any language, are of this description. If a child had even ten times the ordinary degree of the faculty in question, a judicious teacher would find abundance of useful employment for it, without resorting to any that could possibly be detrimental to his future habits, moral, religious, or intellectual." -London Review, 1829, No. II. Art. V. "Juvenile Library," pp. 412, 413. [GG]. Part II. Chap. i. § 1. p. 214. "So great is the outcry which it has been the fashion among some persons for several years past to raise against expediency, that the very word has become almost an ill-omened sound. It seems to be thought by many a sufficient ground of condemnation of any legislator to say that he is guided by views of expediency. And some seem even to be ashamed of acknowledging that they are in any degree so guided. I, for one, however, am content to submit to the imputation of being a votary of expediency. And what is more, I do not see what right any one who is not so has to sit in Parliament, or to take any part in public affairs. Any one who may choose to acknowledge that the measures he opposes are expedient, or that those he recommends are inexpedient, ought manifestly to have no seat in a deliberative assembly, which is consti-. tuted for the express and sole purpose of considering what measures are conducive to the public good;-in other words, 'expedient.' I say, the public good,' because, of course, by 'expediency' we mean, not that which may benefit some individual, or some party or class of men, at the expense of the Public, but what conduces to the good of the Nation. Now this, it is evident, is the very object for which delibera variance with the and I may add, tive Assemblies are constituted. And so far is this from being regarded, by our Church at least, as something at variance with religious duty, that we have a prayer specially appointed to be offered up during the sitting of the Houses of Parliament, that their consultations may be directed and prospered for the safety, honor, and welfare of our Sovereign and her dominions.' Now, if this be not the very definition of polit ical expediency, let any one say what is. "But some persons are so much at doctrine of our Church on this point, with all sound moralists, -as to speak of expediency as something that is, or may be, at variance with duty. If any one really holds that it can ever be expedient to violate the injunctions of duty,-that he who does so is not sacrificing a greater good to a less, (which all would admit to be inexpedient,) that it can be really advantageous to do what is morally wrong,-and will come forward and acknowledge that to be his belief, I have only to protest, for my own part, with the deepest abhorrence, against what I conceive to be so profligate a principle. It shocks all the notions of morality that I have been accustomed from childhood to entertain, to speak of expediency being possibly or conceivably opposed to rectitude. "There are indeed many questions of expediency in which morality has no concern, one way or the other. In what way, for example, a husbandman should cultivate his field, or in what branch of trade a merchant should invest his capital, are questions of expediency in which there is usually no moral right or wrong on either side. But where there is moral right and wrong, it can never be expedient to choose the wrong. If the husbandman or the merchant should seek to gain increased profits by defrauding his neighbor, this would be at variance with expediency, because it would be sacrificing a greater good to a less. For what would it profit a man if he should gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?' "I believe, however, that the greater part of those who raise a clamor against expediency mean, in reality, an apparent, but false and delusive expediency;-that which is represented as expedient, but in truth is not so. But if this be their meaning, it would surely be better, with a view to cutting short empty declamation, and understanding clearly whatever matter is under discussion, that they should express, distinctly, and according to the ordinary use of language, what they do mean. It would be thought absurd for a man to declaim against 'virtue,' and then at length to explain that what he meant was not real virtue, but an hypocritical semblance of it; or to argue against the use of coin,' meaning all the time, not real genuine coin, but fraudulent counterfeits. And surely it is not at all more reasonable for any one to declaim against 'expediency,' if what he means be, not what is really expedient, but what is erroneously mistaken for it."-Charge of 1845. INDEX TO SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL WORDS. Ability, (dreaded by a certain class of persons,) part ii. ch. iii. § 2 Action, p. iv. ch. iv. § 6. Adversaries, (testimony of,) p. i. ch. ii. § 4. Advice to a Reviewer, p. i. ch. iii. § 7. Advocate, (office of,) p. i. ch. i. § 1. ? (endeavor of, to convince us that he thinks what he says,) (habits formed by the occupation,) p. ii. ch. iii. § 5 Allegory, p. i. ch. ii. § 3. Analogy, p. i. ch. ii. § 7. Antiquarians, (estimate of their authority,) p. ii. ch. iii. § 5 Approach, (argument by,) p. i. ch. ii. § 6. A priori, (argument,) p. i. ch. ii. § 2. Argument, (distinguished from proposition,) p. i. ch. i. § 3. -, (satisfactory and compulsory,) p. i. ch. iii. § 1. Aristotle, (his definition of Rhetoric,) Introd. § 4. (his distinction between real and invented examples,) p. i ch. ii. § 8. Arrangement, (of arguments,) p. i. ch. iii. §.4. -, (of words,) p. iii. ch. i. § 3. and ch. ii. § 11. Arrogance, (what,) p. i. ch. iii. § 2. Articles, (how to be interpreted when drawn up by an Assembly,) p. i. ch. iii. § 2. Assembly, (documents proceeding from, how to be interpreted,) p. i. ch. iii. § 2. 539 Bashfulness, (in public speaking,) p. iv. ch. iii. § 7, 8. Burden of proof, p. i. ch. iii. § 2. Burke, (extract from,) p. iii. ch. ii. § 8. Butler, Bp., (his style,) p. iii. ch. iii. § 2. Campbell, Dr., (extracts from,) Appendix [D] and [H]. Chances, (calculation of,) p. i. ch. ii. § 4, 5. Character, (of Speaker,) p. ii. ch. i. § 3. and ch. iii. § 1. (of persons to be addressed,) p. ii. ch. iii. § 1. Cicero, (omits to state when, and why he begins with his proofs,) p. i. ch. iii. § 5. Climax, (use of,) p. ii. ch. ii. § 4. Common Sense, p. i. ch. ii. § 6. (when apt to be laid aside,) p. iii. ch. ii. § 6. Comparison, (use of, in exciting any feeling,) p. ii. ch. ii. § 4. Composition, (fallacy of,) p. i. ch. ii. § 4. Conciseness, p. iii. ch. ii. § 7. Conclusion, (when to come first,) p. i. ch. iii. § 5. Conscious, (manner,) p. iv. ch. iv. § 2. p. 248, note. Consistency, (mistakes respecting,) p. ii. ch. iii. § 5. Conviction, (distinguished from Persuasion,) p. ii. ch. i. § 1. (Letter of Lord Dudley to,) p. i. ch. iii. § 2. (his share in reviving the study of Logic,) p. i. ch. iii. § 2. Council, (joint compositions of, how to be interpreted,) p. i. ch. iii. § 2. Crowded, (style,) p. iii. ch. ii. § 9. Debating Societies, (advantages and disadvantages of,) Introd. § 6. Deference, p. i. ch. iii. § 2. Delivery, p. iv. ch. iv. § 1. Dickenson, Bp., (“Remains" of,) p. i. ch. iii. § 7. |