any observation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it, and express it in parable, or Aphorifm, or fable. But for fables, they were vicegerents and supplies where Examples failed: now that the times abound with history, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And therefore the form of writing which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of Negotiation and occafion is that which Machiavel chose wifely and aptly for Government; namely, discourse upon Hif tories or Examples: for knowledge drawn freshly, and in our view, out of particulars, knoweth the way beft to particulars again; and it hath much greater life for practice when the difcourfe attendeth upon the Example, than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance: for when the Example is the ground, being fet down in a history at large, it is fet down with all circumstances, which may fometimes control the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it as a very pattern for action; whereas the Examples alleged for the difcourfe's fake are cited fuccinctly, and without particularity, and carry a fervile aspect toward the discourse which they are brought in to make good.

But this difference is not amifs to be remembered, that as history of Times is the best ground for discourse of Government, such as Machiavel handleth, so history of Lives is the most proper for discourse of business, because it is most conver

sant in private Actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, which is discourse upon letters, such as are wise and weighty, as many are of Cicero ad Atticum, and others. For letters have a great and more particular reprefentation of business than either Chronicles or Lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this part of Civil knowledge, touching Negotiation, which we note to be deficient.

But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much from that whereof we have spoken as fapere and fibi Sapere, the one moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre. For there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of preffing a man's own fortune; and they do fometimes meet, and often fever; for many are wife in their own ways that are weak for government or Counsel; like Ants, which are wife creatures for themselves, but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge of: Nam pol fapiens, faith the Comical Poet, fingit fortunam fibi; and it grew to an adage, Faber quifque fortunæ propriæ; and Livy attributeth it to Cato the first, in hoc viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat, ut quocunque loco natus effet, fibi ipfe fortunam facturus videretur.

This conceit or pofition, if it be too much declared and profeffed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed in Timotheus the Athenian who having done many great fervices

to the Estate in his government, and giving an account thereof to the people, as the manner was, did conclude every particular with this Clause, And in this fortune had no part. And it came fo to pass that he never prospered in any thing he took in hand afterwards: for this is too high and too arrogant favouring of that which Ezekiel faith of Pharaoh, Dicis, Fluvius eft meus, et ego feci memet ipfum: or of that which another Prophet speaketh, that men offer Sacrifices to their nets and fnares; and that which the Poet expreffeth,

Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod inutile libro,
Nunc adfint!

for these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed: and therefore those that were great Politicians indeed ever afcribed their fucceffes to their felicity, and not to their skill or virtue. For fo Sylla furnamed himself Felix, not Magnus: fo Cefar faid to the Mafter of the ship, Cæfarem portas et fortunam ejus.

But yet nevertheless these Positions, Faber quifque fortunæ fuæ: Sapiens dominabitur aftris: Invia virtuti nulla eft via, and the like, being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to infolency, rather for resolution than for presumption or outward declaration, have been ever thought found and good; and are, no queftion, imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this opinion, as they can scarce contain it within: as we see in Auguftus Cæfar, (who was rather diverse

T

from his uncle, than inferior in virtue,) how when he died, he defired his friends about him to give him a Plaudite, as if he were conscious to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage. This part of knowledge we do report also as deficient: not but that it is practifed too much, but it hath not been reduced to writing. And therefore left it should seem to any that it is not comprehenfible by Axiom, it is requifite, as we did in the former, that we set down some heads or paffages of it.

Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted Argument to teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein every man perchance will be ready to yield himself a difciple, till he feeth difficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impofitions as virtue; and it is as hard and fevere a thing to be a true Politician, as to be truly moral. But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and in substance: in honour, because pragmatical men may not go away with an opinion that learning is like a Lark, that can mount, and fing, and please herself, and nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the Hawk, that can foar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey: in fubftance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, that nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewife in the globe of Crystal, or Form; that is, that there be not any thing in being and action, which should not be drawn and collected into con

templation and doctrine. Neither doth learning admire or esteem of this Architecture of fortune, otherwise than as of an inferior work: for no man's fortune can be an end worthy of his being; and many times the worthieft men do abandon their fortune willingly for better respects: but nevertheless fortune, as an organ ofv irtue and merit, deferveth the confideration.

First therefore the precept which I conceive to be moft fummary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus did require who seeing in the frame of man's heart fuch angles and receffes, found fault that there was not a window to look into them; that is, to procure good informations of particulars touching perfons, their natures, their defires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps and advantages, and whereby they chiefly ftand: fo again their weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they lie moft open and obnoxious; their friends, factions, and dependencies; and again their oppofites, enviers, competitors, their moods and times, Sola viri molles aditus et tempora noras; their principles, rules, and obfervations, and the like: and this not only of perfons, but of actions; what are on foot from time to time, and how they are conducted, favoured, oppofed, and how they import, and the like. For the knowledge of present Actions is not only material in itself, but without it also the knowledge of perfons is very erroneous: for men change with the actions; and whilft they are in pursuit