justice to the evidence of the New Testament, and another group, Anglican and Protestant, which looks for some revision of that formula which, without sacrificing its essence, shall yet succeed in avoiding the difficulties that the ancient definition seems to involve and in giving a more plausible explanation of one aspect of the Synoptic picture. This group seeks for a solution through the medium of the idea of Kenosis, but it is most important to realize that for the Kenotic as for the Chalcedonian Christology the notion of the Pre-existence and the Incarnation of the Son of God is an essential factor. It is a controlling idea in a sense in which it is not for any of the other attempts at Christological re-statement which have come before us. Accordingly, we must separate ourselves from Professor Warfield, Mr. R. A. Knox and writers who argue that the Kenotic conception implies a Christ who, while He was on earth, was not God, 'a very impressive, very acute, very good man, who had once been God,' says Mr. Knox in drawing what he believes to be the right conclusion from the theory' that in the Incarnation Jesus Christ divested himself of certain of those attributes which we necessarily have in our minds when we use the term God." The word 'divesting' is hardly just as a description of the belief of the modern Kenoticist, however fairly it may represent the less cautious ideas of older thinkers. For it is one thing to put off certain qualities, and another to hold them retracted, in posse rather than in esse. We do not think it possible, on the basis of the Kenotic doctrine, to reduce the Jesus of the Gospels to the level of a God-inspired man, though Professor Warfield thinks this the inevitable outcome of all modern efforts to revise the Chalcedonian formula.

This is not to say that Kenoticist Christology does not present difficulties. To many of those which Dr. Loofs indicates there is no easy answer. Not only are there the speculative difficulties attendant upon the theory of the retraction of Divine qualities, but the Synoptic Gospels include a good deal of evidence which it is not easy to handle along the lines of this doctrine. Perhaps the best

1 Some Loose Stones, p. 98.

answer to the apparent implications of such a passage as St. Matt. xi 25-27 is that Christ was not always on the level of this great moment of self-consciousness, and of consciousness of the Father. That moment was an unique moment even in that Plerosis or Self-Fulfilment of Christ which is the complement of His Kenosis or Self-Emptying. But we cannot here examine this Christology in detail. We are only concerned to maintain that the predication 'Christ is God' is not seriously imperilled by it, while its intrinsic merit is that it makes room for a continued Plerosis in the life of the Incarnate, and, if it be extended to include Christ's ignorance of His impeccability, allows more satisfactorily than any other theory for the reality of temptation to Him.

The difficulties which beset the Christology of Chalcedon are also partly derived from the text of the Gospels, partly from doubts whether it does not involve a number of anti-rational and indeed mutually contradictory propositions. The Logos and a human soul, two natures, two wills lying side by side within a personal unity—these are certainly not easy thoughts. To say that they are irreconcileable with the Gospel picture, even apart from St. John, would be an exaggeration. The One Christ of the Gospels facing God-ward and man-ward is not a generically different Christ from the Christ of the Definition, which need not be taken as countersigning everything in Leo's letter. And that it is still necessary to deliver a warning against judging whether a thing is possible for God by whether it is conceivable for us is evident since Dr. Loofs makes use of just this argument as evidence against the idea of the Incarnation in itself.1

And here a word must be said of the ablest effort of recent years to maintain the Chalcedonian doctrine, while doing justice to the true religious interests involved in

1 Op. cit. p. 172: 'We cannot imagine the Godhead as being constricted by the limitations of human existence.' One may note that even in the wording of this sentence there is a not unimportant inaccuracy. The Incarnation of God the Son should not be described as the constriction of 'Godhead.'

and determinative of the Kenotic theory-Dr. Weston's The One Christ. Dr. Weston does not accept any of the modern forms of that theory; nevertheless he is quick to see the inadequacies of a Christology such as Cyril's, which does in effect minimize the reality of Christ's manhood in the interests of the idea of its deification.' His own position is akin to that of Dr. Moberly. No non-human sphere of the Incarnation is to be kept open. Christ is at every point, and in every relationship God-as-man or God-in-manhood. Accordingly the subject of the humanity is not the unlimited Logos as Cyril taught, nor the unlimited Logos, Who from time to time limits Himself, as Athanasius taught, but the Logos self-limited through an act which must be referred to the pre-incarnate state. At this point Dr. Weston's argument runs close alongside of that deep chapter on the Kenosis in Dr. Forsyth's book. But Dr. Forsyth would not endorse such a statement of our Lord's infallibility as a Teacher as Dr. Weston makes when he writes 'We cannot for a moment believe that the Incarnate ever spoke a single word, of which in His universal life as Logos He could say "That is not exactly and finally true."' But this brings in a further issue.

