It will often happen that this deference is not recognized by either party. A man will perhaps disavow with scorn all deference for some person, a son or daughter, perhaps, or an humble companion, whom he treats, in manner, with familiar superiority; and the other party will as readily and sincerely renounce all pretension to Authority; and yet there may be that "habitual Presumption" in the mind of the one, in favour of the opinions, suggestions, &c., of the other, which we have called Deference. These parties, however, are not using the words in a different sense, but are unaware of the state of the fact. There is a Deference; but unconscious. Those who are habitually wanting in Deference towards such as we think entitled to it, are usually called arrogant," the word being used as distinguished from self-conceited, proud, vain, and other kindred words. Such persons may be described as having an habitual and exclusive "self-deference."

Arrogance.

Of course the persons and works which are looked up to as high authorities, or the contrary, will differ in each Age, Country, and Class of men. But most people are disposed,-measuring another by their own judgment, to reckon him arrogant who disregards what they deem the best authorities. That man however may most fairly and strictly be so called who has no deference for those whom he himself thinks most highly of. And instances may be found of this character; i. e. of a man who shall hold in high estimation the ability and knowledge of certain persons-rating them perhaps above himself—whose most deliberate judgments, even on matters they are most conversant with, he will nevertheless utterly set at nought, in each particular case that arises, if they happen not to coincide with the idea that first strikes his mind.

Admiration and

deference,

distinct.

For it is to be observed that admiration, esteem, and concurrence in opinion, are quite distinct from "Deference," and not necessarily accompanied by it. If any one makes what appears to us to be a very just remark, or if we acquiesce in what he proposes on account of the reasons he alleges, -this is not Deference. And if this has happened many times, and we thence form a high opinion of his ability, this again neither implies, nor even necessarily produces Deference; though in reason, such ought to be the result. But one may often find a person con versant with two others, A, and B, and estimating A without hesi tation as the superior man of the two; and yet, in any case whatever that may arise, where A and B differ in their judgment, taking for granted at once that B is in the right.

Grounds of

deference.

Admiration, esteem, &c., are more the result of a judgment of the understanding; (though often of an erroneous one ;) "Deference" is apt to depend on feelings;—often, on whimsical and unaccountable feelings. It is often yielded to a vigorous claim,-to an authoritative and overbearing demeanour. With others, of an opposite character, a soothing, in

sinuating, flattering, and seemingly submissive demeanour will often gain great influence. They will yield to those who seem to yield to them; the others, to those who seem resolved to yield to no one. Those who seek to gain adherents to their School or Party by putting forth the claim of antiquity in favour of their tenets, are likely to be peculiarly successful among those of an arrogant disposition. A book or a Tradition of a thousand years old, appears to be rather a thing than a person; and will thence often be regarded with blind deference by those who are prone to treat their contemporaries with insolent contempt, but who "will not go to compare with an old man.' They will submit readily to the authority of men who flourished fifteen or sixteen centuries ago, and whom, if now living, they would not treat with decent respect.

1976

With some persons, again, Authority seems to act according to the law of Gravitation; inversely as the squares of the distances. They are inclined to be of the opinion of the person who is nearest. Personal Affection, again, in many minds, generates Deference. They form a habit of first, wishing, secondly, hoping, and thirdly, believing a person to be in the right, whom they would be sorry to think mistaken. In a state of morbid depression of spirits, the same cause leads to the opposite effect. To a person in that state, whatever he would be "sorry to think" appears probable; and consequently there is a Presumption in his mind against the opinions, measures, &c., of those he is most attached to. That the degree of Deference felt for any one's authority ought to depend not on our feelings, but on our judgment, it is almost superfluous to remark; but it is important to remember that there is a danger on both sides; —of an unreasonable Presumption either on the side of our wishes, or against them.

Deference as

points.

