Page images
PDF
EPUB

parties in Scotland took alarm. The Kirkmen detested the army because it was sectarian and tolerant; the statesmen, because it threatened the independence of the weaker kingdom.

In the case of a mind constituted like that of Argyll, it is always difficult to distinguish its own natural workings from decisions taken from interested motives. The speech delivered by Argyll to the English Parliament in 1646 probably opens the door most widely into the ideas which underlay his tortuous course. He then called on English statesmen to avoid on the one hand lawless liberty in religion, and on the other hand persecution of peaceable men who, through scruple of conscience, could not in all things adapt themselves to the common rule. His sentiment with respect to the relations between the two countries is, however, of more importance than his views on the internal government of England. He upheld the view that the two kingdoms were essentially one, so that in effect we differ in nothing but in name as brethren do which I wish were also removed that we might be altogether one, if the two kingdoms shall think fit.' In other words, Scotland was not to take umbrage at the rapidly developed military power of England. Her remedy lay not in a vain attempt to impose her will upon England by force, but in cultivating a sentiment of union with her, to be followed by a constitutional union as soon as the time was ripe. Who shall say after this that Argyll was not as much Montrose's superior in statesmanship as he was his inferior in character ?

That faction largely entered into Argyll's opposition to the Hamiltonian Engagers in 1648, and still more into his conduct after their defeat at Preston, it is impossible to deny. Resting on the Kirk, he took advantage of the discredit into which his personal rivals had fallen to break up a hostile Parliament and to order fresh elections, which, as Scotland was then constituted, naturally turned in his own favour. From the newly formed Parliament he excluded, by the act of classes, the great majority of the nobility and persons of whatever rank who refused to satisfy the Kirk, or, in other words, to renounce their connexion with the Hamiltons. So far all historians are agreed. They have, however and the editors of The Deeds of Montrose' are no exception to the rule-omitted to notice that Argyll's political success in 1648 was a Pyrrhic victory, and that from henceforth he becomes the slave and, unless every indication

VOL. CLXXIX. NO. CCCLXVII.

K

we possess is to be distrusted, the unwilling slave, of the Kirk, which formed the basis of his authority in Scotland. Again and again he is found kicking against the pricks, and was finally driven from power, not, as the editors of The 'Deeds of Montrose' appear to think, by his association with Charles II., but by the impossiblity of retaining power without accepting from his party a policy against which his better judgement revolted.

Argyll's first effort to carry out the policy sketched out in his speech at Westminster was his acceptance of the hand offered him by Cromwell. When once he was convinced that the victorious English army had no intention of interfering in the domestic affairs of Scotland, true statesmanship was all on the side of an understanding with the man who was its virtual leader. That Argyll was in the right in trusting Cromwell in this matter we now know from Cromwell's own words addressed to Hammond :—

'Was it not fit to be civil, to profess love, to deal with them for the removing of prejudice; to ask them what they had against us, and to give them an honest answer? This we have done and no more; and herein is a more glorious work in our eyes than if we had gotten the sacking and plunder of Edinburgh, the strong castle into our hands, and made a conquest from the Tweed to the Orcades.' *

The understanding between Cromwell and Argyll, on which rested the hope of peace, was broken by the trial and execution of the King. The horror of that deed carried Scottish Presbyterians off their feet, and, whether Argyll was carried off his feet or not, he thought it expedient to go with his party. That party resolved to acknowledge Charles II. as King of Scotland, provided that he would not only accept the Covenant, but impose it upon England, and Ireland as well. Even if Argyll preferred a restoration to an alliance with a regicide republic, every consideration bound him to resist the folly of an attempt to make unwilling England submit to the yoke of Scottish

These words occur in a letter, the original of which-though not in Cromwell's hand-is in the possession of the Marquis of Lothian. It will shortly appear in the second volume of the Clarke Papers,' which Mr. Firth is editing for the Camden Society. We take this opportunity of expressing our surprise that in a country in which an interest in historical study is so widely spread, a Society which has done so much, and is ready to do so much more, for it by the publication of historical texts, should be so badly supported as to be compelled for the present to reduce the number of its annual volumes.

Presbyterianism. How great a folly it was no man knew better than himself, and there is strong reason to believe that he was still willing to resist it. It is, however, characteristic of the man that he attempted to resist it, not by open speech but by secret intrigue. It has long been known that Lauderdale visited Scotland in the beginning of January, 1649, and that he, together with Lanark, who soon afterwards became Duke of Hamilton by his brother's execution, fled to Holland before the end of the month. The despatches of Graymond, the French agent in Scotland, show that the assumed anger of Argyll was collusive, and that an understanding was come to between him and the exiled Lords of the Engagement. Argyll took care to leave few traces of his underground diplomacy; but the scanty pieces of evidence we possess give some reason for believing that Argyll hoped, with the assistance of the Engagers, to modify the policy which he openly supported, relieving Charles from the necessity of connecting his acceptance of the Scottish Crown with the burden of a promise to force upon England a religion which his own supporters in England would be the first to condemn.

