Real and invented Examples. other, from a supposed case. And he remarks, that though the latter is more easily adduced, the former is more convincing. If however due care be taken, that the fictitious instance,-the supposed case, adduced, be not wanting in probability, it will often be no less convincing than the other. For it may so happen, that one, or even several, historical facts may be appealed to, which, being nevertheless exceptions to a general rule, will not prove the probability of the conclusion. Thus, from several known instances of ferocity in black tribes, we are not authorized to conclude, that blacks are universally, or gen erally, ferocious; and in fact, many instances may be brought forIward on the other side. Whereas in the supposed case, (instanced by Aristotle, as employed by Socrates,) of mariners choosing their steersman by lot, though we have no reason to suppose such a case ever occurred, we see so plainly the probability that if it did occur, the lot might fall on an unskilful person, to the loss of the ship, that the argument has considerable weight against the practice, so common in the ancient republics, of appointing magistrates by lot. cases must be probable. There is, however, this important difference; that a fictitious case which has not this intrinsic probability, has absolutely Fictitious no weight whatever; so that of course such arguments might be multiplied to any amount, without the smallest effect whereas any matter of fact which is well established, however unaccountable it may seem, has some degree of weight in reference to a parallel case; and a sufficient number of such arguments may fairly establish a general rule, even though we may be unable, after all, to account for the alleged fact in any of the instances. E. G. No satisfactory reason has yet been assigned for a connexion between the absence of upper cutting teeth, or of the presence of horns, and rumination; but the instances are so numerous and constant of this connexion, that no Naturalist would hesitate, if, on examination of a new species, he found those teeth absent, and the head horned, to pronounce the animal a ruminant. Whereas, on the other hand, the fable of the countryman who obtained from Jupiter the regulation of the weather, and in consequence found his crops fail, does not go one step towards proving the intended conclusion; because that consequence is a mere gratuitous assumption without any probability to support it. In fact, the assumption there, is not only gratuitous, but is in direct contradiction to experience; for a gardener has, to a certain degree, the command of rain and sunshine, by the help of his watering-pots, glasses, hot-beds, and flues; and the result is not the destruction of his crops. There is an instance of a like error in a tale of Cumberland's, intended to prove the advantage of a public over a private education. He represents two brothers, educated on the two plans, respectively; the former turning out very well, and the latter very ill; and had the whole been matter of fact a sufficient number of such instances would have had weight as an Argument; but as it is a fiction, and no reason is shown why the result should be such as is represented, except the supposed superiority of a public education, the Argument involves a manifest petitio principii; and resembles the appeal made, in the well-known fable, to the picture of a man conquering a lion; a result which might just as easily have been reversed, and which would have been so, had lions been painters. It is necessary, in short, to be able to maintain, either that such and such an event did actually take place, or that, under a certain hypothesis, it would be likely to take place. Supposed cases assert nothing. On the other hand it is important to observe, with respect to any imaginary case, whether introduced as an argument, or merely for the sake of explanation, that, as it is (according to what I have just said) requisite that the hypothesis should be conceivable, and that the result supposed should follow naturally from it, so, nothing more is to be required. No fact being asserted, it is not fair that any should be denied. Yet it is very common to find persons, "either out of ignorance and infirmity, or out of malice and obstinacy," joining issue on the question whether this or that ever actually took place; and representing the whole controversy as turning on the literal truth of something that had never been affirmed. [See treatise on Fallacies, Chapter III. §"Irrelevant conclusion:" of which this is a case.] To obviate this mistake more care must be taken than would at first sight seem necessary, to remind the hearers that you are merely supposing a case, and not asserting any fact: especially when (as it frequently happens) the supposed case is one which might actually occur, and perhaps does occur. 