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the negative or prohibitory commands avoided the common fault of accenting the word "not."

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And here it may be worth while to remark, that in some cases the Copula ought to be made the emphatic word; (i. e. the "is," if the proposition be affirmative, the "not," if negative ;) viz. where the proposition may be considered as in opposition to its contradictory.20 If, e. g. it had been a question whether we ought to steal or not, the commandment, in answer to that, would have been rightly pronounced, "thou shalt not steal" but the question being, what things we are forbidden to do, the answer is, that "to steal" is one of them, "thou shalt not steal." In such a case as this, the proposition is considered as opposed, not to its contradictory, but to one with a different Predicate; the question being, not, which Copula (negative or affirmative) shall be employed, but what shall be affirmed or denied of the subject: e g. "it is lawful to beg; but not to steal;" in such a case, the Predicate, not the Copula, will be the emphatic word.

One fault worth noticing on account of its commonness is the placing of the emphasis on "neighbour" in the ninth and tenth Commandments; as if there might be some persons precluded from the benefit of the prohibitions. One would think the man to whom our Lord addressed the parable of the good Samaritan, had been used to this mode of delivery, by his asking "and who is my neighbour ?"

The usual pronounciation of one part of the "Apostles' Creed," is probably founded on some misapprehension of the sense of it:22 "The Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints," is commonly read as if these were two distinct articles; instead of the latter clause being merely an explanation of the former: "The Holy Catholic Church, [viz.] the Communion of Saints."

[0.] Part. IV. Chap. ii. § 5. p. 247.

"It need hardly be observed how important it is, with a view to these objects," (the training of children in sound and practical religious knowledge) "to abstain carefully from the practice, still too prevalent, though much less so, we believe, than formerly, of compelling, or encouraging, or even allowing children to learn by rote, forms of prayer, catechisms, hymns, or in short anything connected with morality and religion, when they attach no meaning to the words they utter.

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It is done on the plea that they will hereafter learn the meaning

19 Dr. Johnson, in Boswell's Life, is recorded to have sanctioned this fault, in respect at at least of the ninth Commandment.

20 Nor is this properly an exception to the above rule; for, in such cases, that which is expressed as the Copula, is, in sense, the Predicate; the question being in fact whether "true" or "false" shall be predicated of a certain assertion.

21 I have heard again of some persons among the lower Orders who, practically, lay the stress on "against ;" thinking it allowable to give false evidence in any one's favour.

22 See Sir Peter (afterwards Lord) King's History of the Apostles' Creed; a work much more valuable (in proportion to its size) than most that are studied by theologians.

of what they have been thus taught, and will be able to make a practical use of it. But no attempt at economy of time can be more injudicious. Let any child, whose capacity is so far matured as to enable him to comprehend an explanation, e. g. of the Lord's Prayer, have it then put before him for the first time, and when he is made acquainted with the meaning of it, set to learn it by heart; and can any one doubt that in less than half a day's application, he would be able to repeat it fluently? And the same would be the case with other forms. All that is learnt by rote by a child before he is competent to attach a meaning to the words he utters, would not, if all put together, amount to so much as would cost him, when able to understand it, a week's labour, to learn perfectly. But it may cost the toil -often the vain toil-of many years, to unlearn the habit of formalism; of repeating words by rote without attending to their meaning; a habit which every one conversant with education knows to be, in all subjects most readily acquired by children, and with difficulty avoided, even with the utmost care of the teacher; but which such a plan must inevitably tend to generate.

"It is often said, and very truly, that it is important to form early habits of piety; but to train a child in one kind of habit, is not the most likely way of forming the opposite habit; and nothing can be more contrary to true piety than the superstition (for such in fact it is) of attaching efficacy to the repetition of a certain form of words, as of a charm, independent of the understanding and of the heart."

"It is also said, with equal truth, that we ought to take advantage of the facility which children possess of learning words; but to infer from thence, that Providence designs us to make such a use (or rather abuse) of this gift, as we have been censuring, is as if we were to take advantage of the readiness with which a new-born babe swallows whatever is put into its mouth, to dose it with ardent spirits, instead of wholesome food and necessary medicine. The readiness with which children learn and remember words, is in truth a most

23"We have spoken with so much commendation of the Hints on Early Education [Mrs. Hoare's], that we feel bound to notice Incidentally a point in which we think the author, if not herself mistaken, is likely to lead her readers into a mistake. 'PUBLIC WORSHIP. Silence,' says the author,' self-subjection, and a serious deportment, both in family and public worship, ought to be strictly enforced in early life, and it is better that children should not attend, till they are capable of behaving in a proper manner. But a practical regard for the Sabbath, and for the services of religion is but an effect of that reverence for everything sacred which it is of primary importance early to establish as a habit of mind.' -pp. 172, 173.

