Judgment, notwithstanding all their Cavillations, are very fufficient to certify and report truth, though not always immediately, yet by comparifon, by help of instrument, and by producing and urging fuch things as are too fubtile for the fense to fome effect comprehenfible by the sense, and other like affiftance. But they ought to have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the fenfes. This I fpeak, not to disable the mind of man, but to ftir it up to seek help: for no man, be he never fo cunning or practised, can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be eafily done by help of a Ruler or Compass.

This part of Invention, concerning the Invention of Sciences, I purpose, if God give me leave, hereafter to propound, having digested it into two parts; whereof the one I term Experientia Literata, and the other Interpretatio Natura: the former being but a degree and rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a promise.

The Invention of speech or argument is not properly an Invention: for to Invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or refummon that which we already know: and the use of this Invention is no other but, out of the Knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpofe which we take into our confideration. So as

to speak truly, it is no Invention, but a Remembrance or Suggestion, with an Application; which is the cause why the Schools do place it after Judgment, as fubfequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do account it a Chase, as well of Deer in an inclosed Park as in a Forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name, let it be called Invention: fo as it be perceived and discerned, that the Scope and end of this Invention is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.

To procure this ready use of Knowledge there are two Courses, Preparation and Suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a part of Knowledge, confifting rather of Diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein Ariftotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the Sophifts near his time, faying, They did as if one that profeffed the Art of Shoe-making fhould not teach how to make a Shoe, but only exhibit, in a readiness a number of Shoes of all fashions and Sizes. But yet a man might reply, that if a Shoemaker should have no Shoes in his Shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, speaking of Divine Knowledge, faith, that the Kingdom of Heaven is like a good Householder, that bringeth forth both new and old store; and we fee the ancient Writers of Rhetoric do give it in precept, that Pleaders should have the Places, whereof they have moft continual ufe, ready handled in all the variety that may be; as that, to speak for the

literal Interpretation of the Law against Equity, and Contrary; and to speak for Presumptions and Inferences against Testimony, and Contrary. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have occafion to speak of, if he will take the pains, he may have it in effect premeditate, and handled, in thefi; so that when he cometh to a particular he shall have nothing to do, but to add Names, and times, and places, and fuch other Circumstances of Individuals. We fee likewise the exact diligence of Demofthenes; who, in regard of the great force that the entrance and accefs into causes hath to make a good impreffion, had ready framed a number of Prefaces for Orations and Speeches. All which Authorities and Precedents may overweigh Ariftotle's opinion, that would have us change a rich Wardrobe for a pair of Shears.

But the Nature of the Collection of this Provifion or Preparatory Store, though it be common both to Logic and Rhetoric, yet having made an entry of it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the further handling of it to Rhetoric.

The other part of Invention, which I term Suggeftion, doth affign and direct us to certain Marks, or Places, which may excite our Mind to return and produce fuch Knowledge as it hath formerly collected, to the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this ufe, truly taken, only to furnish argument to dispute probably with others, but like

wife to Minister unto our Judgment to conclude aright within ourselves. Neither may thefe places serve only to prompt our Invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wife interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato faith, Whosoever feeketh, knoweth that which he feeketh for in a general Notion: elfe how shall he know it when he hath found it? and therefore the larger your Anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your fearch. But the fame Places which will help us what to produce of that which we know already, will alfo help us, if a man of experience were before us, what questions to ask; or, if we have Books and Authors to inftruct us, what points to search and revolve; fo as I cannot report that this part of Invention, which is that which the Schools call Topics, is deficient.

Nevertheless, Topics are of two forts, general and Special. The general we have spoken to ; but the particular hath been touched by fome, but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But leaving the humour which hath reigned too much in the Schools, which is, to be vainly subtle in a few things which are within their command, and to reject the reft; I do receive particular Topics, (that is, places or directions of Invention and Inquiry in every particular knowledge,) as things of great use, being Mixtures of Logic withthe Matter of Sciences; for in these it holdeth, Ars inveniendi adolefcit cum Inventis; for as in going of a way, we do not only gain that part of the way which is

passed, but we gain the better fight of that part of the way which remaineth: fo every degree of proceeding in a Science giveth a light to that which followeth; which light if we strengthen by drawing it forth into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our pursuit.

Now we pass unto the Arts of Judgment, which handle the Natures of Proofs and Demonftrations; which as to Induction hath a Coincidence with Invention; for in all Inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the fame action of the Mind which Inventeth, Judgeth; all one as in the fenfe; but otherwise it is in proof by Syllogifm; for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, the Invention of the Mean is one thing, and the Judgment of the Confequence is another; the one Exciting only, the other Examining. Therefore, for the real and exact form of Judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have spoken of Interpretation of Nature.

For the other Judgment by Syllogifm, as it is a thing moft agreeable to the Mind of Man, so it hath been vehemently and excellently laboured; for the Nature of Man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his Understanding fixed and immoveable, and as a Reft and Support of the Mind. And therefore as Ariftotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all Motion there is fome point quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient Fable of Atlas, that stood fixed, and bare up the Heaven, from falling, to be meant of the Poles or Axle-tree of Heaven, whereupon the Conversion is accomplished so assuredly men have a defire to have an