67 I can well sympathize with the contempt mingled with indignation expressed by Cicero against certain philosophers who found fault with Plato, for having, in a case he proposes, alluded to the fabulous ring of Gyges, which had the virtue of making the wearer invisible. They had found out, it seems, that there never was any such ring." It is worth observing, that Arguments from Example, whether real or invented, are the most easily comprehended by the young and the uneducated; because they facilitate the exercise of Abstraction; a power which in such hearers is usually the most imperfect. This mode of reasoning corresponds to a geometrical demonstration by means of a Diagram; in which the Figure placed before the learner, is an individual, employed, as he soon comes to perceive, as a sign, 67 Atque hoc loco, philosophi quidam, minime mali illi quidem, sed non satis acuti, fictam et commenticiam fabulam prolatam dicunt a Platone: quassi vero ille, aut factum id esse, aut fieri potuisse defendat. Hæc est vis hujus annuli et hujus exempli, si nemo sciturus, nemo ne suspicaturus quidem sit, cum aliquid, divitiarum, potentiæ, dominationis, libidinis, caussa feceris-si id diis hominibusque futurum sit semper ignotum, sisne facturus. Negant id fieri posse. Quanquam potest id quidem; sed quæro, quod negant posse, id si posset, quidaam facerent? Urgent rustice sane: negant enim posse, et in eo perstant. Hoc verbum quid valeat, non vident. Cum enim quærimus, si possint celare, quid facturi sint, nop quærimus, possintne celare, &c. (Cic. de Off. B. III. C. IX.) -though not an arbitrary sign," representing the whole class. The algebraic signs, again, are arbitrary; each character not being itself an individual of the class it represents. These last therefore correspond to the abstract terms of a language. Fable and illustration. Under the head of Invented Example, a distinction is drawn by Aristotle, between Parabolè and Logos. From the instances he gives, it is plain that the former corresponds (not to Parable, in the sense in which we use the word, derived from that of Parabolè in the Sacred Writers, but) to Illustration; the latter to Fable or Tale. In the former, an allusion only is made to a case easily supposable; in the latter, a fictitious story is narrated. Thus, in his instance above cited, of Illustration, if any one, instead of a mere allusion, should relate a tale, of mariners choosing a steersman by lot, and being wrecked in consequence, Aristotle would evidently have placed that under the head of Logos. The other method is of course preferable, from its brevity, whenever the allusion can be readily understood: and accordingly it is common, in the case of well-known fables, to allude to, instead of narrating them. That, e. g. of the Horse and the Stag, which he gives, would, in the present day, be rather alluded to than told, if we wished to dissuade a people from calling in a too powerful auxiliary. It is evident that a like distinction might have been made in respect of historical examples; those cases which are well known, being often merely alluded to and not recited. Fable and Tale. The word "Fable" is at present generally limited to those fictions in which the resemblance to the matter in question is not direct, but analogical; the other class being called Novels, Tales, &c."9 Those resemblances are (as Dr. A. Smith has observed) the most striking, in which the things compared are of the most dissimilar nature; as is the case in what we call Eables; and such accordingly are generally preferred for argumentative purposes, both from that circumstance itself, and also on account of the greater brevity which is, for that reason, not only allowed but required in them. For a Fable spun out to a great length becomes an Allegory, which generally satiates and disgusts; on the other hand, a fictitious Tale, having a more direct, and therefore less striking resemblance to reality, requires that an interest in the events and persons should be created by a longer detail, without which it would be insipid. The Fable of the Old Man and the Bundle of Sticks, compared with the Iliad, may serve to exemplify what has been said: the moral conveyed by each being the same, viz. the strength acquired by union, and the weakness resulting from division; the latter fiction would be perfectly insipid if conveyed in a few lines; the former, in twenty-four books, insupportable. 68 The words, written or spoken of any lan- Picture-writing or Hieroglyphic, are natural guage, are arbitrary signs; the characters of signs. 