent from the outset that the Prussian army would be numerically inferior. Austria

did not stand alone. The minor States of the German confederation made little secret of their anti-Prussian sympathies. Individually they were weak. Bavaria, the most important, could not muster more than 60,000 men. But collectively their armies reached, on paper, the respectable total of 150,000; and, of even more moment, their position in case of war between Prussia and Austria was strategically advantageous. A Prussian army could not march southwards without exposing its communications. Hanover, Hesse, Baden, Nassau, Würtemburg, and Saxony commanded this line from the Main to the Bohemian Mountains, a distance of more than a hundred miles. Moreover, Hanover and Hesse divided the Prussian monarchy into two distinct portions, intervening as they did between the Rhenish provinces and those watered by the Weser and the Elbe. In short, Prussia would not only be outnumbered, but, strategically, she was badly placed. She had few fortresses. The capital was an open town. The mountains which were between her and Austria availed her nothing. Saxony, her enemy's sturdiest ally, lay north of the Erzgebirge; and, pouring through the gap thus opened, an invading army would find itself only six marches from Berlin. Moreover, the interposition of Bohemia, jutting northward like a bastion, severed Silesia from the remainder of the kingdom.

Von Moltke, therefore, as regards the most powerful enemy, had to deal with the problem of a re-entering frontier; and, with these several data before us, it can hardly be said that the task of the strategist was a light one. The numerical proportion, however, was lessened by astute diplomacy. Italy, with Venice as the bait, easily yielded to the wiles of Bismarck; and of her army of 550,000 men Austria was obliged to maintain a considerable force in the Quadrilateral. But, even with this deduction from the hostile strength, the balance was by no means even. Some compensation, however, was to be found in the homogeneity of the Prussian troops and their superior readiness for war. If the political interests of the allies were identical, their several contingents were distinct units; and even if they submitted to the control of a single chief, they would form at best but an unwieldy mass. Nor were their armies organised on the same business-like principles which prevailed in Prussia. Their passage from a peace to a war footing was based on no established system. In accordance with the ideas which obtained in every European State save Prussia alone, details

were left until the time for action arrived; to use the catchphrase of 1870, dans le cas spécial on se débrouillera.'

Austria, well aware of the peculiar advantages of her enemy, endeavoured to gain time by secret preparations. But the recall of her reserves to the colours, the transport of troops to the frontier, and the armament of her border fortresses, were not measures that could be long concealed. By the end of March it was known in Berlin that large movements of troops were taking place in Moravia and Bohemia. The unwonted silence of the Austrian press was construed as a symptom of sinister significance, and the official denials of any extraordinary activity were rightly interpreted as mere ruses de guerre. Beyond placing the artillery regiments on a war strength of both men and horses, and reinforcing the garrisons of her fortresses, Prussia made no responsive move. Not a single battalion left its peace quarters; not one additional squadron was sent forward to the frontier.

At the beginning of May, however, the situation became critical. Austria had called in her last reserves, and it was believed that her preparations were nearly completed. Silesia and the Marks lay defenceless. To mobilise the army and to concentrate it on the frontier, at least five weeks were necessary, and a defensive attitude seemed imperatively imposed. On May 2, the Cabinet of Berlin ordered the whole artillery, the greater part of the cavalry, and half the infantry, to mobilise, and six days later, the remainder of the army. On May 16, four army corps were set in motion towards the frontier. One took post in Prussian Saxony, one in Lusatia, and two in Silesia. A fifth was concentrated at Coblenz.

This was a purely defensive measure. Prussia had been anticipated in preparation by Austria and Saxony, and it was thought necessary to place the troops just prepared in the frontier districts, where they could directly cover Berlin and Breslau.'*

Practically speaking, this operation was completed in eight days, and on May 23, 120,000 men guarded the Prussian marches; whilst behind this screen the remainder of the army, already mobilised, had rapidly assembled. The situation at this moment was as follows:-Two groups, each composed of two army corps, guarded the approaches to Berlin and Breslau. Five corps were second and third line, cantoned along the railways, and in readiness to move.

* The Campaign of 1866 in Germany, p. 505,