were first found out, and then after the Reasons and caufes were difcourfed; and not the Causes firft found out, and by light from them the Medicines and Cures difcovered. And Plato, in his Theatetus, noteth well, That particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no fufficient direction; and that the pith of all Sciences, which maketh the Artsman differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propofitions, which in every particular knowledge are taken from Tradition and Experience." And therefore we fee, that they which difcourfe of the Inventions and Originals of things, refer them rather to Chance than to Art, and rather to Beafts, Birds, Fishes, Serpents, than to Men.

Dictamnum genetrix Cretaa carpit ab Ida,
Puberibus caulem foliis et flore comantem
Purpureo: non illa feris incognita Capris
Gramina, cum tergo volucres hæfere fagitta.

So that it was no marvel, the manner of Antiquity being to confecrate Inventors, that the Egyptians had fo few human Idols in their Temples, but almoft all Brute.

Omnigenumque Deum monftra, et latrator Anubis,

Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &c. And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and afcribe the first Inventions to Men; yet you will rather believe that Prometheus first struck the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when he firft ftruck the flints he expected the fpark: and therefore we fee the Weft Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the European, because of

the rareness with them of flint, that gave the first occafion. So as it fhould feem, that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild Goat for Surgery, or to a Nightingale for Mufic, or to the Ibis for fome part of Phyfic, or to the Pot lid that flew open for Artillery, or generally to Chance, or any thing else, than to Logic, for the Invention of Arts and Sciences. Neither is the form of Invention which Virgil defcribeth much other :

Ut varias ufus meditando extunderet artes

Paulatim:

For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that which brute Beafts are capable of, and do put in ufe; which is a perpetual intending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an abfolute neceffity of confervation of being: for fo Cicero faith very truly, Ufus uni rei deditus et Naturam et Artem fæpe vincit. And therefore if it be faid of Men,

Labor omnia vincit

Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egeftas!

it is likewise faid of beasts, Quis Pfittaco docuit fuum Xaige?" Who taught the Raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree, where she espied water, that the water might rise so as she might come to it? Who taught the Bee to fail through such a vast Sea of air, and to find the way from a field in flower, a great way off, to her Hive? Who taught the Ant to bite every grain of Corn that she burieth in her hill, left it should take root and

grow? Add then the word Extundere, which importeth the extreme difficulty, and the word Paulatim, which importeth the extreme flowness, and we are where we were, even amongst the Ægyptians' Gods; there being little left to the faculty of Reason, and nothing to the duty of Art, for matter of Invention.

Secondly, the Induction which the Logicians speak of, and which feemeth familiar with Plato, (whereby the Principles of Sciences may be pretended to be invented, and fo the middle propofitions by derivation from the Principles ;) their form of Induction, I fay, is utterly vicious and incompetent: wherein their error is the fouler, because it is the duty of Art to perfect and exalt Nature; but they contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced Nature. For he that shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of Knowledge, like unto that which the Poet speaketh of, Aërei mellis cœleftia dona, diftilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the field and Garden, shall find that the mind of herself by Nature doth manage and Act an Induction much better than they describe it. For to conclude upon an Enumeration of particulars, without inftance contradictory, is no conclufion, but a conjecture; for who can affure, in many subjects, upon those particulars which appear of a fide, that there are not other on the contrary fide which appear not? As if Samuel fhould have refted upon thofe Sons of

fee which were brought before him, and failed of David, which was in the field. And this form, to say truth, is so gross, as it had not been poffible for wits fo fubtile as have managed these things to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their Theories and Dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful toward particulars; which their manner was to use but as Lictores and Viatores, for Sarjeants and Whifflers, Ad fummovendam turbam, to make way and make room for their opinions, rather than in their true use and fervice. Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of feducement are the very fame in Divine and Human truth: for as in Divine truth Man cannot endure to become as a Child; fo in Human, they reputed the attending the Inductions whereof we speak, as if it were a fecond Infancy or Childhood.

Thirdly, allow fome Principles or Axioms were rightly induced, yet nevertheless certain it is that Middle Propofitions cannot be deduced from them in Subject of Nature by Syllogifm, that is, by Touch and Reduction of them to Principles in a Middle Term. It is true that in Sciences popular, as Moralities, Laws, and the like, yea, and Divinity (because it pleaseth GOD to apply himself to the capacity of the fimpleft), that form may have use; and in Natural Philofophy likewife, by way of argument or fatisfactory Reason, Quæ affenfum parit, operis effoeta eft: but the fubtlety of Nature and

Operations will not be enchained in those bonds: for Arguments confift of Propositions and Propofitions of Words; and Words are but the Current Tokens or Marks of popular Notions of things; which Notions, if they be groffly and variably collected out of particulars, it is not the laborious examination either of Consequences of Arguments, or of the truth of Propofitions, that can ever correct that Error, being, as the Phyficians fpeak, in the first digeftion and therefore it was not without cause, that fo many excellent Philofophers became Sceptics and Academics, and denied any certainty of Knowledge or Comprehenfion; and held opinion, that the knowledge of man extended only to Appearances and Probabilities. It is true that in Socrates it was fuppofed to be but a form of Irony, Scientiam diffimulando fimulavit: for he used to disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his Knowledge; like the Humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would Reign, but would not acknowledge so much and in the later Academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of Acatalepfia, I doubt, was not held fincerely for that all those which excelled in Copia of speech feem to have chosen that Sect, as that which was fittest to give glory to their eloquence and variable difcourses; being rather like Progreffes of pleasure, than Journeys to an end. But affuredly many scattered in both Academies did hold it in fubtilty and integrity: but here was their chief Error; they charged the deceit upon the Senses; which in my