69 A Novel or Tale may be compared to a Picture; a Fable, to a Device. ав Of the various uses, and of the real or apparent refutation, of Examples, (as well as of other Arguments,) I shall treat hereafter; but it may be worth while here to observe, that I have been speaking of Example as a kind of Argument, and with a view therefore to that purpose alone; though it often happens, that a resemblance, either direct or analogical, is introduced for other purposes; viz. not to prove any thing, but either to illustrate and explain one's meaning, (which is the strict etymological use of the word Illustration,) or to amuse the fancy by ornament of language in which case it is usually called a Simile: as, for instance, when a person whose fortitude, forbearance, and other such virtues, are called forth by persecutions and afflictions, is compared to those herbs which give out their fragrance on being bruised. is of course most important to distinguish, both in our own compositions and those of others, between these different purposes. I shall accordingly advert to this subject in the course of the following chapter. It CHAP. III. Of the various use and order of the several kinds of § 1. Arguments of THE first rule to be observed is, that it should be considered, whether the principle object of the discourse be, to give satisfaction to a candid mind, and convey instruction to those who are ready to receive it, or to compel the assent, or silence the objections, of an opponent. For, eases may occur, in which the arguments to be employed with most effect will be different, according as it is the one or the other of these objects that we are aiming at. It will often happen that of the two great classes into which Arguments were divided, the "A priori" [or Argument from cause to effect] will be principally employed when the chief object is to instruct the Learner; and the other class, when our aim is to refute the Opponent. And to whatever class the Arguments we resort to may belong, the general tenour of the reasoning will, in many respects, be affected by the present consideration. The distinction in question is nevertheless in general little attended to. It is usual to call an Argument, simply, strong cr weak, without reference to the purpose for which it is designed, . whereas the Arguments which afford the most satisfaction to a candid mind, are often such as would have less weight in controversy than many others, which again would be less suitable for the former purpose. E. G. There are some of the internal evidences of Christ ianity which, in general, are the most satisfactory to a believer's mind, but are not the most striking in the refutation of unbelievers : the Arguments from Analogy, on the other hand, which are (in refuting objections) the most unanswerable, are not so pleasing and consolatory. My meaning cannot be better illustrated than by an instance referred to in that incomparable specimen of reasoning, Dr. Paley's Hore Paulinæ. "When we take into our hands the letters," (viz. Paul's Epistles,)" which the suffrage and consent of antiquity hath thus transmitted to us, the first thing that strikes our attention is the air of reality and business, as well as of seriousness and conviction, which pervades the whole. Let the sceptic read them. If he be not sensible of these qualities in them, the argument can have no weight with him. If he be; if he perceive in almost every page the language of a mind actuated by real occasions, and operating upon real circumstances; I would wish it to be observed, that the proof which arises from this perception is not to be deemed occult or imaginary, because it is incapable of being drawn out in words, or of being conveyed to the apprehension of the reader in any other way, than by sending him to the books themselves.” 70 There is also a passage in Dr. A. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, which illustrates very happily one of the applications of the principle in question. "Sometimes we have occasion to defend the propriety of observing the general rules of justice, by the consideration of their necessity to the support of society. We frequently hear the young and the licentious ridiculing the most sacred rules of morality, and professing, sometimes from the corruption, but more frequently from the vanity of their hearts, the most abominable maxins of conduct. Our indignation rouses, and we are eager to refute and expose such detestable principles. But though it is their intrinsic hatefulness and detestableness which originally inflames us against them, we are unwilling to assign this as the sole reason why we condemn them, or to pretend that it is merely because we ourselves hate and detest them. The reason, we think, would not appear to be conclusive. Yet, why should it not; if we hate and detest them because they are the natural and proper objects of hatred and detestation? But when we are asked why we should not act in such or such a manner, the very question seems to suppose that, to those who ask it, this manner of acting does not appear to be so for its own sake the natural and proper object of those sentiments. must show them, therefore, that it ought to be so for the sake of something else. Upon this account we generally cast about for other arguments; and the consideration which first occurs to us, is the disorder and confusion of society which would result from the universal prevalence of such practices. We seldom fail, therefore, to insist upon this topic."""" 70 P. 403. 71 Part II. sec. ii. pp. 151, 152, vol. i. ed. 1812. We |