Now if reverence for things sacred' be the only habit we wish to implant, the caution here given is sufficient; but if we would form in the child the much more important habit of hearty devotion as distinguished from super

stitious formalism, we should wait for his being not only capable of behaving' with outward decorum, but also of understanding and joining in the Service.

"We would also deprecate, by the way, the practice (which this writer seems to countenance, though without any express inculcation) of strictly prohibiting children from indulging in their usual sports on the Lord's day; which has a manifest tendency to associate with that festival ideas of gloom and restraint; and also to generate the too common notion that God requires of us only one day in seven, and that scrupulous privation on that day will afford license for the rest of the week. We are speaking, be it observed, of the Christian festival of the Lord's Day. Those who think themselves bound by the precepts of the Old Testament relative to the Sabbath, should remember that Saturday is the day to which those precepts apply."

important advantage, if rightly employed; viz. if applied to the acquiring of that mass of what may be called arbitrary knowledge of insulated facts, which can only be acquired and retained by a mere act of memory, and which is necessary in after life; when the acquisition of it would both be more troublesome, and would encroach on time that might otherwise be better employed. Chronology, names of countries, weights and measures, and indeed all the words of any language, are of this description. If a child had even ten times the ordinary degree of the faculty in question, a judicious teacher would find abundance of useful employment for it, without resorting to any that could possibly be detrimental to his future habits, moral, religious, or intellectual."-London Review, 1829, No. II. Art V. “ Juvenile Library," pp. 412, 413.

[GG] Part II. Chap. i. § 1. p. 139.

"So great is the outcry which it has been the fashion among some persons for several years past to raise against expediency, that the very word has become almost an ill-omened sound. It seems to be thought by many a sufficient ground of condemnation of any legislator to say that he is guided by views of expediency. And some seem even to be ashamed of acknowledging that they are in any degree so guided. I, for one, however, am content to submit to the imputation of being a votary of expediency. And what is more, I do not see what right any one who is not so has to sit in Parliament, or to take any part in public affairs. Any one who may choose to acknowledge that the measures he opposes are expedient, or that those he recommends are inexpedient, ought manifestly to have no seat in a deliberative assembly, which is constituted for the express and sole purpose of considering what measures are conducive to the public good;-in other words, 'expedient.' I say, the 'public good,' because, of course, by 'expediency' we mean, not that which may benefit some individual, or some party or class of men, at the expense of the Public, but what conduces to the good of the nation. Now this, it is evident, is the very object for which deliberative Assemblies are constituted. And so far is this from being regarded, by our Church at least, as something at variance with religious duty, that we have a prayer specially appointed to be offered up during the sitting of the Houses of Parliament, that their consultations may be 'directed and prospered for the safety, honour, and welfare of our Sovereign and her dominions.' Now, if this be not the very definition of political expediency, let any one say what is.

"But some persons are so much at variance with the doctrine of our Church on this point, and I may add, with all sound moralists --as to speak of expediency as something that is, or may be, at variance with duty. If any one really holds that it can ever be expedient to violate the injunctions of duty,-that he who does so is

not sacrificing a greater good to a less, (which all would admit to be inexpedient,) that it can be really advantageous to do what is morally wrong, and will come forward and acknowledge that to be his belief, I have only to protest, for my own part, with the deepest abhorrence, against what I conceive to be so profligate a principle. It shocks all the notions of morality that I have been accustomed from childhood to entertain, to speak of expediency being possibly or conceivably opposed to rectitude.

"There are indeed many questions of expediency in which morality has no concern, one way or the other. In what way, for example, a husbandman should cultivate his field, or in what branch of trade a merchant should invest his capital, are questions of expediency in which there is usually no moral right or wrong on either side. But where there is moral right and wrong, it can never be expedient to choose the wrong. If the husbandman or the merchant should seek to gain increased profits by defrauding his neighbour, this would be at variance with expediency, because it would be sacrificing a greater good to a less. 'For what would it profit a man if he should gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?'

