and floth making the Disciple not to know his ftrength.

But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on, ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were poffible, in the fame Method wherein it was invented; and fo is it poffible of knowledge induced. But in this fame anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet nevertheless, Secundum majus et minus, a man may revifit and descend unto the foundations of his Knowledge and Confent; and so transplant it into another, as it grew in his own Mind. For it is in Knowledges as it is in Plants: if you mean to use the Plant, it is no matter for the Roots; but if you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more affured to rest upon roots than Slips: fo the delivery of Knowledges, as it is now used, is as of fair bodies of Trees without the Roots; good for the Carpenter, but not for the Planter. But if you will have Sciences grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body of the Tree, so you look well to the taking up of the Roots: of which kind of delivery the Method of the Mathematics, in that Subject, hath some shadow but generally I fee it neither put in ure nor put in Inquifition, and therefore note it for deficient.

Another diverfity of Method there is, which hath fome affinity with the former, used in fome cafes by the discretion of the Ancients, but difgraced fince by the Impoftures of many vain perfons, who have made it as a false light for their

counterfeit Merchandises; and that is, Enigmatical and Disclofed. The pretence whereof is, to remove the vulgar Capacities from being admitted to the fecrets of Knowledges, and to reserve them to selected Auditors, or wits of fuch fharpness as can pierce the veil.

Another diversity of Method, whereof the consequence is great, is the delivery of knowledge in Aphorifms, or in Methods; wherein we may observe, that it hath been too much taken into Cuftom, out of a few Axioms or Obfervations upon any Subject, to make a folemn and formal Art, filling it with fome Discourses, and illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into a fenfible Method: but the writing in Aphorifms hath many excellent virtues, whereto the writing in Method doth not approach.

For first, it trieth the Writer, whether he be fuperficial or folid: for Aphorifms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and heart of Sciences; for discourse of illustration is cut off: Recitals of examples are cut off; Difcourse of Connection and order is cut off; Descriptions of practice are cut off; so there remaineth nothing to fill the Aphorifms but fome good quantity of Obfervation: and therefore no man can fuffice, nor in reafon will attempt to write Aphorifms, but he that is found and grounded. But in Methods,

Tantum Series juncturaque Pollet,

Tantum de Medio fumptis accedit honoris ;

as a Man fhall make a great shew of an Art,

which, if it were disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, Methods are more fit to win Consent or belief, but lefs fit to point to Action; for they carry a kind of Demonftration in Orb or Circle, one part illuminating another, and therefore fatisfy; but particulars, being dispersed, do beft agree with dif perfed directions. And lastly, Aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire farther; whereas Methods, carrying the fhew of a Total, do fecure men, as if they were at fartheft.

Another Diversity of Method, which is likewise of great weight, is the handling of knowledge by Affertions and their Proofs, or by Questions and their Determinations; the latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of Learning, as it is to the proceeding of an Army to go about to befiege every little Fort or Hold. For if the Field be kept, and the fum of the Enterprise pursued, those smaller things will come in of themselves: indeed a Man would not leave some important piece with an Enemy at his back. In like manner, the use of Confutation in the delivery of Sciences ought to be very sparing; and to serve to remove ftrong Preoccupations and Prejudgments, and not to minister and excite Disputations and doubts.

Another Diversity of Method is, According to the Subject or Matter which is handled; for there is a great difference in Delivery of the Mathematics, which are the most abstracted of knowledges,

and Policy, which is the most immersed: and howfoever contention hath been moved, touching a Uniformity of Method in Multiformity of matter, yet we see how that opinion, besides the weakness of it, hath been of ill defert towards Learning, as that which taketh the way to reduce Learning to certain empty and barren Generalities; being but the very Hufks and Shells of Sciences, all the kernel being forced out and expulsed with the torture and prefs of the Method: and therefore as I did allow well of Particular Topics for Invention, fo I do allow likewise of particular Methods of Tradition.

Another Diversity of Judgment in the delivery and teaching of knowledge is, According unto the light and prefuppofitions of that which is delivered; for that knowledge which is new, and foreign from opinions received, is to be delivered in another form than that that is agreeable and familiar; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he faith, If we shall indeed difpute, and not follow after Similitudes, &c. For those whofe conceits are feated in popular opinions, need only but to prove or difpute; but those whose Conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonftrate: fo that it is of neceffity with them to have recourse to fimilitudes and tranflations to express themselves. And therefore in the Infancy of Learning, and in rude times, when

P

thofe Conceits which are now trivial were then new, the World was full of Parables and Similitudes; for else would men either have passed over without Mark, or elfe rejected for Paradoxes that which was offered before they had understood or judged. So in Divine Learning, we see how frequent Parables and Tropes are: for it is a Rule, That whatsoever Science is not confonant to presuppofitions, must pray in aid of Similitudes.

There be alfo other Diverfities of Methods, vulgar and received: as that of Resolution, or Analyfis, of Conftitution or Syftafis, of Concealment or Cryptic, &c. which I do allow well of, though I have ftood upon those which are leaft handled and obferved. All which I have remembered to this purpose, because I would erect and constitute one general Inquiry, which feems to me deficient, touching the Wisdom of Tradition.

But unto this part of Knowledge concerning Methods doth farther belong not only the Architecture of the whole frame of a Work, but also the feveral beams and Columns thereof; not as to their stuff, but as to their quantity and figure: and therefore Method confidereth not only the difpofition of the Argument or Subject, but likewise the Proposttions: not as to their Truth or Matter, but as to their Limitation and Manner. For herein Ramus merited better a great deal in reviving the good Rules of Propofitions, Καθόλου πρῶτον κατὰ παντός, &c. than he did in introducing the Canker of Epitomes; and yet (as it is the Condition of Human