VI

Can we come to any conclusion? To a practical one at any rate. Those who accept Chalcedonian or Kenotic Christology should understand their common object better, namely the vindication of the belief that the Subject of all that is recorded in the Gospels is the Son of God, Himself true God, Who for us men and for our salvation descended and was incarnate. The differences which separate the adherents of the two Christologies are differences within an incomparably more vital unity. And if the belief in that Divine Subject is shaken, both Christologies are bankrupt. Other Christologies may be able to get along without itbut then do we still have the doctrine of Christ's Godhead, do we still have Christology?

J. K. MOZLEY.

1 P. 226.

ART. II.-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOLOGY.

1. British Association for the Advancement of Science; Australia, 1914. Presidential Address. By WILLIAM BATESON, M.A., F.R.S. Part 1-Melbourne.

-Sydney. (London: John Murray. 1914.)

Part 2

2. British Association, 1914. Presidential Address to the Zoological Section. By Professor ARTHUR DENDY, D.Sc., F.R.S. (London: John Murray. 1914.)

3. Mechanism, Life and Personality. By J. S. HALDANE, M.D., LL.D., F.R.S. (London: John Murray. 1913.) 4. The Science and Philosophy of the Organism. By HANS DRIESCH, Ph.D. 'Gifford Lectures' for 1907. Two Volumes. (London: A. & C. Black. 1908.)

And other Works.

THE meeting of the British Association held last year in Australia was in many ways a notable occasion. When it became known that the gathering was to be presided over by the foremost exponent in this country of Mendel's doctrine of heredity, expectations were raised that in the presidential address would be found a striking and authoritative pronouncement on the scientific grounds of the Mendelian conception, and a well-considered estimate of its bearing on general evolutionary method. This expectation was by no means falsified, and in the two parts of Mr. Bateson's discourse, delivered respectively at Melbourne and Sydney, we have before us the latest conclusions in the region of genetic research which have been arrived at by one who, in the words of Professor Dendy, ' has devoted his life with signal success to the experimental investigation of evolutionary problems.'

As might have been anticipated, a note struck early in this address is one of scepticism as to the adequacy of the Darwin-Wallace explanation of the origin of species by means of variation and natural selection.

'We go to Darwin,' says Mr. Bateson, 'for his incomparable collection of facts. We would fain emulate his scholarship, his

width and his power of exposition, but to us he speaks no more with philosophical authority. We read his scheme of Evolution as we would those of Lucretius or of Lamarck, delighting in their simplicity and their courage.' But in face of what we now know of the distribution of variability in nature, the scope claimed for Natural Selection in determining the fixity of species must be greatly reduced. The doctrine of the survival of the fittest is undeniable so long as it is applied to the organism as a whole, but to attempt by this principle to find value in all definiteness of parts and functions, and in the name of science to see fitness everywhere, is mere eighteenth-century optimism.

Shorn of these pretensions the doctrine of the survival of favoured races is a truism, helping scarcely at all to account for the diversity of species. Tolerance plays almost as considerable a part. By these admissions almost the last shred of that teleological fustian with which Victorian philosophy loved to clothe the theory of Evolution is destroyed. Those who would proclaim that whatever is is right will be wise henceforth to base this faith frankly on the impregnable rock of superstition and to abstain from direct appeals to natural fact.'

This passage lends itself to obvious criticism. We may pass over such question-begging expressions as 'teleological fustian' and the like, with the remark that they seem scarcely consonant with the dignity that should belong to the ex cathedra deliverance of the president of a great scientific assembly. But what are we to make of the implication that the upholders of natural selection as the guiding principle in evolution are committed to the doctrine that whatever is is right? If anyone holds this position he does so without warrant from genetic theory, whether in the sphere of physical science, of politics, or of morals. Mr. Bateson makes a notable admission in asserting that the doctrine of the survival of the fittest is undeniable so long as it is applied to the organism as a whole; this indeed is the gist of the Darwinian contention. But if he means, as his words seem to suggest, that it is necessary either to 'see fitness everywhere' or greatly to reduce the scope claimed for natural selection, he is seriously misrepresenting both Darwin himself and also the most competent and reasonable of Darwin's successors. No one with an adequate