peareth also that Logic differeth from Rhetoric, not only as the fift from the palm, the one close, the other at large; but much more in this, that Logic handleth Reason exact and in truth, and Rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and Manners. And therefore Aristotle doth wifely place Rhetoric as between Logic on the one fide, and Moral or Civil Knowledge on the other, as participating of both for the Proofs and Demonftrations of Logic are toward all men indifferent and the fame; but the Proofs and perfuafions of Rhetoric ought to differ according to the Auditors:

Orpheus in Sylvis, inter Delphinas Arion:

which application, in perfection of Idea, ought to extend fo far, that if a Man should speak of the fame thing to several perfons, he should speak to them all respectively in several ways: though this Politic part of Eloquence in private Speech it is easy for the greatest Orators to want; whilft, by the obferving their well-graced forms of speech, they lofe the volubility of Application: and therefore it fhall not be amifs to recommend this to better inquiry, not being curious whether we place it here, or in that part which concerneth Policy.

Now therefore will I defcend to the deficiences, which, as I faid, are but Attendances: and first, I do not find the Wisdom and diligence of Ariftotle well pursued, who began to make a Collection of the popular figns, and colours of good and evil, both fimple and comparative, which are as the Sophisms of Rhetoric, as I touched before. For Example:

SOPHISMA.

Quod laudatur, bonum: Quod vituperatur, malum.

REDARGUTIO.

Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.

Malum eft, Malum eft, inquit Emptor: fed cum recefferit, tum gloriabitur! The defects in the labour of Ariftotle are three: one, that there be but a few of many; another, that their Elenches are not annexed; and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use of them: for their use is not only in probation, but much more in Impreffion. For many forms are equal in Signification which are differing in Impression; as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength of the percuffion be the fame for there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said, Your enemies will be glad of this:

Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ : than by hearing it faid only, This is evil for you.

Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, touching Provision or Preparatory Store, for the Furniture of speech and readiness of Invention, which appeareth to be of two forts; the one in resemblance to a fhop of pieces un-made up, the other to a shop of things ready made up; both to be applied to that which is frequent and most in request: the former of these I will call Antitheta, and the latter Formula.

Antitheta are Thefes argued pro et contra; wherein men may be more large and laborious:

but, in fuch as are able to do it, to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the feeds of the several arguments to be caft up into fome brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, but to be as Skains or Bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be used; supplying authorities and Examples by reference.

Pro verbis Legis.

Non eft interpretatio, fed divinatio, quæ recedit a literâ: Cum receditur a litera, Judex tranfit in legislatorem. Pro fententia Legis.

Ex omnibus verbis eft eliciendus fenfus qui interpretatur fingula:

Formula are but decent and apt paffages or conveyances of speech, which may serve indifferently for differing fubjects; as of Preface, Conclufion, Digreffion, Transition, Excufation, &c. For as in buildings, there is great pleasure and ufe in the well cafting of the stair-cases, entries, doors, windows, and the like; fo in fpeech, the conveyances and paffages are of special ornament and effect.

A conclufion in a Deliberative.

So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences future.

There remain two Appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, the one Critical, the other Pedantical. For all knowledge is either delivered by Teachers, or attained by men's proper endeavours and therefore as the principal part of Tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of Books, fo the Relative part thereof concerneth reading of Books; whereunto appertain incidently these

confiderations. The firft is concerning the true Correction and edition of Authors; wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great prejudice. For these Critics have often prefumed, that that which they understand not is false set down as the Prieft that, where he found it written of St. Paul, Demiffus eft per sportam, mended his book, and made it Demiffus eft per portam; because Sporta was a hard word, and out of his reading: and furely their errors, though they be not fo palpable and ridiculous, are yet of the fame kind. And therefore, as it hath been wifely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct.

The second is concerning the expofition and explication of Authors, which refteth in Annotations and Commentaries: wherein it is over usual to blanch the obfcure places, and difcourfe upon the plain.

The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great light to true Interpretations. The fourth is concerning fome brief Censure and judgment of the Authors; that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what Books to read.

And the fifth is concerning the Syntax and difpofition of ftudies; that men may know in what order or pursuit to read.

For Pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of Tradition which is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers confiderations of great fruit.

At first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with what to initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them.

Secondly, the confideration where to begin with the easiest, and fo proceed to the more difficult; and in what courses to prefs the more difficult, and then to turn them to the more easy for it is one Method to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise dancing with heavy shoes.

A third is, the application of learning according unto the propriety of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual, but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies: as for example, if a Child be Bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, the Mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is to begin anew. And as sciences have a propriety towards faculties for Cure and help, fo faculties or powers have a Sympathy towards Sciences for excellency or speedy profiting: and therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom, what kinds of wits and Natures are most apt and proper for what sciences.

Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great confequence to hurt or help: for, as is well obferved by Cicero, men in exercifing their faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise their faults and get ill habits as well as good; fo there is a great judgment to be had in the continuance and intermiffion of Exercises. It were too long to particularize a number of other confiderations of