"I believe, however, that the greater part of those who raise a clamour against expediency mean, in reality, an apparent, but false and delusive expediency;-that which is represented as expedient, but in truth is not so. But if this be their meaning, it would surely be better, with a view to cutting short empty declamation, and understanding clearly whatever matter is under discussion, that they should express, distinctly, and according to the ordinary use of language, what they do mean. It would be thought absurd for a man to declaim against virtue,' and then at length to explain that what he meant was not real virtue, but an hypocritical semblance of it; or to argue against the use of 'coin,' meaning all the time, not real genuine coin, but fraudulent counterfeits. And sure it is not at all more reasonable for any one to declaim against 'expediency,' if what he means be, not what is really expedient, but what is erroneously mistaken for it."-Charge of 1845.

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INDEX.

TO SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL WORDS.

ABILITY, (dreaded by a certain class of
persons,) part ii. ch. iii. § 2.
Accessible arguments, (to the unlearned,)
p. i. ch. iii. § 8.
Action, p. iv. ch. iv. § 6.

Adversaries, (testimony of,) p. i. ch. ii.
§ 4.

Advice to a Reviewer, p. i. ch. iii. § 7.
Advocate, (office of,) p. i. ch. i. § 1.
(endeavour of, to convince us
that he thinks what he says,) p. ii. ch.
iii. § 3.

(habits formed by the occu-

pation,) p. ii. ch. iii. § 5.
Allegory, p. i. ch. ii. § 3.
Analogy, p. i. ch. ii. § 7.

Butler, Bp., (his style,) p. iii. ch. iii. § 2.
Campbell, Dr., (extracts from,) Appendix,
[D] and [H].

Catlin, (his account of the Mandan-In-
dians,) Appendix, [DDD]

Cause, (argument from,) p. i. ch. ii. § 2.
Chances, (calculation of,) p. i. ch. ii.
§ 4, 5.

Character, (of Speaker,) p. ii. ch. i. § 3.
and ch. iii. § 1.

(of persons to be addressed,)
p. ii. ch. iii. § 1.
Cicero, (omits to state when, and why
he begins with his proofs,) p. i. ch. iii.
§ 5.

Climax, (use of,) p. ii. ch. ii. § 4.

Antiquarians, (estimate of their author- Common Sense, (p. i. ch. ii. § 6.

ity,) p. ii. ch. iii. § 5.

Antithesis, p. iii. ch. ii. § 14.

Approach, (argument by,) p. i. ch. ii.
§ 6.

A priori, (argument,) p. i. ch. ii. § 2.
Argument, (distinguished from proposi-
tion,) p. i. ch. i. § 3.

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(satisfactory and compulso-
ry,) p. i. ch. iii. § 1.
Aristotle, (his definition of Rhetoric,) In-
trod. § 4.

-, (his distinction between real
and invented example,) p. i. ch. ii. § 8.
Arrangement, (of arguments,) p. i. ch. ii.
§ 4.

(of words,) p. iii. ch. i. § 3.

and ch. ii. § 11.
Arrogance, (what,) p. i. ch. iii. § 2.
Articles, (how to be interpreted when
drawn up by an Assembly,) p. i. ch. iii.
§ 2.

Assembly, (documents proceeding from,
how to be interpreted,) p. i. ch. iii. § 2.
Bashfulness, (in public speaking,) p. iv.
ch. iii. § 7, 8.

Belief, (coincident with disbelief,) p. i. ch.
ii. § 5.

Benson, (extract from,) Appendix [M].
Burden of proof, p. i. ch. iii. § 2.

Burke, (extract from,) p. iii. ch. ii. § 8.

-, (when apt to be laid aside,)
p. iii. ch. ii. § 6.
Comparison, (use of, in exciting any feel-
ing,) p. ii. ch. ii. § 4.

or Simile, p. iii. ch. ii. § 3.
Composition, (fallacy of,) p. i. ch. ii. § 4.
Conciseness, p. iii. ch ii. § 7.
Conclusion, (when to come first,) p. i. ch.
iii. § 5.

Conscious, (manner,) p. iv. ch. iv. § 2. p.
248, note.

Consistency, (mistakes respecting,) p. ii.
ch. iii. § 5.

Conviction, (distinguished from Persua
sion,) p. ii. ch. i. § 1.
Copleston, Bp., (on Analogy,) Appendix
[E].

(Letter of Lord Dudley,) p.

i. ch. iii. § 2.

(his share in reviving the
study of Logic,) p. i. ch. iii. § 2.
Council, (joint compositions of, how to be
interpreted,) p. i. ch. iii. § 2.
Credulity, (coincident with incredulity,)
p. i. ch. ii. § 5.

Crowded, (style,) p. iii. ch. ii. § 9.
Debating Societies, (advantages and dis-
advantages of,) Introd. § 6.
Deference, p. i. ch. iii. § 2.
Delivery, p. iv. ch. iv. § 1.

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