for and in this case an excitement of such feelings, though not effected directly by a process of reasoning, is very far from being any thing opposed to reason, or tending to mislead the judgment. Stimulants are not to be condemned as necessarily bringing the body into an unnatural state, because they raise the circulation: in a fever this would be hurtful; but there may be a torpid, lethargic disease, in which an excitement of the circulation is precisely what is wanted to bring it into a healthy condition.

Danger of beone's own ingeing misled by nuity.

When however it is said that a good and wise man often has to act the part of an orator towards himself, in respect of that very point the excitement of the Feelingswhich in many minds is the most associated with the idea of dishonest artifice, it must not be forgotten that a man is in danger- the more, in proportion to his abilities of exercising on himself, when under the influence of some passion, a most pernicious oratorical power, by pleading the cause as it were, before himself, of that passion. Suppose it anger, e. g. that he is feeling: he is naturally disposed to dwell on and amplify the aggravating circumstances of the supposed provocation, so as to make out a good case for himself; a representation such as mayor might, if neededserve to vindicate him in the eyes of a bystander, and to give him the advantage in a controversy. This of course tends to heighten his resentment, and to satisfy him that he "doth well to be angry;" or perhaps to persuade him that he is not angry, but is a model of patience under intolerable wrongs. And the man of superior ingenuity and eloquence will do this more skilfully than an ordinary man, and will thence be likely to be the more effectually self-deceived: for though he may be superior to the other in judgment, as well as in ingenuity,

it is to be remembered that while his judgment is likely to be, in his own cause, biased, and partially blinded, his ingenuity is called forth to the utmost.

And the like takes place, if it be selfish cupidity, unjust partiality in favor of a relative or friend, party-spirit, or any other passion, that may be operating. For, universally, men are but too apt to take more pains in justifying their propensities, than it would cost, to control them. And a man of superior powers will often be in this way entrapped by his own ingenuity, like a spider entangled in the web she has herself spun. Most persons are fearful, even to excess, of being misled by the eloquence of another : * but an ingenious reasoner ought to be especially fearful of his own. There is no one whom he is likely so much, and so hurtfully, to mislead as himself, if he be not sedulously on his guard against this self-deceit.

Division of acwe principles.

$3.

The Active Principles of our nature may be classed in various ways. The arrangement adopted by Mr. Dugald Stewart † is, .erhaps, the most correct and convenient: the heads he enumerates are Appetites, (which have their origin in the body,) Desires, and Affections; these last being such as imply some kind of disposition relative to another Person; to

* I have known a man accordingly shun the acquaintance of another of whom he knew no harm, solely from his dread of him as a man who, he imagined, "could prove any thing." Men of a low tone of morality, judging from themselves, take for granted that whoever "has a giant's strength" will not scruple to "use it like a giant." + Outlines of Moral Philosophy.

which must be added, Self-love, or the desire of Happiness, as such; and the Moral-Faculty, called by some writers Conscience, by others Conscientiousness, by others the Moral sense, and by Dr. A. Smith, the sense of Propriety.

Under the head of Affections may be included the sentiments of Esteem, Regard, Admiration, &c., which it is so important that the audience should feel towards the Speaker. Aristotle has considered this as a distinct head; separating the consideration of the Speaker's Character (Hoos Tou léYouros) from that of the disposition of the hearers; under which, however, it might, according to his own views, have been included; it being plain from his manner of treating of the Speaker's Character, that he means, not his real character, (according to the fanciful notion of Quinctilian,) but the impression produced on the minds of the hearers, by the Speaker, respecting himself.

Character to be established by the speaker.

He remarks, justly, that the Character to be established is that of, first, Good Principle, secondly, Good Sense, and thirdly, Goodwill and friendly disposition towards the audience. addressed, and that if the Orator can completely succeed in this, he will persuade more powerfully than by the strongest Arguments. He might have added, (as indeed he does slightly hint at the conclusion of his Treatise,) that, where there is an Opponent, a like result is produced by exciting the contrary feelings respecting him; viz. holding him up to contempt, or representing him as an object of reprobation or suspicion.

To treat fully of all the different emotions and springs of action which an Orator may at any time find it necessary to call into play, or to contend against, would be to enter on an

* Αρετή, Φρόνησις, Εὔνοια, Book II. Ch. 1

almost boundless field of Metaphysical inquiry, which does not properly fall within the limits of the subject now before us and on the other hand, a brief definition of each passion, &c. and a few general remarks on it, could hardly fail to be trite and uninteresting. A few miscellaneous Rules therefore may suffice, relative to the conduct, generally, of those parts of any Composition which are designed to influence the Will

Men impatient of dictation in respect of their feelings.

Of the conduct of any address to the Feelings,

generally.

§ 1.

THE first and most important point to be observed in every address to any Passion, Sentiment, Feeling, &c. is, (as has been

already hinted,) that it should not be introduced as such, and plainly avowed; otherwise the effect will be, in great measure, if not entirely, lost. This circumstance forms a remarkable distinction between the head now under consideration, and that of Argumentation. When engaged in Reasoning, properly so called, our purpose not only need not be concealed, but may, (as I have said,) without prejudice to the effect, be distinctly declared on the other hand, even when the Feelings we wish to excite are such as ought to operate, so that there is no reason to be ashamed of the endeavors thus to influence the hearer, still our purpose and drift should be, if not absolutely concealed, yet .ot openly declared, and made prominent. Whether the

motives which the orator is endeavoring to call into action be suitable or unsuitable to the occasion,-such as it is right, or wrong, for the hearer to act upon, the same rule will hold good. In the latter case it is plain, that the speaker who is seeking to bias unfairly the minds of the audience, will be the more likely to succeed by going to work clandestinely, in order that his hearers may not be on their guard, and prepare and fortify their minds against the impression he wishes to produce. In the other case,-where the motives dwelt on are such as ought to be present, and strongly to operate,men are not likely to be pleased with the idea that they need to have these motives urged upon them, and that they are not already sufficiently under the influence of such sentiments as the occasion calls for. A man may indeed be convinced that he is in such a predicament; and may ultimately feel obliged to the Orator for exciting or strengthening such sentiments; but while he confesses this, he cannot but feel a degree of mortification in making the confession, and a kind of jealousy of the apparent assumption of superiority, in a speaker, who seems to say, "Now I will exhort you to feel as you ought on this occasion;" "I will endeavor to inspire you with such noble, and generous, and amiable sentiments as you ought to entertain; " which is, in effect, the tone of him who avows the purpose of Exhortation. The mind is sure to revolt from the humiliation of being thus moulded and fashioned in respect to its feelings, at the pleasure of another; and is apt, perversely, to resist the influence of such a discipline.

On the other hand, there is no such implied superiority in avowing the intention of convincing the understanding. Men know, and (what is more to the purpose) feel, that he who presents to their minds a new and cogent train of Argument, does not necessarily possess or assume any offensive supe