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and no King-a doctrine which either means this, or it means nothing-that there shall be no distinction of ranks in society, is brought forward, under circumstances so peculiar as those which attended the statement of this doctrine by the Defendant, it becomes the duty of those who are entrusted with watching over the laws of this country, under the control of Juries, who are finally to decide between them and individuals who may be charged with a breach of them, at least to do their duty in stating this to the public, that no one shall dare to hold language like this, without being prepared to tell a Jury of this country upon what grounds he conceives himself justifiable in holding it under the circumstances of the present case.

Gentlemen, advert a little to the time-this was in November 1792. There does not exist upon the face of the earth, I hope, a man more zealously attached to this doctrine than I am. I mean, that every man in this country, and in every country, has an equal right to equal laws, to an equal protection of personal security, to an equal protection of personal liberty; to an equal protection of that, without which, it requires no reasoning to prove, that neither personal security, nor personal liberty, ever can exist,-I mean to an equal protection of property-that property which the labour of his life, under the blessing of Providence, may have gained to him, or which the superior kindness of Providence may have given him, without bestowing the labour

of life in order to acquire it; all this sort of equality is that which the Constitution of Great Britain has secured to every man who lives under it, but is not the equality which was connected with the doctrine No King, upon the 6th of November 1792.

Gentlemen, that country, from which it appears, from this conversation, Mr. Frost came, and to which it appears, from this conversation, that he expected to go, in the year 1789, had framed what was called a constitution, and almost every thing that was valuable in it was borrowed from the constitution of this country in which we live, which had provided for the equal rights of man to equal laws; it had laid down in doctrine, however ill or well it supported the principle, the equal right of every man to the protection of his personal liberty, of his personal security, and of his property. But in 1792, that first year of Equality, as it was called, a different system of equality, connected materially with this system of No King, had been established: a system, which, if it meant any thing, meant this it meant equality of property, for all other equality had been before provided for.

Gentlemen of the Jury, it is every man's birthright to have a certain species of equality secured to him, but it neither requires reasoning, nor is it consistent with common sense, and cannot be consistent with reason and common sense, because it is not consistent with the nature of things, as established

by the Author of nature, that any other system of equality should exist upon the face of the world.

Gentlemen, this equality, recommended by this gentleman, advisedly, as I think you will be satisfied in this transaction of the 6th of November 1792, is a system which has destroyed all ranks-is a system which has destroyed all property-is a system of universal proscription-is a system which is as contrary to the order of moral nature, as it is contrary to the order of political nature-it is a system which cuts up by the roots all the enjoyments that result from the domestic relations of life, or the political. relations of life-it is a system which cuts up by the roots every incentive to virtuous and active industry, and holds out to the man, who chooses to live a life of profligacy and idleness, that he may take from him, who has exerted through life a laborious and virtuous conduct, those fruits which the God of justice, and every law of justice, have endeavoured to secure to him. This is the only sort of equality that can be connected with this doctrine of No King, upon the 6th of November 1792.

Gentlemen, I am ready to agree, that where the charge is, that words have been spoken, it is fit for those who prosecute for the public to remember, that in that situation, they are in a certain degree advocates for the Defendant; for no man can do his duty who wishes to press a Defendant, charged upon the part of the public, with acting more improperly than he shall appear, upon the candid examination of

the circumstances, to have acted; it is fit for me also to observe, that the degree of criminality of these words will depend very much upon the temper, the circumstances, the quo animo, with which this gentleman thought proper to utter them.

Gentlemen, I will not depart from this principle which I have before stated, that if men will dare to utter words, expressions of more serious import than those which produced the mischief to which I have been alluding in other places, it will be the duty of persons in official situations to watch for you and the public over that, which they conceive to be a blessing to you and the public; at least to inform those gentlemen that they must account for their conduct; it will be for them, if they can, to account for it satisfactorily.

Gentlemen, you will hear from the witnesses with what temper, with what demeanour, and in what manner, these words were uttered; and I allude again to that which will be described to you, I mean the feelings of the persons present, as some degree of evidence, which will have its due, and not more than its due weight, in your minds.

Gentlemen, I will read to you the words of Mr. Justice Forster, as containing the principle upon which, though the law holds seditious expressions as an exceeding high misdemeanour, it has not thought proper to consider them as a crime of the magnitude of High Treason. He says, "As to mere words, sup"posed to be treasonable, they differ widely from writ

ings in point of real malignity and proper evidence. "They are often the effect of mere heat of blood, "which in some natures, otherwise well disposed, "carrieth a man beyond the bounds of decency or σε prudence; they are always liable to great miscon"struction from the ignorance and inattention of "the hearers, and too often from a motive truly "criminal." Loose words, therefore, not relative to any act or design, are not overt acts of treason, but words of advice or persuasion, and all consultations for the traitorous purposes treated of in this chapter, are certainly so; they are uttered in contemplation of some traitorous purpose, actually on foot or intended, and in prosecution of it.

Gentlemen of the Jury, it is competent to Mr. Frost, and he will give me leave to say, I think it is incumbent upon him, having made use of words of this sort, to state to you, that in the sentiment which that language conveys, he does not express those sentiments by which his general conduct in life is regulated. For aught I know, he is otherwise well disposed; and I am sure, if evidence of that sort is given to you, you will feel the propriety of giving to it, not only a candid, but you have my leave to give it the very utmost consideration that can possibly be given to it. Gentlemen, you observe too, that words are not made treason, because words may be spoken to by witnesses from a motive truly criminal. You will be to judge, whether the evidence of the witnesses to be called to you to-day

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