It is obvious that Deference ought to be, and usually is, felt in reference to particular points. One has a deference for to particular his physician, in questions of medicine; and for his bailiff, in questions of farming; but not vice versa. And accordingly, Deference may be misplaced in respect of the subject, as well as of the person. It is conceivable that one may have a due degree of Deference, and an excess of it, and a deficiency of it, all towards the same person, but in respect of different points. It is worth remarking, as a curious fact, that men are liable to deceive themselves as to the degree of Deference they feel towards various persons. But the case is the same (as I shall have occasion hereafter to point out") with many other feelings also, such as pity, contempt, love, joy, &c.; in respect of which we are apt o mistake the conviction that such and such an object deserves pity, contempt, &c., for the feeling itself; which often does not acompany that conviction. And so also, a person will perhaps scribe himself (with

Men often self-deceived as to their feelings of deference.

76 Shakspear?, Twelfth Night

77 Part II. Ch. I. § 2.

sincere good faith) as feeling great Deference towards some one, on the ground of his believing him to be entitled to it; and perhaps being really indignant against any one else who does not manifest it. Sometimes again, one will mistake for a feeling of Deference his concurrence with another's views, and admiration of what is said or done by him. But this, as has been observed above, does not imply Deference, if the same approbation would have been bestowed on the same views, supposing them stated and maintained in an anony mous paper. The converse mistake is equally natural. A man

may fancy that, in each case, he acquiesces in such a one's views or suggestions from the dictates of judgment, and for the reasons given; ("What she does seems wisest, virtuousest, discreetest, best";) when yet perhaps the very same reasons, coming from another, would have been rejected.

above re

Statemeuts of facts liable to be disregarded,

It is worth observing also, that though, as has been marked, (Ch. II. § 4) questions of fact and of opinion, ought to be decided on very different grounds, yet, with many persons, a statement of facts is very little attended to when coming from one for whose judgment (though when coming they do not deliberately doubt his veracity) they have little or no Deference. For, by common minds, the above distinction, between matters of fact and opinion, is but imperfectly apprehended." It is not therefore always superfluous to endeavour to raise a Presumption in favour of the judg ment of one whom you wish to obtain credit, even in respect of matters in which judgment has, properly, little or no concern.

from those whose judgment is undervalued.

It is usual, and not unreasonable, to pay more Deference-other points being equal to the decisions of a Council, or Assembly of any kind, (embodied in a Manifesto, Act of Parliament, Speech from the Throne, Report, Set of Articles, &c.,) than to those of an individual, equal, or even superior to any member of such Assembly. But in one point, and it is a very important one, though usually overlooked, this rule is subject to something of an exception; which may be thus stated in any composition of an individual who is deemed worthy of respect, we presume that whatever he says must have some meaning-must tend toward some object which could not be equally accomplished by erasing the whole passage. He is expected never to lay down a rule, and then add exceptions, nearly or altogether coextensive with it; nor in any way to have so modified and explained away some assertion, that each portion of a passage shall be virtually neutralized by the other. Now if we interpret in this way any joint-production of several persons, we shall often be led into mistakes. For, those who have had experience as members of any deliberative Assembly, know by that experience (what indeed

78 Milion.

79 It is a curious characteristic of some of our older writers, that they are accustomed to

cite authorities,-and that most profusely, for matters of opinion, while for facts they often omit to cite any.

any one might conjecture) how much compromise will usually take place between conflicting opinions, and what will naturally thence result. One person, e. g. will urge the insertion of something, which another disapproves; and the result will usually be, after much debate, something of what is popularly called "splitting the difference" the insertion will be made, but accompanied with such limitations and modifications as nearly to nullify it. A fence will be erected in compliance with one party, and a gap will be left in it, to gratify another. And again, there will often be, in some document of this class, a total silence on some point, whereon, perhaps, most of the Assembly would have preferred giving a decision, but could not agree what decision it should be.

A like character will often be found also in the composition of a single individual, when his object is to conciliate several parties whose views are conflicting. He then represents, as it were, in his own mind, an Assembly composed of those parties.

