Plato maketh of the Cave: for certain.y if a child were continued in a Grot or Cave under the Earth until maturity of age, and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd Imaginations. So in like manner, although our persons live in the view of Heaven, yet our spirits are included in the Caves of our own complexions and Cuftoms, which minifter unto us infinite Errors and vain opinions, if they be not recalled to examination. But hereof we have given many examples in one of the Errors, or peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our firft Book.

And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the Vulgar fort: and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well Loquendum ut Vulgus, fentiendum ut fapientes; yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar's Bow, do fhoot back upon the understanding of the wifeft, and mightily entangle and pervert the Judgment; so as it is almost neceffary, in all controverfies and difputations, to imitate the wisdom of the Mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are fure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, in questions and differences about words. To conclude therefore, it must be confeffed that it is not

poffible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances, because they are inseparable from our Nature and Condition of life; so yet nevertheless the Caution of them, (for all Elenches, as was said, are but Cautions,) doth extremely import the true conduct of Human Judgment. The particular Elenches or Cautions against these three falfe appearances, I find altogether deficient.

There remaineth one part of Judgment of great excellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also deficient ; which is the application of the differing kinds of Proofs to the differing kinds of Subjects; for there being but four kinds of demonstrations, that is, by the immediate Confent of the Mind or Senfe, by Induction, by Syllogifm, and by Congruity (which is that which Ariftotle calleth Demonftration in Orb or Circle, and not a Notioribus ;) every of these hath certain Subjects in the Matter of Sciences, in which respectively they have chiefefst use; and certain others, from which respectively they ought to be excluded; and the rigour and curiofity in requiring the more severe Proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the more remifs proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hinderance to Knowledge. The distributions and affignations of demonftrations, according to the Analogy of Sciences, I note as deficient.

The Cuftody or retaining of Knowledge is either in Writing or Memory; whereof Writing hath two

parts, the Nature of the Character, and the order of the Entry; for the Art of Characters, or other vifible notes of Words or things, it hath nearest conjugation with Grammar; and therefore I refer it to the due place: for the Disposition and Collocation of that Knowledge which we preserve in Writing, it confifteth in a good Digeft of Commonplaces; wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the use of Common-place Books, as causing a retardation of Reading, and fome floth or relaxation of Memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in Knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep and full, I hold the Entry of Common-places, to be a matter of great use and effence in studying, as that which af fureth "copia copia" of Invention, and contracteth Judgment to a strength. But this is true, that of the Methods of Common-places that I have seen, there is none of any fufficient worth; all of them carrying merely the face of a School, and not of a World; and referring to vulgar matters and Pedantical Divifions, without all life, or refpect to Action.

For the other Principal Part of the Cuftody of Knowledge, which is Memory, I find that faculty in my Judgment weakly inquired of. An Art there is extant of it; but it seemeth to me that there are better Precepts than that Art, and better practices of that Art than those received. It is certain the Art, as it is, may be raised to points of oftentation prodigious but in ufe, as it is now managed, it is

barren, (not burdenfome, nor dangerous to Natural Memory, as is imagined, but barren,) that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of bufinefs and occafions. And therefore I make no more estimation of repeating a great number of Names or Words upon once hearing, or the pouring forth of a number of Verses or Rhimes ex tempore, or the making of a Satirical Simile of every thing, or the turning of every thing to a jest, or the falfifying or contradicting of every thing by Cavil, or the like, (whereof in the faculties of the Mind there is great Copia, and such as by device and practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder,) than I do of the tricks of Tumblers, Funambuloes, Baladines; the one being the fame in the Mind that the other is in the body, Matters of Strangeness without worthiness.

This Art of Memory is but built upon two Intentions; the one Prenotion, the other Emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the Indefinite seeking of that we would remember, and directeth us to feek in a narrow Compafs, that is, fomewhat that hath Congruity with our Place of Memory. Emblem reduceth conceits intellectual to Images fenfible, which strike the Memory more; out of which Axioms, may be drawn much better Practice than that in use; and besides which Axioms, there are divers more touching help of Memory, not inferior to them. But I did in the beginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but only ill Managed.

There remaineth the fourth kind of Rational Knowledge, which is tranfitive, concerning the expreffing or transferring our Knowledge to others; which I will term by the general name of Tradition or Delivery. Tradition hath three parts; the first concerning the Organ of Tradition: the fecond concerning the Method of Tradition; and the third concerning the Illuftration of Tradition.

For the Organ of Tradition, it is either Speech or Writing: for Ariftotle faith well, Words are the Images of Cogitations, and Letters are the Images of Words; but yet it is not of neceffity that Cogitations be expreffed by the Medium of Words. For whatfoever is capable of fufficient differences, and thofe perceptible by the fenfe, is in Nature competent to exprefs Cogitations. And therefore we fee in the Commerce of barbarous People, that understand not one another's language, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that men's minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to serve the turn. And we understand further, that it is the use of China, and the Kingdoms of the High Levant, to write in Characters real, which express neither Letters nor words in grofs, but Things or Notions; infomuch as Countries and Provinces, which understand not one another's language, can nevertheless read one another's Writings, because the Characters are accepted more generally than the Languages do extend; and therefore they have a vaft multitude of Characters, as many, I suppose, as Radical words.