NOTE O.-Page 64. Bacon, in his Novum Organum, under what he terms "Instances of Power," says, "If any one, after an attentive consideration of the works already extant, would determine to use his best and strongest endeavours, he might doubtless either carry them somewhat further, or convert them to some other obvious purpose; or apply and transfer them to more noble uses than were known before." Gunpowder and shot, which for centuries have been used only as engines of destruction, have lately been converted, by Captain Manby, into engines of preservation. NOTE P.-Page 70. South (in his excellent sermon on Human Perfection) when speaking of grief, says: And, on the other side, for sorrow. Had any loss or disaster made but room for grief, it would have moved according to the severe allowances of prudence, and the proportions of the provocation. It would not have sallied out into complaint, or loudness, nor spread itself upon the face, and writ sad stories upon the forehead. No wringing of the hands, knocking the breast, or wishing oneself unborn; all which are but the ceremonies of sorrow, the pomp and ostentation of an effeminate grief; which speak not so much the greatness of the misery as the smallness of the mind. Tears may spoil the eyes, but not wash away the affliction. Sighs may exhaust the man, but not eject the burthen. Sorrow then would have been as silent as thought, as severe as philosophy. It would have rested in inward senses, tacit dislikes: and the whole scene of it been transacted in sad and silent reflections." NOTE N.-Page 85. This note, containing a few observations upon the pleasures of sense, of benevolence, of malevolence, and of taste, is published with the hope that it may induce some future inquirers to consider, whether our happiness does not mainly depend upon a due examination of our different sources of delight. THE PLEASURES OF SENSE. Sed multi mortales, dediti ventri atque somno, indocti, incultique, vitam sicuti peregrinantes transiere:-Eorum ego vitam mortemque juxta æstumo. Happiness does not consist in the Pleasures of Sense. Happiness does not consist in the pleasures of sense, in whatever profusion or variety they may be enjoyed: for 1st, These pleasures continue but a little while at a time. 2dly, By repetition they lose their relish. 3dly, The eagerness for high and intense delights takes away the relish from all others. There is hardly any delusion by which men are greater sufferers in their happiness, than by their expecting too much from what is called pleasure; that is, from those intense delights which vulgarly engross the name of pleasure. K These pleasures have, however, their value and as the young are always too eager in the pursuit of them, the old are sometimes too remiss, that is, too studious of their ease, to be at the pains for them which they really deserve. The supposition that Happiness consists in the Pleasures of Sense is from Ignorance. Euphranor. But Socrates, who was no country parson, suspected your men of pleasure were such through ignorance. Lysicles. Ignorance of what? Euph. Of the art of computing: it was his opinion that rakes cannot reckon; and that for want of this skill they make wrong judgements about pleasure, on the right choice of which their happiness depends. Lys. I do not understand you. Euph. Do you grant that sense perceiveth only sensible things? Lys. I do. Euph. Sense perceiveth only things present? Lys. This too I grant. Euph. Future pleasures, therefore, and pleasures of the understanding, are not to be judged of by actual sense. Lys. They are not. Euph. Those, therefore, who judge of pleasure by sense, may find themselves mistaken at the foot of the account. Cum lapidosa chiragra Contudit articulos veteris ramalia fagi, Tum crassos transîsse dies lucemque palustrem, To make a right computation, should you not consider all the faculties and all the kinds of pleasure, taking into your account the future as well as the present, and rating them all according to their true value? Crito. The Epicureans themselves allowed, that pleasure, which procures a greater pain or hinders a greater pleasure, should be regarded as a pain ; and that pain, which procures a greater pleasure |