Any one therefore who should think himself bound in due deference for the collective wisdom of some august Assembly, to interpret any joint-composition of it, exactly as he would that of a respectable individual, and never to attribute to it any thing of that partiallyinconsistent and almost nugatory character which the writings of a sensible and upright man would be exempt from, any one, I say, who should proceed (as many do) on such a principle, would be often greatly misled.80

It may be added, that the Deference due to the decisions of an Assembly, is sometimes, erroneously, transferred to those of some individual member of it; that is, it is sometimes taken for granted, that what they have, jointly, put forth, is to be interpreted by what he, in his own writings, may have said on the same points. And yet it may sometimes be the fact, that the strong expressions of his sentiments in his own writings, may have been omitted in the jointproduction of the Assembly, precisely because not approved by the majority in that Assembly.

Transferring the Burden of proof.

It is to be observed, that a Presumption may be rebutted by an opposite Presumption, so as to shift the Burden of proof to the other side. E. G. Suppose you had advised the removal of some existing restriction: you might be, in the first instance, called on to take the Burden of proof, and allege your reasons for the change, on the ground that there is a Presumption against every Change. But you might fairly reply, "True, but there is another Presumption which rebuts the former; every Restriction is in itself an evil; and therefore there is a Presumption in favour of its removal, unless it can be shown necessary for prevention of some greater evil: I am not bound to allege any

80 In studying the Scriptures we must be on our guard against the converse-mistake, of interpreting the Bible as if it were one Book, the joint-work of the Sacred Writers, instead of,

what it is, several distinct books, written by individuals independently of each other.

81 SeeCharges and other Tracts," p. 447. '

specific inconvenience; if the restriction is unnecessary, that is reason enough for its abolition: its defenders therefore are fairly called on to prove its necessity."

Again, in reference to the prevailing opinion, that the "Nathanael" of John's Gospel was the same person as the apostle "Bartholomew" mentioned in the others, an intelligent friend once remarked to me that two names afford a "prima facie" Presumption of two persons. But the name of Bartholomew, being a "Patronymic," (like Simon Peter's designation Bar-Jona, and Joseph's Sirname of Barsabas, mentioned in Acts;--he being probably the same with the Apostle " Joseph Barnabas," &c.,) affords a Counterpresumption that he must have had another name, to distinguish him from his own kindred. And thus we are left open to the arguments drawn from the omission, by the other Evangelists, of the name of Nathanael,-evidently a very eminent disciple, the omis sion by John of the name of the Apostle Bartholomew,—and the recorded intimacy with the Apostle Philip.

Presumption against Logic.

In one of Lord Dudley's (lately published) letters to Bishop Coplestone, of the date of 1814, he adduces a presumption against the Science of Logic, that it was sedulously cultivated during the dark periods when the intellectual powers of mankind seemed nearly paralysed,-when no discoveries were made, and when various errors were wide-spread and deeprooted and that when the mental activity of the world revived, and philosophical inquiry flourished, and bore its fruits, Logical studies fell into decay and contempt. To many minds this would appear a decisive argument. The author himself was too acute to see more in it than what it certainly is a fair Presumption. And he would probably have owned that it might be met by a counter-presumption. When any science or pursuit has been unduly and unwisely followed, to the neglect of others, and has even been intruded into their province, we may presume that a reaction will be likely to ensue, and an equally excessive contempt, or dread, or abhorrence, to succeed. 83 And the same kind of reaction occurs in every department of life. It is thus that the thraldom of gross superstition, and tyrannical priestcraft, have so often led to irreligion. It is thus that "several valuable medicines, which when first introduced, were proclaimed, each as a panacea, infallible in the most opposite disorders, fell, consequently, in many instances, for a time, into total disuse; though afterwards they were established in their just estimation, and employed conformably to their real properties."784

Counter-pre

sumption.

So, it might have been said, in the present case, the mistaken and absurd cultivation of Logic during ages of great intellectual dark

82 See Essay II. "On the Kingdom of Christ," § 33.

83 I dwelt on this subject in a Charge to the Dioceses of Dublin, 1843.

84 Elements of Logic, Pref. p. x.