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directing him to disband and leave the country, and at the same time informing him that he intended to find employment in England,* perhaps as a substitute for Count Waldemar, who, finding no money forthcoming at the Hague, had returned in dudgeon to Germany. That Charles expected from some one in authority in Scotland permission to Montrose to withdraw from Scotland without injury to himself or to the leading Royalists is evident from a note of Secretary Long's, of which a copy, in the handwriting of Thomas Carte, is preserved among the Carte Papers in the Bodleian Library.†

May--Order to Montrose to lay down arms, leave cannon, arms, ammunition brought from Gottenburg in Orkney, or deliver them to the sheriff of county-10,000 rix-dollars paid to his use in Sir Patrick Drummond's hands. Indemnity for him, Earls Seaforth, Kinnoul, Lords Napier and Reay, Sir James Macdonnell, &c.

This upon King's agreement with Scots Commissioners.

'Sir W. Fleming sent with the orders, all his officers and soldiers indemnified. Montrose to stay in safety for a competent time in Scotland, and ship to lie, provided for transporting him where he pleased.'

The first part of this note is a mere précis of Charles's letters to Montrose. The remainder, which we have placed in italics, is entirely outside the correspondence. It points, as we have said, to an agreement by some one in authority in Scotland to give an indemnity to Montrose and the others named. That this authority was not the Parliament is shown by Charles's letter to that body, also entrusted to Fleming, in which he asks Parliament to permit the safe departure of Montrose's men, without any allusion to a preceding promise. Who then can have given the engagement except Argyll? Moreover, the supposition that he had done so is supported by a phrase in one of Charles's letters to Montrose.

'You have given me so many testimonies of your affection to me and zeal to my service, that you cannot reasonably doubt of my real intention to provide for your interests and restitution with my utmost care; and though I may not be able to effect it for the present, yet I do not despair of doing it in a little time.'

Again in Charles's instruction to Fleming, the following words are used:

'You shall assure the said Marquis of Montrose that we hope, upon good grounds, that we shall be able in a little time to make his peace

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The letters and instructions are printed in the Wigton Papers,'

in vol. ii. of the 'Miscellany of the Maitland Club.'

+ Carter MSS. vol. cxxx. fol. 119.

in Scotland, and to restore him to his honour and estate, and that we shall shortly have an honourable employment for him in our service against the rebels of England.'

This is precisely the language we should expect if Charles, without any actual engagement from any constituted authority, had got a promise from a person like Argyll, whose real influence he was certain to overrate. If this were the case, the frequent directions to Fleming to consult with Will Murray, which formed such a stumbling-block to Napier and writers of his school, become for the first time intelligible.*

A difficulty less easily solved arises from the letter which Charles wrote to the Scottish Parliament on May 12, on receiving news, apparently very vaguely conveyed to him, of Montrose's defeat at Carbisdale. Unfortunately, no full copy of this letter has reached us, and we have to content ourselves with an account given of the proceedings in Parliament when it was then read after Montrose's execution, on May 25:

'A letter from the King's Majesty to the Parliament, dated from Breda, May 12 [i.e. May 13, 1650]-showing that he was heartily sorry that James Graham had invaded this kingdom, and how he had discharged him from doing the same; and earnestly desires the Estates of Parliament to do himself that justice as not to believe that he was accessory to the said invasion in the least degree-read.

Also a double of his Majesty's letter to James Graham, dated May 15 [i.e. May], commanding him to law down arms, and secure all the ammunition under his charge, read in the House.

'The House remits to the Committee of Despatches to answer his Majesty's letter to the Parliament.

The Marquis of Argyll reported to the House that himself had a letter from the Secretary, the Earl of Lothian, which shew him that his Majesty was no ways sorry that James Graham was defeated, in respects (as he said) he had made that invasion without and contrary to his command.'†

The curious and incoherent instructions of May 9 may be explained without much difficulty. Fleming was to advise Montrose not to lay down arms if circumstances were unfavourable, but he was to consult with Will Murray about his not disbanding if he had a large force. We suggest that verbal conversation with Fleming filled up the break between the two parts of the instructions. Whether Montrose was to lay down arms or not was for Fleming alone to decide. In case he did lay down arms-this suggestion, we admit, has nothing to represent it in the instructions themselves-he, Fleming, and Will Murray-that is to say practically, Fleming and Argyll were to consult together how the disarmed men might be kept together for future service against the English 'rebels.'

+ Balfour, iv. 23.

That Charles should have denied that he had ever ordered Montrose to invade Scotland, when so much evidence was at hand to prove the contrary, appears so incredible that Napier pronounced the letter read in Parliament to have been forged by Argyll. Such a solution, however, of the difficulty can only be admitted in the last resort, and Mr. Denistoun, the editor of the Wigton papers, put the case as it stood at the time when he was writing, with singular impartiality :—

'Those,' he writes, who have studied the characters of Argyll and Lothian, may attach small weight to the verbal report of the former, of an allegation written by the latter. . . . But there is a far more serious charge contained in the Lord Lyon's minute of the reading of a letter addressed by the King to the Parliament, in which he desires them "to do himself that justice, as not to believe that he was accessory to the said invasion in the least degree," and the idea of a fraud or a forgery is scarcely reconcileable with the subsequent remit of this letter to the Committee of Despatches, that it might be answered. Yet how deeply were the Parliament interested to invent a justification for their bloodthirsty zeal in condemning Montrose. . . . And is it credible that the King should (apart from all considerations of honour, integrity, or gratitude) dare to dictate to his Parliament a public despatch, contradicted in every point by no less than seven documents which accompanied it, probably by the same messenger, and which would have all been made equally public, but for that unforeseen catastrophe which suddenly numbered Montrose with those who tell. no tales?'