However this may have been, Scottish Commissioners were sent to the Hague to open a negotiation with Charles. That negotiation broke down because they insisted that the young King should accept not only the Scottish National Covenant, but also the Solemn League and Covenant, which bound him to impose something very like the Scottish ecclesiastical system on England. Lauderdale advised Charles to accept the National Covenant, but to refuse to follow the Scottish clergy in meddling with England. Charles consequently replied that he could do nothing in England and Ireland without the consent of the Parliaments of those countries. It was a sound constitutional position, and it may well be that, if the advice which guided Charles came from Lauderdale, he did not speak without the consent of Argyll. The Commissioners were bound by their instructions to stand firm, and on May 27 they landed at Leith to give an account of their failure.

The way was thus cleared for Montrose. To him the very thought of an understanding either with Argyll or the Engagers was hateful. He had denounced in Council the Scots of both parties as rebels, and he was eager to vindicate with the sword his young master's claim to rule by right of birth. Men were indeed to be had in plenty from the disbanded armies of the Thirty Years' War, but money

was hard to come by. Montrose, indeed, had obtained some jewels from Ulfeldt, the Danish chancellor, but what were a few jewels to support an army? Yet neither Montrose nor Charles could persuade themselves but that the kings and princes of Europe would be ready to dispense their treasures to maintain, in Charles's person, the sanctity of the monarchical principle. On April 13, 1649, whilst the Scottish Commissioners were still at the Hague, Charles empowered Montrose to treat for pecuniary aid with kings and princes. On May 19, the day on which he gave his last answer to the Scots, he named Montrose Admiral of Scotland. On June 12 he renewed all his former commissions, and promised never to take a step in Scottish affairs without his advice.

Charles's rejection of the Scottish demands involved an entire reconsideration of his position. As he was not to go to Scotland, he accepted an invitation from Ormond to go to Ireland, and to prepare an Irish invasion of England after Ireland had been subdued by the united efforts of Ormond and confederate Catholics. This change of front brought with it the possibility, as Charles thought, of obtaining help from the Roman Catholic states. On May 27, Cottington and Hyde were sent to Madrid to ask the King of Spain for money. On July 28 a priest, named Meynell, was sent to Rome to beg money of the Pope. In June, Charles himself, probably taking Montrose with him, visited Brussels to implore aid of the Archduke Leopold, the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands. Not that the money of Protestants was rejected; and before Charles left the Hague he expected to receive from the Elector of Brandenburg, afterwards known as the Great Elector, a loan sufficient to enable him to pay a force of German troops, to be commanded by Montrose. Before the end of July he learnt that the Elector was unable or unwilling to supply him, and, Charles having proceeded to France to visit his mother on his way to Ireland, Montrose started in August on a roving commission to raise men and money as best he might for the invasion of Scotland.

Our knowledge of the proceedings of Montrose in the execution of this commission has been largely increased by the industry of the editors of The Deeds of Montrose.' They have collected evidence from various sources which paint in the most lively colours his constancy under everrecurring difficulties, and they have succeeded in overthrow

* In giving dates we have followed the old style.

ing the credit of an exaggerated report of his doings which fell into the hands of Nicholas, and was accepted by Napier as a safe foundation for this part of his narrative. Montrose was, it seems, associated with Sir John Cochrane in an attempt to raise money at Hamburg. Cochrane, however, failed in this, and afterwards proceeded to Courland, where the Duke was ready to give help, though what he sent did not arrive in time to be of any service. In the meanwhile, however, Montrose had not been idle. In August he sent off the Earl of Kinnoul to the Orkneys with 100 Danish and other recruits, and eighty officers, to command levies which might be raised in those islands and on the mainland. The Scottish Government had no navy, and the Orkneys would therefore serve as an impregnable base of operations. Though David Leslie, in command of the Scottish army, hurried northwards in October, he was unable to cross the Pentland Firth.

Montrose had, in the meanwhile, arrived in Denmark. The King, Frederick VI., though personally friendly, could do nothing for him, further than allow him to enlist men secretly at Copenhagen. Money, however, ran so short that Montrose only succeeded in obtaining 200 recruits. In the second week of November he made his way to Gothenburg, where he found a wealthy Scot, John Maclear, settled as a merchant. Maclear threw himself heart and soul into his cause, lent him 60,000 rix-dollars, a sum equivalent to about 25,000l., and also made over to him a moiety of a considerable store of arms which had some months before been obtained from Queen Christina by the Earl of Brentford on the condition that half of them should be delivered to Montrose and the other half to Ormond. From Christina Montrose expected much, but obtained little. She directed her officers to wink at his proceedings at Gothenburg, and she sold him a frigate, The Herderinn,' but she could do no more. In the middle of December Montrose was joined by a ship with his 200 Danish recruits. He had hired another in the town, and with these three vessels he intended to sail on the 16th.

6

More than once Montrose went on board, but his sailing was again and again delayed. Once, indeed, some of his vessels were caught in the ice, and made their way back with difficulty. There seems to be no doubt that he contrived to send detachments before him, but the details of these minor embarkments are not to be discovered, and all that can be said is that the rumour of the destruction of large numbers of his men by shipwreck find no support in documentary

« PreviousContinue »