conclusion: a conclusion which I think is also established by several of the instances given in this and in the other Treatise. Persons not wanting in ability, or in knowledge of their subject, are frequently found either to have fallen into some fallacy, or to have weakened the force of what they had to say, or laid themselves open to misapprehension, or to have committed some other mistake, from which an attentive study of the precepts that have been given might have saved them. There is HARDLY A SINGLE PRECEPT in the Elements of Logic or in the present Work, THAT IS NOT FREQUENTLY VIOLATED in the compositions of men not deficient in natural powers; as is proved, in several instances, by the examples adduced. And the precepts I allude to are such, exclusively, as it is possible to apply, practically, and—in the strict senseto follow. I mention this, because one may sometimes find precepts (so called) - laid down, on various subjects, of so vague and general a character as to be of no practical use; -such as no one indeed should depart from, but which no one can be really guided by, because he can never take any step in consequence of the enunciation of one of these barren truisms. If e. g. we were to advise a sick man "to take whatever medicines were proper for him," and to "use a wholesome diet," or if we were to bid an Orator "use forcible arguments, suited to the occasion," we should be in fact only telling them to "go the right way to work," without teaching them what is the right way. But no such empty pretence of

instruction will be found, I trust, in the present Treatise.

As for the complaint sometimes heard, of "fettering genius by systems of rules," I shall offer some remarks on that, in the course of the Work.

It may perhaps be hardly necessary to observe, that the following pages are designed principally for the instruction of unpractised writers. Of such as have long been in the habit of writing or speaking, those whose procedure has been conformable to the rules I have laid down, will of course have anticipated most of my observations; and those again who have proceeded on opposite principles, will be more likely to pass censures, as it were in self-defence, than laboriously to unlearn what they have perhaps laboriously acquired, and to set out afresh on a new system. But I am encouraged, partly by the result of experiments, to entertain a hope that the present System may prove useful to such as have their method of composition, and their style of writing and of delivery to acquire. And an Author ought to be content if a work be found in some instances not unprofitable, which cannot, from its nature, be expected to pass completely uncensured.

Whoever, indeed, in treating of any subject, recommends (whether on good or bad grounds) a departure from established practice, must expect to encounter opposition. This opposition does not, indeed, imply that his precepts are right; but neither does it prove them wrong; it only indicates that they

are new; since few will readily acknowledge the plans on which they have long been proceeding, to be mistaken. If a treatise, therefore, on the present subject were received with immediate, universal, and unqualified approbation, this circumstance, though it would not, indeed, prove it to be erroneous, (since it is conceivable that the methods commonly pursued may be altogether right,) yet would afford a presumption that there was not much to be learned from it.

On the other hand, the more deep-rooted and generally prevalent any error may be, the less favorably, at first, will its refutation (though proportionably the more important) be for the most part received.

With respect to what are commonly called Rhetorical Artifices-contrivances for "making the worse appear the better reason," it would have savored of pedantic morality to give solemn admonitions against employing them, or to enter a formal disclaimer of dishonest intention; since, after all, the generality will, according to their respective characters, make what use of a book they think fit, without waiting for the Author's permission. But what I have endeavored to do, is clearly to set forth, as far as I could, (as Bacon does in his Essay on Cunning,) these sophistical tricks of the Art; and as far as I may have succeeded in this, I shall have been providing the only effectual check to the employment of them. The adulteraters of food or of drugs, and the coiners of base money, keep their processes a secret, and dread no one so much as him who detects, describes, and proclaims

their contrivances, and thus puts men on their guard; for "every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be made manifest."

To the prevailing association of the term "Rhetoric," with the idea of these delusive contrivances, may be traced the opinion (which I believe is also common) that the power of eloquence is lost on those who themselves possess it; or at least that a critical knowledge of the art of Composition fortifies any one, in proportion to his proficiency, against being affected by the persuasive powers of another. This is undoubtedly true, as far as Sophistical skill is concerned. better acquainted one is with any kind of rhetorical trick, the less liable he is to be misled by it. The Artifices, strictly so called, of the Orator, are,

like tricks by sleight of hand,

Which, to admire, one should not understand:

The

and he who has himself been behind the scenes of a puppet-show, and pulled the strings by which the figures are moved, is not likely to be much affected by their performance. This is indeed one great recommendation of the study of Rhetoric, that it furnishes the most effectual antidote against deception of this kind. But it is by no means true that acquaintance with an Art-in the nobler sense of the word, - not as consisting in juggling tricks,-tends to diminish our sensibility to the most excellent productions of Art. The greatest proficients in music are usually the most enthusiastic admirers of good music: the best

Painters and Poets, and such as are best versed in the principles of those arts, are in general (when rivalry is out of the question) the most powerfully affected by paintings and by poetry, of superior excellence. And none I believe are more open to the impression of sound, honest, manly eloquence, than those who display it in their own compositions, and are capable of analyzing critically the mode in which its effects are produced.

I may add, that I have in one place (Part II. ch. 1. § 2.) pointed out an important part of the legitimate art of the orator, in respect of the minds of his hearers, as coinciding exactly with the practice of a wise and good man in respect of his own mind.

Several passages will be found in the following pages which presuppose some acquaintance with Logic; but the greatest part will, I trust, be intelligible to those who have not this knowledge. At the same time, it is implied by what I have said of that Science, and indeed by the very circumstance of my having written on it, that I cannot but consider him as undertaking a task of unnecessary difficulty, who endeavors, without studying Logic, to become a thoroughly good argumentative writer.

It should be observed, however, that a considerable portion of what is by many writers reckoned as a part of Logic, has been treated of by me not under that head, but in Part I. of the present work.*

* I have recently been represented (while the sixth edition of this