We venture to think that the story of Charles's secret negotiation with Argyll through Will Murray, who-and not Sir W. Fleming-was the bearer of this despatch, will supply a partial, though not a complete, solution of the problem. Charles, as we know, had been engaged in pushing forward a scheme for withdrawing Montrose from Scotland and employing him elsewhere, and he had reason to believe that for this he could reckon on the co-operation of Argyll. When, therefore, he received news that Montrose had been defeated, we can well understand that, being what he was, he regarded the invasion itself as-to use words put into the mouth of one of his successors-'an untoward event.' He would certainly do all that in him lay to clear himself of conducting a deceptive negotiation whilst he was all the while urging on Montrose to carry on his attack against the Covenanters. There is very little more than this in Balfour's notes of the letter, and we may conclude that, if we had the letter before us, we should find no more than this, especially as it was accompanied by a copy of the King's despatch to Montrose of May 5, showing that what was in his mind was to clear

himself of complicity during the last fortnight. If the notes of the letter, and, still more, the reported conversation with Lothian, say more than this, it must be remembered that we owe our knowledge of both to men whose interest it was to exaggerate anything that Charles may actually have written or said.

Yet, even with the most favourable interpretation, the letter in the form in which it has come down to us, is neither generous nor kingly. We should like to have known that Charles's first thought had not been for explaining his own action, but for the safety of Montrose. It may be, indeed, that he did plead for Montrose, and that his pleadings were suppressed by Argyll or Balfour. Unfortunately, there was nothing in Charles's character to lead us to think that his thoughts were concentrated on anyone but himself.

Before this letter reached Scotland, Montrose had ended his noble life in triumph on the gallows. The story of his last days has been told by Napier with what, in most other cases, would be a superfluity of detail. In narrating the close of Montrose's great career, no detail can be superfluous. In his last days no word, no gesture of his has been recorded which his most sensitive admirer would wish to have been other than it was. So stirbt ein Held anbetungsvoll. He never could have been a statesman, because he had no eye for the complexity of life. The simplicity of his conceptions did not fit him for the guidance of his nation in the sore straits into which it had fallen. It did something better than anything that the statesman can achieve. It gave to those who are immersed in the struggles of the world an example of one who kept his heart pure and his eye clear for the reception of every truth which he was capable of admitting. Great in life, Montrose was even greater in his death.

For Montrose himself no moment could be more opportune for death. He did not live to see the bearer of the crown which he had idealised veiling his honour before the Covenanting crew, and outwitted by those whom he had vainly hoped to outwit. Still happier was he that he did not live to witness the baseness of the Restoration Government and the harlotries of Whitehall. His own life had been passed in the agony of a struggle in which even victory could have given no triumph which one so pure as he could have appreciated. Montrose was the Milton of the battlefield: :

'He hates him

That would upon the rack of this tough world
Stretch him out longer.'

ART. VII.-1. Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani.
RÖHRICHT. Weinburg: 1893.

2. Les Colonies Franques en Syrie. By E. REY.

By R.


POPULAR opinion at the present time regards the Crusades as fanatical and futile attempts to establish Christianity in Asia, leading only to misery and bloodshed, and frustrated by the power of Islam. The historian of England seems to think it hardly necessary to consider the fortunes of kings like Richard Lion Heart and Edward I. during their wars in Syria, and regards their absence in the East as having been a pure loss to their subjects at home. It is pointed out that the Franks left no impress on the Levant which is now traceable, and it is believed that superstition and priestcraft alone profited by what are supposed to have been desultory raids on the Holy Land. This, however, is a superficial view of the causes and results of these great popular movements of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; for what is most remarkable as the outcome of two centuries of effort is the effect produced on Europe itself. The Italian Renaissance had its roots in the communications with ancient homes of civilisation in the Levant, and even the reformation of the Church owed its origin to the thought and culture brought from Syria to the West.

For nearly a century all Syria and Palestine formed a feudal confederacy, ruled by Normans and Germans, and for another century after that the Lebanon and seaside plains to the south were the property of Franks defended by the three great military orders, who owed allegiance only to the Pope. The details of this history of European conquest, colonisation, and land tenure in Asia have occupied the attention of antiquaries in France, Italy, and Germany for the last half-century, though they seem to have attracted much less attention in England, owing, perhaps, to the fact that the English took part in these matters only for a short period after the loss of the kingdom of Jerusalem. Among the various writers on the subject-including Beugnot, Du Cange, and De Rozière in France; Prutz, Heyd, and Schlumberger in Germany; Paoli and Muller in Italy-none have, perhaps, done more to recreate a true picture of Frank history in Syria than have the two authors whose names are mentioned at the head of this article. The English contribution consists mainly in the

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